From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States

I don't know if school history still teaches that Eli Whitney invented mass production using interchangeable parts, the way it happened in the '60s, but the real story is far more complicated and interesting. Seldom have I read a revisionist history so completely convincing as David Hounshell's "From the American System to Mass Production." True, it was published 25 years ago, so I am just catching up. Part of the reason Hounshell is so persuasive is that not only did he make use of corporate documents, but he also was able to take apart a couple of century-old Singer sewing machines at the Smithsonian Institution to see if their parts interchanged. They did not. If all he had done had been to debunk Whitney, it would not be worth spending 400 pages -- lavishly illustrated pages though they are -- with the book. "From the American System" has a trajectory reminiscent of a Greek play -- not necessarily a tragedy -- with a surprising outcome: After a century of strenuous effort to invent mass production, the system failed within 13 years. The argument is nuanced. As Henry Ford and his engineers, who put the cap on mass production by inventing the assembly line in 1913, said at the time, mass production was not merely quantity production. Singer had achieved quantity production in the 1880s without even adopting the American system, although after reaching about 500,000 units per year it did have to adopt it. The story begins in England, where Marc Brunel broke down the craft of making reeving blocks for the Royal Navy into 22 operations, each performed by a specialized machine. Significantly, it was a military demand. The U.S. War Department was instrumental in pushing for mass production by means of interchangeable parts, although for the first 50 years it did not get it. Even managing to make truly interchangeable parts, which John Hall did at Harpers Ferry in the 1840s, did not mean large production or lower costs. It was the interchangeability itself that was the goal of the army. Later, Ford used interchangeability, along with single-purpose tools, carefully orchestrated work routines and -- the capstone -- the moving assembly line, to drive costs lower and lower. Hounshell traces the development through the national and private armories in New England, which influenced sewing machine manufacturers in the `50s. A patent cartel allowed the sewing machine companies to make enormous profits, which perhaps (Hounshell does not make this point) militated against a drive for the lowest cost production. Singer, and others, continually drove down costs, but only by a process of semi-rationalization, with some machine work but still using "fitters" to make the final assembly. One other manufacturer, Brown & Sharpe, adopted something closer to the American system and competed on costs (apparently) but not on marketing. Throughout, Hounshell emphasizes that business success went not to the firm that was most efficient but to the one that had the

This is well written and researched book. It gives anyone interested in American industry a deep perspective of our emergence as a world manufacturing power. Not only does it provide deep insights, it is written in a style that makes it hard to put down.

The early days of the American republic were categorized not by the "American system of mass production" but by determined entrepreneurs who made skilled use of workers. Hounshell tracks several industries including woodworking, International Harvester, Singer Sewing machines and gun manufacturing showing how scale and interchangeable parts came into existence. The first half of his book tries to dispel the myth of the American System of manufacturing and provides great technical insight into each of the industries mentioned above. The second half looks at how the principles of mass production were applied. Particular attention is paid to Pope bicycles which were among the first items mass produced. You can clearly see how technology built upon one another to form the mass production we know today. The last three chapters of the book focus mostly on Ford and their production models from the Model T to the Model A. Some attention is given to GM and their efforts to undermine the cheap characteristics of Ford and create the car industry as we know it today. It considers the idea of mass production and debates what Ford really did create. The book does an excellent job of looking at how industries progressed over a long period of time and while getting lost in the details it does come through. There is some thick description were the technological explanation is more than someone would want to know but mostly it is good solid information. This is a great book for those who are just beginning to study the history of technology or for the experts.

I saw a reference to this book in Womack et al's The Machine that Changed the World, a book about Toyota's lean production system and automobile manufacturing in general. That book starts with the shift from craft production to Just-In-Time production and necessarily passes through Ford's production system. Hounshell ends his book with Ford in the Depression and the struggle against GM. Hounshell begins with armory manufacture. As another reviewer has pointed out, the idea of making guns with interchangeable parts started in the French Army and introduced in the US by both Thomas Jefferson and a French officer who was instrumental in the founding of West Point. Eli Whitney took a stab at it, but he was more adept at self-promotion than achieving interchangeability. It took almost another generation or more before the system was perfected at the Springfield and Harper's Ferry armories; had it not been part of the West Point curriculum, it is not clear whether the idea would have borne fruit even that quickly. Hounshell goes on to follow the development of manufacturing technology from guns to sewing machines, reapers, clocks, wooden furniture, bicycles, and finally the automobile. I was surprised at some of the twists and turns: Singer actually achieved dominance through a superior marketing and retail network and only adopted the "armory system" of gages later. The McCormicks were more adept at selling and servicing than at manufacture, but did introduce annual model changes; early on, they were afraid of making too many because they thought they would flood the market and put themselves out of business. The bicycle industry in the 1890s was necessary for the development of the automobile because it introduced the idea of personal mechanical transportation to the masses and refined the process of metal stamping, which has become crucial. Throughout the pre-automotive period, most of the industries that finally adopted "the American System" did so after hiring someone who had previous experience in a New England gun manufacturer. Thus, the history of mass production owes much to the French (who abandoned the idea early on), to government investment (through the Army), and to the Yankee mechanic. Woven throughout, it is easy to see the simultaneous development of modern quality control methods, but this is not explicitly discussed. Hounshell augments the narrative with photographs of early machine parts and of the revolutionary gage system. Setting and maintaining standards was the only way to achieve interchangeability, which led to faster and cheaper assembly by eliminating the need for skilled "fitters" who essentially built each machine (gun, reaper, sewing machine, etc.) by custom fitting with files. By making parts to specification, unskilled labor could assemble the system. That idea informs the Toyota JIT system, as does Ford's invention of the assembly line and development of the Rouge Plant (upon which Hounshell sheds lig

Hounshell is a serious academic historian, which means that he doesn't put words in the mouths of dead people, and he draws prudent inferences from period documents, drawings and photographs. It makes him credible, if a bit plodding at times and overly concerned with always crediting the right inventors. What you learn in this book is surprising and contradicts many popular beliefs. For example:1. Eli Whitney had nothing to do with it.2. Thomas Jefferson picked up the idea in France when he was ambassador. It was abandoned overthere while he, as president, started a pattern of government funding for research that took 50 years to bear fruit. 3. Early adopters don't always win. In his account of the sewing machine industry, he shows how the early adopters of interchangeable parts technology lost out to Singer, which only adopted it 30 years later. If you are interested in the subject and you like your beliefs to be convincingly challenged, check out this book. Even if you are not a history buff but a citizen concerned about the role of the federal government in technology development, this book will give you a valuable perspective.