Freedom Evolves

Daniel Dennett has written (as he calls it) an apologia for determinism in "Freedom Evolves" in which he endeavors to reinstate free will in human affairs. In fact he states that the common belief that free will is banished by determinism is dead wrong! And I think he has succeeded in at least convincing himself that his definition of determinism allows for this seeming slight of hand. I have to note I am in no way a philosopher of science, so I will give here only my opinion of this as a biologist who has specialized in arthropods, and as a rank layman in theoretical evolutionary thought. I will also note that I tend to agree most with the views of Ernst Mayr on the subject. Mayr quotes Sewall Wright in "Toward a New Philosophy of Biology", p. 288, as saying "The Darwinian process of continued interplay of a random and a selective process is not intermediate between pure chance and pure determinism, but in its consequences utterly different from either." Thus, like the argument between nature and nurture, the issue of determinism vs. indeterminism is at least in part spurious. Given, however, that there is some reason to discuss this issue at all (it is certainly fascinating) it seems very reasonable that a man as eminently qualified as Daniel Dennett should write this book. Indeed, Dennett wrote an excellent exposition of the determinist view of evolution in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea." I have a few bones to pick, however. On p. 25, Dennett uses Van Inwagen's definition for determinism as the thesis that "there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future." He goes on to state that determinism thus defined does not imply inevitability. However, most dictionaries state in their definitions that determinism precludes free will. Is Dennett here redefining the meaning of the word to allow himself the luxury of free will? To some extent he is- at least the commonly understood meaning. However, he does so at his peril because words can and do get people into trouble and his detractors have the same privilege! The second bone is the statement by Dennett that he felt the need to write this book because he and his associates (among whom he lists Crick, Watson, Wilson, Dawkins, and Pinker) are often misunderstood and misquoted by colleagues who disagree with "genetic determinism." He may have a point about his colleagues (although they have said the same thing about him). He also notes that there have been "some unfortunate overstatements and over simplifications," which have made him and his associates targets (undoubtedly in part because of sensational headlines often associated with them.) Unfortunately, the press, most politicians, and much of the general public will never understand the nuances of the argument and some don't want to do so for their own reasons! Beside, some of the people he names as associates, or "responsible, cautious naturalists," as he calls them (suc

All I can say is "Wow." I admit to struggling with this excellent book for much of the first half, then, after digesting as much as I could, the last half was a bit easier. Dennett does his usual outstanding job of defining and carefully leading us through the many different arguments around his controversial topic of Free Will. Having read both Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Ideas, I was really looking forward to this book as well. Little did I know that it would so challenge my focus and ingrained ideas about determinism and free will.Dennett shows that determinism does not imply inevitability. As if that isn't enough to struggle with, he then goes on to show that indeterminism doesn't give us free will as most people argue it does. And then, to add insult to injury, Dennett shows clearly how there are real options in a deterministic world. Free will becomes "real, but it is not a preexisting feature of our existence, like the law of gravity. It is also not what tradition declares it to be: a God-like power to exempt oneself from the causal fabric of the physical world. It is an evolved creation of human activity and beliefs, and it is just as real as such other human creations as music and money. And even more valuable."Since I speak and lecture on Ethics as a Process, I was most interested in Dennett's view on ethics. He gave me much to think about as he states that: "I have not sought to replace the voluminous work in ethics with some Darwinian alternative, but rather to place that work on the foundation it deserves: a realistic, naturalistic, potentially unified vision of our place in nature." No doubt I will have to return to this book again soon. And there is also no doubt that I will enjoy it even more the next time around and learn perhaps as much as my first time through. This is definitely a five out of five on my review scale!

Although this book doesn't introduce anything radically new for those who follow Dennett, it does clarify his previous ideas on consciousness, free will, and human nature, and thisis far from a trivial matter. For anyone seriously interested in the question of how human free will can possibly be compatible with physical laws of cause and effect, and thought that nothing else could be reasonably said on the matter, this book is an essential. It will indeed help you clarify your thoughts, which is afterall one of the best things a work of philosophy can do for you, and one all too rarely accomplished by most philosophers.For those who wonder about the conditions that foster human freedom and those that suppress it, this book doesn't quite delve into political or social philosophy per se, but it is at least a start at a real answer by providing clear thoughts and useful science and meta-science.One very good reason for this book is that while Dan Dennett is a clear and vivid writer, particularly for a philosopher, he is also frequently rather badly misunderstood for some reason. He has been described by reviewers as denying that human beings have free will or conscious awareness, and he has been accused of being an "ultraDarwinist," although he himself disputes these claims. In Freedom Evolves, he ties his previous ideas together and presents them in a way that will resist these misinterpretations of his ideas. First, Dennett defends the compatibilist tradition (where free will and determinism are considered compatible in principle). He believes that the universe is probably deterministic in its physical nature, but that this doesn't mean our lives are pre-determined, nor does it prevent us from having forms of freedom worth working and fighting for. This is done by distinguishing determinism clearly from inevitability with the help of his perspective tool of different 'stances.' The 'stances' help see causation in different terms: mechanical causes from a physical stance vs. functional causes from a design stance vs. the action of intentional agents from an intentional stance. We perceive inevitability in causal models from the design stance. Then we get confused between free will and determinism because we apply inevitability back to the physical, where it simply doesn't happen.Then he builds a non-Cartesian account of choice and agency. Rather than distinguishing mind from mechanicals, he describes different kinds of agency arising as the result of different raw materials available at different times and places. He uses the "toy model" of Conrad's Game of Life as an intuition pump to show how the appearance of agency arises from Darwinian algorithms through patterns like anticipating and avoiding harm. The fact that the game is implemented on a device that follows instructions to the letter makes it a tough sell I think, and not entirely convincing (something he is acutely aware of, but can't seem to do anything about).The human kind

I am honored to be the first to review this book. I have read most of Dennett's previous books (Elbow Room, CE, and DDI) and many of his essays but I have always felt a little anxious about his conclusions; like he is the crow in the Dumbo cartoon (read the book). Why is this man smiling?Freedom Evolves ties together all of his previous books. He convincingly shows how a naturalistic account of ourselves gives us REAL free will. He also clarifies many previous arguments. Dennett defines freedom as the "capacity to achieve what is of value in a range of circumstances." Despite the prevailing view, science does not decrease our freedom through exculpation, but increases it by giving us more options and self-control. He also points out that memes give us freedom by giving us new standpoints. Also, memes are tools and need to be used to work; that is, we still have to think. This is a very important point because almost everyone I try to explain memetics to hates it because they feel it robs them of their self. It does the exact opposite!Dennett says that a human self results from an interpersonal design process and to become autonomous, we need a little help from our friends. I would add to this point by saying that some of the best "friends" we can ask for help in the arduous process of creating an autonomous self are the great artists of the ages. This is a point Richard Rorty has recently been making. This is a fantastic and extremely important book. I am a philosophical dilettante (but I am a scientist) and I appreciate Dennett's extremely useful and lucid writing. If only more philosophers were like him. More importantly, this book is wonderfully hopeful and can be thought of as a philosophical self-help manual. Now I know why he is smiling.

The first point to make about this book is that Daniel Dennett's ability to engage readers is well-nigh unprecedented in current scientific or philosophic writing. Reading him is like watching a lion-tamer whose daring keeps us, breathless, on the edge of our seats. His basic effort is to reconcile the determinism of Darwinism with the humanist's concern with human freedom. To do so he jettisons the notion that free will is a metaphysical concept. Rather, he explains it in terms of contemporary objective science, specifically via the same sort of evolution that led to the development of the eye or of language. He relies heavily on Richard Dawkin's concept of the evolution of memes: ideas that compete with each other just as other characteristics do via natural selection. In other words he argues that freedom of will grows and evolves. To achieve this conclusion he makes the point that determinism (a cause mechanistically producing an effect) is not the same as inevitability. He uses an example from baseball (shades of the late Stephen Jay Gould!) to make his point. He says that a batter has a choice of turning away from a pitch that is going to hit him or allowing it to hit him, depending on which action will help his team. His action is not determined by the prior history of the universe, but by his own analysis in the moment. In a different game, he might make a different choice. This, and other similar arguments, lead Dennett to the conclusion that the more we know, the more varieties and degrees of freedom we can have. Thus, modern man has more freedom than did, say, the Neanderthal.Essentially then, Dennett, whose earlier work in the areas of consciousness (another concept that gives determinists fits) are seminal, asserts that natural science is the ally of freedom, not an argument against it. The audacious arguments he posits to support this position are breathtaking in their scope and are, for this reader, convincing.