Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth

Of all recent French intellectuals, Foucault is the most perspicacious and daring (and intelligible). His critique of Reiff's Triumph of the Therapeutic (psychiatry/psychology/penology) is brilliant, whether "Civilization & Madness," "Discipline & Punish," or his newly-translated-into-English "History of Madness." Whether one embraces his homoerotic S & M disposition, or not, his assault on the Cult of Therapy/Imprisonment and Powerful must speak to liberals everywhere. Of Foucault's many writings, this collection of essays seems to represent his broadest range of ideas. I continue to find his historical, psychological, hermeneutic, and philosophical discourse problematic, but one cannot mistake his thrusts -- the making of an authentic self against the forces that would limit human freedom, but recognizing that freedom is not synonymous with libertinism. His indictments of the Therapeutic, the Penal, the Authority, etc. are all here. When he focuses on the "hermeneutic of the self (and subject)," one understands he is addressing how we "make ourselves into who we are," interpreting our different modes, in an almost technological (e.g., artificial) sense, but then decides against such constructs unless they "write truth of subjectivity." In scientific parlance, he's writing on the "phase transition" of his Cartesian inheritance between choas and stasis. While associated with Nietzsche and post-modernism, Foucault was an Enlightenment Liberal to the core, and his chief interest was in "relations," including relations of power, viz., relations with the State, relations with Authorities, relations with Authoritarians, relations with Corporate Hegemons, etc. Given this focus, one would expect him to confront relations with others as person-to-person, the subject of morals and ethics. His embedded in Cartesian dualism, notwithstanding (a fault on most French thinkers), and despite exaggerating the apotheosis of the "self," he makes perennial contributions to relations between individuals and "others." Power may be thrilling, but only if one submits to it voluntarily, not if it is imposed from without. Unfortunately, he has not reached deep enough into history to bring the ethical/moral debate into brightest focus. He fails to distinguish between morality (deontological proscriptions) and ethics (teleological prescriptiveness). Rather, he often conflates the two, or confuses them. Nietzsche, of course, heralded a return to an ethics-based civilization, overthrowing deontologically-based Judeo-Christianity, which prizes humility, injustice, and weakness. Foucault suggests as much, but lacks the typical brilliance and clarity in doing so. He also skirts the sole deontological moral imperative (the Harm Principle, articulated by Hippocrates and J.S. Mill), which, of course, the Bible never "reveals." Ethos, for Foucault, is human freedom, and while freedom is necessary, it's insufficient. Alas, Foucault neglects the "sufficient conditions," defer

The acute awareness of the world and the role of the thinker in the world Foucault displays in this collection, especially in this volume, has inspired me. I see this collection as the personal side of Foucault, where the histories/archaeologies are of a slightly more academic tone. Berkeley's Rabinow, one of the leading MC scholars around, provides some great commentary and insight in his introduction.