Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis

A great number of books and articles has been published attempting to explore and explain the Cuban missile crisis that had brought the world to the brink of a thermonuclear world war. Allison and Zelikow, in Essence of Decision, explain the Cuban missile crisis through three different lenses, that is, The Rational Actor Paradigm, Organizational Behavior Paradigm and Governmental Politics Paradigm, each of which is based on a different set of assumptions, each of which has a distinct bundle of organizing concepts and, each of which brings different general/specific propositions for the issue under question. Allison and Zelikow investigate the Cuban missile crisis through the lenses of three models in turn by asking three simple questions: 1. Why did the Soviet Union decide to place offensive missiles in Cuba?2. Why did the United States respond to the missile deployment with a blockade?3. Why did the Soviet Union withdraw the missiles?The analyst looking to Cuban missile crisis through the lens of "rational actor model" conceives of governmental action as a "choice" made by a unitary and rational nation or national government. In this model, national government is treated as if it is an "individual" identifying problem, producing solution alternatives and picking one of those alternatives up whose result would satisfy the expected utility function of the nation best based on the "purpose" of the nation. The rational actor model analyst generates hypotheses, for example, about why the Soviet Union decided to send nuclear missiles to Cuba: to defend Cuba, rectify the nuclear strategic balance, or provide an advantage in the confrontation over Berlin? The virtue of the model comes from its power of explanation especially in case it is able to expose the "purpose" of the nation/state. So all the puzzling pieces of the relevant issue under question are to be tied into a coherent and satisfactory story. The rational actor model falls short of fully understanding of the issue under question in that it does not take account of other equally important considerations. Admittedly, the rational actor model neglects the organizational processes and capabilities that structure the issue or problem under question, and, limit or extend the policy alternatives available to "rational" policy actors. In final instant, it is manifest that policy executives have to decide policy alternative from the "menu" that current organizational technologies and capabilities write. In organizational behavior model, the analyst investigates, for example, the standard operating procedures (SOP) of government organizations in order to understand which policy alternatives are available to political actors and which one is chosen and why. So, the organizational behavior paradigm closes the gaps of the rational actor paradigm.Finally, the governmental politics model conceives of governmental policy under question not as a rational actor choice or organizational output but as a "result

This book is Graham Allison's take on the Cuban Missile Crisis, and he's far from the only author to try and tackle this event. What makes "Essence of Decision" different, however, is that Allison adopts no one, definitive answer to the "main questions" of the crisis, but rather offers three ways of interpreting the event, all with their merits and drawbacks.Allison's main argument is that many foreign policy experts, laymen and experts alike, depend on "rational choice" theories. For an armchair analyst, using game theory or assuming one person is making all the decisions is indeed an easy way to explain the world. However, as Allison demonstrates, people simply don't work that way.To fill this gap, Allison gives two alternate theories: a bureacratic-organization model (where information and decisions are limited by pre-existing structures) and a political process method (where those with close social links to the key decisionmakers have a decisive advantage). Allison makes a good case for these alternate theories, noting that one must discard a lot of facts to construct a "rational" model, and that, in his own words, anyone with a good imagination can construct a rational model (which, incidentally, violates the scientific law of falsifiability).This book seems to be a deliberate attack on the "rational models" most academics use, which is its primary virtue. I myself first encountered it in a sociology class, as the basic theories Allison created to help explain the missile crisis are applicable to many things, from foreign policy to product marketing.

I first read this book in my International Politics class in college almost ten years ago. It fascinated me then and it fascinates me now to read through Allison's three models. He peels away the layers of behavior and motivation with each model and, in doing so, he exposes the strengths and weaknesses of everyone involved--from Kennedy to Castro to Khrushchev. And every time, you learn something new, some important fact or angle that turns everything just a little on its head. Required reading for anyone interested in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Also an excellent primer on the intricacies of decision-making. Still a very good read.

This book is not only the best I've seen concerning the Cuban missile crisis, but it also provides an excellent veiw of international policy making. Many other books concerning the crisis don't illustrate nearly as many implications that the various power centers had to deal with. It also gives an excellent portrayal of presidental decision making.

I read this book in the mid-1970's, but have re-read several times. The author reviews the history and basics of three decision-models: the rational actor, organizational, & bureaucratic. Then he takes each in turn and applies it to the Cuban Missile Crisis. So, one reads three separate case studies, all of the same event, but through different theoretical glasses. Events can be explained in more than one fashion. Humility is an asset to an analyst. My book shelves hold around 250 books, so some books are given away so new ones can be added. Allison's, Essence of Decision, has remained for a quarter century.Historical Note: The Cuban Missile crisis happened in October, 1962. The Soviets had been installing medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Upon discovery, the Kennedy administration had to decide what to do and how to do it. Many believe that the actions between the US and the USSR during these 10 days in October are as close as we have ever come to a nuclear war.