Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem -- Once and For All

This book reads like an intrigueing spy novel - you might want to read it solely for the entertainment value. But as a historical account, I found it indispenseable in my journey to understand the middle-east conflict, the justification for the sustained economic sanctions in Iraq during the 90's that was claimed to be responsible for so may Iraqi children's deaths, the politics and manuvering of our country and the hidden motives. What I found particularly interesting is the Ritter's paradox: How can you expect Saddam to accept inspections if the inspectors are CIA agents trying to assasintate him? Pick one: assasination or inspections, and persue it. A great read and an essential element in understanding where we are today and why.

Instead of watching the news coverage of the war that is currently going on in Iraq I have spent some of my spare time reading this excellent work by someone who deserves attention. The behind the scenes account of political intrigues in Iraq, the US, and the UN is very telling and informative and puts a lot of events into their proper perspective. After I got half way through the book I was sort of surprised that Ritter has opposed the war, but in the closing chapters he makes his case (I think too briefly) and says that too much is made of the problems around weapons inspections, and not enough is made of the great successes that have been achieved (his own book seems to also have something of this problem.) I found the accounts of Richard Butler helped a lot to resolve my impression of the man as being very oddly political in his role in the UN. I never found him to be credible and Ritter's book backs up my impression somewhat. Anyway - if you are at all interesting into how the situation in Iraq got to where it is today I highly recommend this book.

I have lived in Iraq for ten years (1980-1990). During that period I formed some kind of an idea about Iraq. So, I found Mr. Ritter's account of Iraqi problems very realistic. Finally an American who seems to understand power structures of a non-western country. It seems that American government is still largely guided by the racial hierarchy- thinking, which Michael Hunt argued to be U.S. foreign policy ideology. I.e. there is no point in trying to understand how savage people behave - civilized nations (i.e. anglo-saxons) should guide sub-humans. People in Finland - where I come from - are racially more white than Americans, but for us it is a sign of intellect to understand other cultures. Perhaps our location as Russian neighbours has taught us some realism. That's why it is painful to read, for example, how American mission to Moscow intepreted Russians in the 1930's. The first American ambassador thaught that Litvinov was a bad guy, who should be removed - as if that would change something etc.Endgame is filled with insights of Iraqi reality. Scott Ritter understands clearly how all the major problems in Iraq are not created by Saddam - i.e. border disputes with Iran and Kuwait and the kurdish question. So removing Saddam will not solve much. Saddam is defeated and humiliated many times. So it is not a sign of submission to Baghdad if Americans now take leadership position and try to control Iraq by giving them something. At least for the sake of Iraqi population and American image. I have the feeling that Iraqis have never serously thaught of themselves as a world scale super power. Instead they have been struggling with some kinds of national trauma and pride issues. Saddam got away with nationalizing oil in the early 1970's. So taking Kuwait was seen as third phase of nationalizing "Iraq's" oil. I think Saddam's regime understands now that they were in totally different position when Americans were losing the Vietnam war. Also nationalizing raw materials within a certain country has been "more acceptable" than claiming old territories.Scott Ritter has given very good analysis on the weapons of mass destruction issue. According to Ritter Iraq can not threaten its neighbours with her present army or use chemical weapons or she will face very bad consequences. As long as Iraq is saying that they haven't got any chemical weapons, it is senseless for the iraqis to use them against any minorities in their own country either.Ritter has also very realistic picture as to what Americans can do. Iraqi government is experienced in crushing down revolts. The regime cannot be weakened with inspections or other means to the point that some uprising could succeed. American direct intervention might succeed according to Ritter, but is it a great cause enough to lose American lives?So, if American government is not ready to provide leadership to the rest of the world and knock Iraqi government out, they should pay h

Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem--Once and For All Scott Ritter Simon & Schuster $22.00 by Augustus Richard NortonAs NATO's circumspect air campaign in Serbia slowly erodes Serbia's military and paramilitary resources, it is timely to reflect on the aftermath of the Gulf war of 1991. NATO's crisp briefers have been at pains to exculpate the people and demonize the leadership. Perhaps we demand demons to justify the horror of war, but the cost is a messy diplomatic challenge when an obdurate Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic survives. These are not men who faint at the sight of blood, or who comfortably wear their tail between their legs. The Gulf war is an important cautionary tale, especially since the intensity of the war against Iraq dwarfs the pinpricks inflicted by NATO on Serbia. If great efforts were taken to avoid targeting Iraqi civilians, the immensity of the allied bombardment of Baghdad insured that every Iraqi was quickly affected by the war in the most basic ways, including access to clean water and electricity. Barring an extraordinary escalation in the Balkans, Serbians will continue to live normal lives, more or less unscathed by the effort to bend their leader to NATO's will. It is fitting to remember that the Iraqi regime survives, unbowed and unrepentant, notwithstanding hope to contrary, not least by many Iraqis. With Iraq's infrastructure in tatters and the images of hapless Iraqi soldiers beseeching their conquerors fresh in mind, the architects of the 1991 Gulf war victory laid down strict terms for peace. Few participants or observers, whether President George Bush, George Will or anonymous CIA analysts, expected Saddam Hussein to survive the spring of 1991. As the godfather of Iraq's humiliation, his would be a grisly end, hastened by an extensive system of punitive sanctions mandated by the United Nations. America's wars may imitate Hollywood, but Iraq was no celluloid fantasy. Saddam refused to read to his part. In political systems where the only retirement is to the grave, power is life and those on top cling fiercely to the instruments of their power. Endgame, at its best, depicts the cat and mouse game that the Baghdad government has played with the United Nations to hide and preserve prohibited weapons programs. Created in April 1991 by Security Council Resolution 687, the task of the United National Special Commission (UNSCOM) is to insure that Iraq's abundant chemical, nuclear and biological weapons are destroyed. No UN agency could eradicate the underlying expertise, but by disabling the network of institutes, laboratories and plants crucial to the development of weapons of mass destruction the clock could be turned back a few years. In the course of its work, UNSCOM teams destroyed more than 38,000 chemical weapons, nearly 700 tons of chemical weapon agents, 48 SCUD missiles capable of striking neighboring Gulf states and Israel, as well as a significa

I am at pains to try and figure out which Scott Ritter book Mr. Barron actually read: the real one, or the one seen through Mr. Barron's myopic view of the world. Indeed, even a cursory examination reveals that Ritter's proposed solution to the Iraq problem is the exact opposite of what Mr. Barron contends: Ritter advocates -- in light of certain moral, political, and strategic realities -- a route of diplomatic engagement with Saddam Hussein's regime, a stance which once again has made him the target of various segments of the foreign policy elite. As for the book itself, readers will be surprised to learn that this is not a "kiss and tell" book consumed with CIA manipulations, insider accounts of derring-do and so forth. True, a good part of that story is here -- in particular, a well-written account of a dangerous attempt to inspect Iraq's Special Security Organization. More importantly, however, Ritter provides a much needed and incisive chronicle of how Iraq really works, from tribal feuds to nearly unspeakable violence, doing so with a scholar's attention to detail and decisive moments. Agree with his conclusions or not, he paints a sophisticated picture of Iraq and how, perhaps, we might bring the country and its people back into the family of nations. Regional experts, military professionals and even those with a passing interest in today's headlines should read this book (and believe me, you'll wind up saying, "This Marine can really write!"). Scott Ritter has once again done something that is so lacking in today's society: he has told it as he saw it.