Empires in the Balance: Japanese and

Empires in the Balance is part one of a trilogy by British professor H. P. Willmott about the war in the Pacific, and the strategies and operations employed by Japan and the Allies. In this first volume Willmott begins with the run up to war, with the emergence of Japan as a modern power and the military, geopolitical and economic forces that set her on a collision course with the western powers: Britain, the Netherlands, and most ominously, the United States. He then covers the outbreak of the war and follows Japan through her initial successes including Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Malay and Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and Burma. The primary theme proffered by Willmott is that the Japanese, by the very ease and thoroughness of their early triumphs in the first five months of the war, have placed themselves in an untenable strategic position. The vulnerability of Japan, despite her vast conquests, is demonstrated by the Doolittle raid, which marks for Willmott a watershed between the first and subsequent phases of the Pacific War, and forms the culmination of this first volume. By Willmott's analysis the Japanese come off as relentless, efficient conquerors, using economy of force and in most cases sticking to their timetable in sweeping aside Allied resistance. The secret to their success, we are told, is not the brilliance of their commanders but the resilience of the common Japanese soldier, able to march greater distances and fight longer under poorer conditions of privation than his enemy. The Japanese command, on the other hand, functions properly as long as things go their way, but even in these heady days of almost uninterrupted success there are signs of cracks in the foundation, small instances of inflexibility that bode ill for the future. A secondary theme of Willmott's is the moribund state of the old European colonies about to be conquered by Japan: Burma and Singapore for the British and the Dutch East Indies. It has always seemed odd to me that these colonial powers fought so hard for their possessions, but after 1945, when the ultimate defeat of Japan had been achieved, they were unable to reassert their authority. Willmott gives the historical background of these colonies, explains the nationalist sentiments that arose even prior to 1941-42, and shows that the nail in the coffin for these old regimes was their inability to provide security for their subjects and therefore failing to demonstrate the legitimacy of their rule. Despite the masterful analysis by Willmott, I give less than five stars due to the scarcity of footnotes in the text. There are interesting observations throughout, ones which the reader might want to explore further in other sources, but, alas, the passage is not footnoted and so the reader is left at a dead-end in his curiosity. Nevertheless, I recommend Empires in the Balance to anyone interested in this first phase of the Pacific War.

Everyone who seriously studies the Pacific War should read this book. First, it is a great read as Willmott writes a narrative that flows ever so smoothly. Like others, I could not put it down. Not only does it read well, but Willmott provides invaluable insights into the making and execution of both Japanese and American strategy during the first phase of the Pacific War. His thoughts regarding the Japanese strategic paralysis following their opening offensives is worth the price itself. One of my favorite works of military history.

This is easily the best review of early WWII in the Pacific I have read - and I have read them all. There is lots of background detail, very detailed descriptions of the campaigns and a fair amount of thoughtful strategic commentary. This book is well worth the investment.

Superbly well written book on how the Pacific War orginated and the basic thought pattern of the Japanese military thought prior to their attack on Pearl Harbor. I thought the author did an very good job in analyzing and thinking through the military, economic and political situation prior to the Pacific War. The book also goes into what the allies were thinking as well and their strategies in responding to the Japanese moves. The book covered the period up to April 1942. By then, allies strategic plans have gone down the wastebasket with Singapore and Bataan falling to the outnumbered Japanese. When I initially read this book, it was one of the first time I realized that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor may not have been a big as success as we Americans often thought it was. I realized now that Admiral Yamamoto's objective at Pearl Harbor should have been the naval base at Pearl Harbor instead of the ships. In many ways, the battleships were unimportant element in the overall scheme of thing. The base, was far more important then any group of ships! Interesting insight such as this can be found throughout this book which make it somewhat a necessary for any one interested in the Pacific War to read.

This is basically a book which examines Japan's rise to Empire, its motives for attacking the United States and starting the Pacific War, and the first six months of the course of the conflict.The book's author is a reasonably prolific writer whose style is easy to read and unlike some popularisers he has a good grasp of his topic. Japan's history is interesting as it opened up to the West and modernised at the time that the European Powers had carved up most of Asia and Africa as their private fiefdoms. The gospel of the time was a book written by Admiral Mahan called the Importance of Sea Power in History. Japan caught up in the fashions of the time decided to embark on the quest of Empire. They built a large army and navy to assist them. The basic problem was that to gain an empire they would have to divest someone else of it as most of the known world had been carved up. Japan initially attacked China and Russia. By allying with Britain and fighting in the First World War it was able to gain a number of pacific Islands. During the 30's it embarked on a series of wars with China which gave it a huge amount of territory. The problem was that this antagonised the United States who imposed an oil embargo to try to stop the Chinese war. Japan was a country which was totally dependant on imported oil to supply its war machine. The embargo meant that it had about one years oil for its ships and about six months aviation fuel. Faced with either giving in or attacking, Japan decided on the later.In reality this was a stupid decision. The Japanese by declaring war immediately started to have problems. It was reliant on imported raw materials for its industry and it imported food. The basis of its trade system was the use of foreign ships as well as its own. By declaring war Japan immediately lost the ability to use foreign ships. With its existing merchant marine Japan was barely able to transport essentials. In addition it had to conquer the oil rich areas of Indonesia within six months to be able to keep its economy going. It did not have enough Tankers to move the oil from the conquered regions if it was successful. The reality of course was that Japan had stopped operating as a state in the early 1920's. Since that time authority had fragmented so that the decision to invade China rather than being the result of some considered policy was undertaken by army units which did not recognisee the central civil authority. Japan limped along with the real power being located in the various armed services but in reality even this power was fragmented. The miracle was of course that in the first six months the Japanese were victorious everywhere. Of course after that they never won a battle. This book is interesting as it explains the process. It is strongest in talking about the Japanese history and motives prior to the war. The coverage of the early campaigns is very readable but falls into some traps of previous histories. For example the Japanese invasi