Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945

The author begins by explaining US war doctrine which was greatly influenced by General McNair. The doctrine was based primarily on our experiences in the Civil War and WWI and it ignores the realities of the strength and habits the Germans have shown since the start of the war and what the Soviets were showing since 1943. I found our war doctrine to be confused and outdated. After further discussion of the US and German armies, the author begins his tactical coverage with the D-Day landings and diligently works his way to the German surrender in May 1945. The coverage is predominately American but from time to time the 21st Army Group is discussed. This is the most complete, single source tactical summary I've been able to find. It shows the hardship of the landing and the first week moving off the beach, fighting through the hedgerows, St Lo, Operation Cobra, the drive through Brittany, Mortain, Falaise, the crossing of the Seine etc, etc. The Aachen-Hurtgen-Roer River campaigns was especially revealing and one of my favorites. The analysis and criticism of Bradley, Hodges and Collins for their poor planning and shortsightedness of this campaign seemed warranted. Hodges and Collins are veterans of the Argonne Forest debacle of 1918; you would think they would avoid a second occurence but they didn't. The loss of life in the Hurtgen was horrific and could have been less if our commanders were less obdurate and more thoughtful. Included with the narrative are 23 full page maps showing the countryside but not detailed troop movements of each campaign discussed. There is an extensive Notes section and Index. Though some reviewers disagreed with some of the author's analysis and judgements, I agreed with much of it. The poor utilization and coordination of infantry and armor, though it improved somewhat later, the refusal to upgrade our tanks, the general insistance of a wide front advance, the over cautious commanders and the mobilization of too few troops to Europe, the lack of a combined long term strategy for both Europe and the Pacific are legitiimate concerns that need to be addressed. There are 730 pages, excluding the Notes and Index, that pertain to the war. The tactical coverage of the US engagements is very good and most readers will learn about the key commanders that prosecuted the war. Its highly recommended.

This book details all the battles that the allies (French included, surprise, surprise) fought from D-Day to the German surrender. It's the best book with an overall perspective that I've read. The author, I feel, from all my reading, mostly biographies, is scrupulously fair in his assessments of the personalities involved. He gives credit where due and criticizes that which is justified. I won't give a more in depth description because it's been done so well by other reviewers. I echo the cricism of the poor maps, a defect felt most strongly because of the detail the author provides about the strategy, battles and tactics. Also, given all the personalities identified and described, photos of them would be appreciated. The soft cover edition has a row of 14 photos on the cover but no identification is provided.

Excellent book on the overall ground campaign in Europe during WWII and the generals involved. This book could have been a doctoral dissertation because of the numerous footnotes. It was meticulously researched. If nothing else it should be used a source for reference to other sources. When Dwight Eisenhower rated his Lieutenant Generals in the beginning of 1945, he gave them the following rank; 1,2 Omar Bradley, Carl Spaatz, 3. Bedell Smith, 4. George Patton, 5. Mark Clark, 6. Lucien Truscott, 7. Jimmy Doolittle, 8. Walter Gerow, 9. Lawton Collins, 10. Alexander Patch, 11. Courtney Hodges, 12. William Simpson. There have been many books written some of the generals and particularly on Bradley and Patton, but there have been a dearth of popular books on the other generals that contributed to the victory in WWII. The author brings he rest of the generals into perspective. This book is basically a excellent massive tome on the European Theatre in WWII within an overall backdrop of the generals involved in the ground campaign theatre; particularly on Bradley, Patton and Montgomery. (Because of the focus on the ground campaign there is scant reference to Spaatz and Doolittle.) He then delves into the corps commanders and how they implemented the tactics. If the book was just about the generals' attitudes, approach, and interaction it would have been one third as long. The vast majority of the book is an objective account of the campaign but the author adds his subjective analysis that is some times critical and sometimes laudatory of the generals' actions. He recognizes the contribution of artillery arm of the army and the spotty success of airborne programs. He pays particular attention to the quality and strength of the Nazi Armies committed against the American Forces and the logistical, and manpower supply issues of the Allies and how it affected the offensive. The maps added to the book seem to have been an afterthought. I used an atlas to follow all of the activity. Because of the amount of detail and quick pace, I also took notes to follow who was leading each army, corps, and division in the campaign. So much detail it was hard to focus on the character and thinking of the Generals involved.

This book is exactly that as it provides a wealth of detail that others merely gloss over. This book is not a tired recitation of the standard WWII European theatre timeline = D-Day, nothing much, Cobra, Race Across France, nothing much, the Battle of the Bulge, marking time, The Rhine, German Surrender.The author presents a thorough operational history of all facets of the campaign including details on such little studied topics as; a.)The Cherbourg Peninsula campaign b.) The Aachen / Roer fighting in Oct. '44 c.) The Hurtigen Forrest fighting d.) Operation Dragoon - the invasion of Southern France in Aug. of '44 e.) The Colmar Pocket f.) Patton's Palatine campaign of '45 g.) The role of the French Army in Alsace and LorraineIn addition the author fixes American strategy in the tradition of the "find 'em, fix 'em and destroy 'em" approach to strategy that dates back to US Grant and the Civil War. And he demonstrates the shortcomings of that strategy. Logistics and troop shortages are not neglected either as the author clearly demonstrates that, although the United States possessed much more potential combat power than Germany, the US Army was oftentimes outnumbered (or possessed only a thin superiority) at the point of attack. Original plans at the outbreak of war (for the U.S.) in 1941 called for an American army of 210 divisions. In fact only 89 were formed and not all of those went to NW Europe. The disparity between plans and execution is effectively analyzed by the author.This last point is an important one because it puts to rest that tired old saw that the US Army and their allies simply overwhelmed the 30% of the German army that faced them in the West while all the "real" fighting was done in the East.The book is invaluable because it casts light on those "other" combat commanders - at Corps and Division level - that we hear almost nothing about. Men like Collins, Corlett, Gerow, Eddie, Robertson, Allen, Van Fleet, etc., (the real heroes of the struggle) finally get their due.I would be remiss if I did not mention the author's treatment of that WWII international superstar Bernard Law Montgomery. I feel Weigly is very evenhanded when it comes to Monty. He gives credit where it is due and clearly points out those instances where Monty promises much and delivers little. This approach will surely upset both sides of the debate on Monty's true contributions to the Allied effort. His partisans, weaned on a steady diet of Monty hagiography, will see the author taking sides against their man. Monty bashers will not get enough satisfaction from Weigly's evenhanded approach.In conclusion, f you are interested in this period and have not read this book - get it.

This book provides an excellent overview for the campaign in Western Europe from the Normandy landings to the fall of Berlin. Weigley focuses on the challenges faced by Eisenhower as he sought to manage the talent (and lack thereof) of his subordinates. Ike often found the feuding of his commanders as exasperating as the Germans themselves. Despite its emphasis on high-level command, the book is also quite useful in providing a reasonably detailed look at the significant operations making up the drive on Germany by the Western Allies.