Drop Zone, Sicily: Allied Airborne Strike, July 1943

The critical lessons to learn from this book is that General Gavin insisted on 75mm pack howitzers being airdropped in pieces (but connected together by a rope) with them despite the extra work required to re-assemble them instead of being lazy and simplistic as today's lightfighters are known to do. In war, as in life, you get what you pay for, and fortunately Gavin had read intelligence reports from Crete where German paratroopers had used towed recoilless rifles for decisive effects and knew to bring his own hip-pocket high explosive firepower means. Even General Ridgway wanted to skimp and just drop some puny mortars---which would have not stopped the German tanks at Biazza Ridge as the howitzers and 2.36" bazooka rocket launchers did, saving the entire invasion from a German panzer division counter-attack. The USMC has never fought a capable first world enemy army (they never fought the combined-arms Germans in WW2) but the U.S. Army that has fought such capable foes was blessed by visionaries like Lee, Gavin, Yarborough and Ryder who insisted it obtain a three-dimensional defacto cavalry force to land ahead of the 2D maneuvering main body, saving the day in Sicily, Italy, France, Holland and Germany. The next important lesson for a "sky cavalry" is ground mobility after air-delivery---after turning back the panzers, Gavin's men had to scrounge the countryside for bikes, carts, horses and trucks to get across the island since they did not have their own organic air-delivered mobility means. Gavin would later on solve this as Chief of Army Research and Development in the 1950s with the invention of the air-transportable, amphibious, all-terrain tracked armored personnel carrier, the amazing M113 now known after his name.

You wonder sometimes if people actually comprehend what they read; in the case of Sicily I often run into people who want to call the Airborne operations "failures" because there were mistakes made when if you read the actual accounts, you realize the Airborne saved the day and accomplished its mission. The simple logic is that if the Airborne had not employed 3-D maneuver and dropped ahead of the sealanding forces, the Nazi Herman Goering Division would have swept the beaches clear; a mechanized 1st world Army threat the marines or Army troops in the Pacific never had to fear from the Japanese who only had thinly armored light tanks to contend with. Its funny how thousands of dead marine bodies in the surf at Tarawa after a mindless frontal assault is "valor" and a few hundred Army Paratroopers dispersed by winds on Sicily constitutes a "failure". At least these men didn't end up as a tragic KIA message to loved ones, but brought the fight to the enemy. The winds dispersing General Ridgway's Paratroopers actually helped; these forces were able as Breuer details--to stop German counter-attacks from reaching the beaches. On the modern, automatic weapons-swept battlefield dispersal is a virtue, it just takes resiliant, self-reliant men to fight this way; training to be mindless robots will not prevail in such conditions.What is especially useful is that the author shows how then Colonel James M. Gavin insisted on parachute dropping 75mm pack howitzers and not 60mm mortars---this technotactical gut-level decision resulted in him being just able to stop German heavy Tiger tanks on Biazza Ridge and saving the day. Gavin's incredible on-the-spot presence of mind and leadership seeing the essence of the situation and rallying the Paratroops was born that day at Biazza Ridge. From that point on, Gavin fought long and hard to get adequate anti-tank weapons and their own armored fighting vehicles for his beloved Airborne troops. Breuer also describes how Gavin dispatched Major Ireland back to the beaches to get naval gunfire support, and how he used a bicycle to get there in time. After the beaches were consolidated, the Paratroopers of the 82d Airborne were then sent ahead of the main body as elite shock troops/spearheads and marched rapidly across the island using bikes, carts and even horses/donkeys. This pattern has held true to the present---whereas the Airborne "opens the door" for larger forces to enter, they usually stay and continue to lead the way as infantry. Its logical that they be properly equipped with light AFVs like the Russian Airborne has in order to do this with more speed/firepower and less casualties. This book if actually read and comprehended proves that those who condemn the American Airborne at Sicily are biased and ignorant of the facts of their triumph. This book would make a good start point for a script for a Saving Private Ryan-type film. As jump procedures (Pathfinders to mark Drop Zo

Breuer tells it like it was, with vivid detail and captivating clarity. The reader will not be able to put down this book. It immerses you in the adventures of young American paratroopers who were put in extraordinary circumstances and acted extraordinarily. It is also frightening how Breuer reveals that intelligence played down the threat posed by enemy forces at Sicily. It is an amazing story of how young men can prevail in the midst of intelligence blunders.

This story reveals how allies were put at risk ( intentionally ) so the Germans would not realize that their ULTRA,coding machine, was deciphered. Although this act was to secure a complete surprise on D-Day, many measures could have been taken to combat the elite German units on the island. This story enriches us with fact, detail, and a bit of humor. My father / grandparents lived through this ordeal in 1943 and what was described in this book is 100% true. Many Sicilians were tired of the war, and were anxious to put that brutal chapter of history behind them. When the allied forces appeared the Sicilians rejoiced, and welcomed the allies with open arms. This campaign almost ended with disaster, and the sheer bravery of allies helped push back a counterattack.