Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security

Many books have been written and many more will be written about the causes, effects, and responses to Hurricane Katrina. I have even outlined one myself, though I doubt it will come to fruition. Among such a large company, Cooper and Block have done an outstanding job of cataloging and analyzing the failures of the Federal response. They sound clearly the warning bell that the Federal government is ill-prepared to support disaster operations, particularly in the less-prepared states. They have put together a wonderful timeline of events before, during, and after Katrina. They noted such contextual factors as the local response to Hurricane Dennis, which has been overwhelmingly ignored by the national media. As an early Katrina evacuee, I found it very interesting how much debate was going on in Washington, even as my family was on the evacuation trail. No book could comprehensively cover a disaster the scale of Katrina. The authors made only passing attempts to chronicle the activities of local and state officials, and those only when the activities impacted the Federal decisions or efforts. They also kept the focus largely on New Orleans, while noting the similarities to the response in other areas. Their narrowness of focus is both a strength and a weakness. The book did not address the fundamental philosophical issues of the role of government in storm response. The authors have done a wonderful job of providing insight into the personalities and organizations that shaped the national response effort. The chapter on people who worked around the system was an extremely good read as evidence that good people can make a difference when they do the right thing. Overall, the book is worth the read just for the insight into the Katrina timeline from a Federal perspective.

If you're not angry when you finish reading "Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security," then you didn't read it carefully enough. Written by two Wall Street Journal reporters -- Christopher Cooper and Robert Block -- this book offers context for the federal government's failed response to Hurricane Katrina last year. Anyone who's ever worked for the federal government won't be surprised to learn that operational results are often less than the sum of their bureaucratic and even well-meaning parts. But finger-pointers take note: Highlighting the federal government's miserable performance is not tantamount to forgiving an ineffective state and local response. Identifying federal failures merely confirms that, in the end, there's more than enough blame to go around. "Disaster" is about much more than the anguished wait of those at the Superdome or the Convention Center for days after last August's storm. It's about the bureaucratic bungling that eventually led to FEMA being utterly unprepared to handle the crisis it faced last summer. "Disaster" is more than a history of failure of the levees and floodgates around New Orleans. It's a detailed recounting of how different arms of the federal government failed to protect an urban population for which it had primary responsibility and how, once disaster struck, that same federal government demonstrated itself to be equally incapable of offering aid. Aside from a slow-motion retelling of the mistakes that led to the crisis that was post-Katrina New Orleans, "Disaster" is also a disturbing articulation of how national emphasis on homeland security (read: protection against terror attacks) seems to have come at the expense of preparing for the more likely scenarios of hurricanes, floods, fires and earthquakes. Given the volume of resources hurled at the Department of Homeland Security since its formation after September 11, it may be reasonable to expect that department to handle disasters of both types, but the book's most damning message comes from its conclusion: "When disaster strikes, we are all on our own."

As a New Orleanian who lost "everything" to the faulty levees, I have followed this story closely for a year, and have read as much as possible about the episode. Even so, I highlighted practically every page of this book. It did an excellent job of busting myths and providing context, in a surprisingly absorbing but factual narrative. Here's as plain as I can put it: Cooper and Block have written the finest "top-down" book on Katrina to date, and I don't expect it to be surpassed anytime soon. The research is impeccable, and I would love for the D.C.-area (1-time reviewers) who pan this book to give examples of the "fictions" about which they complain. Not only is "Disaster" must-reading for anyone who cares about the Katrina story but, also, for anyone who is interested in the priorities and effectiveness of the Dept. Homeland Security. I give this work my highest recommendation.

"Disaster" is a superb, authoritative work that readers of any (or no) political persuasion can appreciate. It focuses on the federal response to the disaster--a catastrophe within a catastrophe--but also gives an excellent background on the history of FEMA and of the levee system around New Orleans. I am from New Orleans. I have read many books on Hurricane Katrina and about the levees, the river, and Louisiana's environmental and ecological predicament. Cooper and Block know New Orleans (Cooper lived there 10+ years as a Times-Picayune reporter) and they know FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security. This is a book of reportage: the authors manage very well to keep opinions out and let the facts speak for themselves. They show that the 80% evacuation of metro New Orleans was a resounding, unprecedented success; that the Bush administration severely and repeatedly cut federal funding for ongoing reinforcements of the city's flood protection system; and that the U.S. government through the Army Corps of Engineers failed to protect the city, whose citizens never imagined the canals' floodwalls would ever collapse. Cooper and Block also show that placing FEMA within the counterterrorist Department of Homeland Security reduces its effectiveness as a disaster response agency. Michael "Brownie" Brown had his flaws, but he at least recognized that FEMA needed better funding and more flexibility as a disaster response agency. Now FEMA is ignored down in DHS's basement while DHS secretary Chertoff, along with the administration he serves, concentrates on counterterrorism--an important job but less frequently needed than response to natural disasters. By letting the facts speak for themselves, and without directly so advocating, Cooper and Block's account makes a strong case for restoring the independence of FEMA and returning its director to the cabinet-level status that James Lee Witt was granted during the Clinton administration. This is a richly documented work by veteran reporters who have no particular agenda but the improved protection of Americans everywhere. As they demonstrate, if New Orleans is not safe, neither is any other major American city. --www.LeveesNotWar.org

Cooper and Block begin by reviewing the years of complacent and misdirected efforts by those responsible for levee and floodwall maintenance, then proceeding to the disaster itself, followed by the subsequent finger-pointing and continuing malfeasance. President Bush's first budget (2001) proposed cutting .5 million from FEMA's $2.5 billion. He also reversed Clinton's precedent of putting someone experienced in charge, and returned to Bush I's placing an inexperienced politico in charge - ending up with the Hurricane Andrew disaster). This appointee (Allbaugh), in turn, drove out many talented and experienced Witt protégés. Then, in 2004 federal, state, and local officials participated in a large-scale planning exercise (Hurricane Pam) in preparation for a severe hurricane striking New Orleans. While better than most (and close to what happened in Katrina), it ended up as only the latest of many such exercises - accepted with little comment and filed on a shelf. Then came 2005 and the real thing - Hurricane Katrina. Saturday evening the mid-level FEMA manager in New Orleans (the only representative on-site) realized that efforts were less intense than appropriate - eg. there was not even an effort to organize a bus evacuation. Fortunately, the lead government weather forecaster took the initiative to call local and state leaders to motivate their getting more serious. Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin then appealed to N.O. ministers to emphasize evacuation, and their self-help message got many out. Meanwhile, the Superdome had no food stockpiled, FEMA's pre-staged supplies were three hours away, limited to one day's worth of food and 50 generators (half that promised in the Pam exercise), and included no buses (vs. 400 buses and 800 drivers called for in Pam). The Louisiana National Guard (LNG) center had never flooded in 170+ years - yet, it was under 8 feet of water 7:30 A.M. Monday, rendering its high water transport trucks unusable. Chertoff, Bush, etc. later maintained the levees didn't breach until the day after the storm. However, this major break was reported to FEMA at 7:30 A.M. by the New Orleans' disaster chief, and by 8 A.M. TSA reported to the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) that the Industrial Canal was breached. Unfortunately, the Army Corp of Engineers (COE) representative buried the topic in page 5 of a 6-page report that covered pay and congratulatory prose more prominently. The local FEMA man cadged two late Monday afternoon chopper rides to get a better assessment - saw water over most of the city, people on rooftops, and a quarter-mile levee gash - his report to HSOC was discounted as hype. Tuesday: Efforts to have the Pentagon fly in 8 water rescue teams from California failed - Rumsfeld could not be located (was at a ballgame). Brown videoconferences Bush, Chertoff, Cheney at 8:30 A.M. Tuesday - 90% of N.O. people displaced, job "too big for FEMA and the LNG." Mayor Nagin then gave FEMA's Michae