Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction. Hans Blix

Blix recounts numerous instances where the Bush administration tried to strong-arm the UN inspections team into taking erroneous positions. For instance, regarding the Iraqi drones that Bush and Blair claimed were for wmd attacks, Blix describes how the Bush administration "concluded that the drone was a violation of the Security Council's resolution. At UNMOVIC we were not ready to make that assessment. This angered Washington, despite the fact that...the U.S. Air Force itself did not believe the Iraqi drones were for the delivery of biological and chemical agents (227). Blix describes how the Bush administration constantly "sought to undermine the credibility" of UNMOVIC and the IAEA (228). "Although the inspection organization was now operating at full strength and Iraq seemed determined to give it promt access everywhere, the United States appeared as determined to replace our inspection force with an invasion army" (1). He recounts a meeting he had with Cheney, followed by meetings with Bush and Rice. Cheney played the bad cop, Bush the good. Cheney informed Blix that if he didn't find the wmd, the "U.S. was 'ready to discredit inspections'...A pretty straight way, I thought, of saying that if we did not soon find the weapons of mass destruction that the U.S. was convinced Iraq possessed, the U.S. would be ready to say that the inspectors were useless and embark on disarmament by other means" (86). Cheney "did most of the talking." He struck Blix as an "overconfident chief executive." It was clear to the UN inspector that the meeting was "obviously not meant as a real exchange of views." The inspections could never have succeeded since, if they never turned up the nonexistent wmd, it only signaled to Cheney that the inspectors weren't looking hard enough, and war would have to be declared. The meeting with Cheney was followed by a short, affable meeting with Bush, who assured Blix that "he was no wild, gung-ho Texan bent on dragging the U.S. into war." The U.S., Bush explained, "wanted peace." Blix's conclusion about the meeting: "It was not a substantial conversation and was presumably not meant to be one" (87). These meetings were followed by a longer one with Condoleezza Rice, who insisted that the inspectors get in line with the U.S. Blix shines needed sunlight on many of the Bush administration's pre-war claims about Iraq. There is so much needless confusion about Bush's infamous claim that Saddam Hussein had attempted to buy uranium from Africa. Ever since Bush cited British intelligence, there has been deep mystery here in the U.S. regarding this claim. According to Blix, Bush simply lifted it from a publicly available British dossier. It turns out that the British based the claim on documents that the Bush administration already knew were forgeries. In fact, they were such bad forgeries that, as Blix points out, "they were signed with the name of a minister who was not in the government of Niger at the time the document was dated" (

After nearly three years, we seem to have accepted the common wisdom that the intelligence was manipulated and Bush/Cheney convinced the American public, and especially the Congress, that Saddam was a threat that couldn't wait. Funny, but that's not the way I remember it. There were a lot of people who questioned the cherry-picked intelligence at the time. Richard Clarke, for instance. And Brent Scowcroft. Most of the rest of the world, as represented by the United Nations, wanted to continue weapons inspections. With Saddam boxed in by no-fly zones, weapons inspectors, and a ton of spy technology aimed at Iraq, he really wasn't much of an immediate threat, and most people knew it. Still, it is interesting to revisit those pre-war days, just to make sure I didn't imagine the whole thing. Hans Blix spent a lifetime as a diplomat, and as you would expect, he couches his criticisms in pleasant-sounding phrases. Much of the time he does just that, but every now and then, he lets fly with a real, unadulterated opinion. Near the end of Disarming Iraq, he "suggests" that Tony Blair and George Bush and their advisors misled the public by asserting categorically that weapons of mass destruction existed. In the world of international diplomacy, I suppose that is what passes for a slap in the face. In the run up to the war, there was a lot of behind-the-scenes maneuvering and endless analysis by pundits and the press. It is fascinating to be able to read one inside player's report on what was said in those private meetings. I was surprised to find that Blix has great regard and admiration for Condoleezza Rice. I was less surprised to find that he has respect and perhaps pity for Colin Powell, and no use at all for Dick Cheney or Paul Wolfowitz. Blix is thorough in describing the history of arms inspection and the history of the U.N.'s dealings with Iraq. Certainly this is useful and important information, but for me the appeal of Disarming Iraq is the description of what was happening in the weeks and days before Iraq was invaded in 2003. Blix's accounts of his meetings with Cheney and Wolfowitz are chilling. Cheney coldly threatens him by telling him that if his weapons inspectors don't find some evidence and fast, Cheney will not hesitate to discredit Blix. Blix's meeting with Tony Blair is less chilling (Blair offered him crumpets), and the meeting with Bush, revealing. Blix, in ultra-diplomatic mode here, writes of how Bush's manner contrasted sharply with that of Cheney's, how he makes a "boyish impression" and "frequently changes his posture in his chair." He told Blix and ElBaradei that he was no wild Texan bent on war, that he would let the Security Council talk about a resolution, but not for long. Bush "mentioned the League of Nations." You get a picture here of Bush, impatient and fidgety, making non-sequiturs about the League of Nations, and eager to get this useless meeting out of the way. It isn't surprising that congressmembers and s

The book is very good. First of all, this is not a little nobody writing some personal account. This is the man in charge of the UN inspections. Nobody better than him to offer real intelligence to the international community. He and El Baradei were in the ground. They were not sitting in D.C. or the CIA headquarters, thousands of miles away trusting in little bugs and informants. They were there, watching the ground with their eyes. They were willing to double check ALL what the US intelligence had gathered for years. Yet, they found that all that was crap. Take into account that this man started the inspection believing that Iraq HAD WMD. Yet, in the process he got convinced that he was wrong. And that is what apparently exasperated Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz. I don't include Bush here because he is the main spokeperson of the administration, not the policy maker (and I am a Republican!). In summary, Blix could have offered the best possible intelligence available by all means. So, whatever the literary accomplishemnts are (I guess he wasn't interested in a Pulitzer), just pay attention to the facts. It will help you fill the gaps in your understanding of what was going on and what is going on now in Iraq. Compare the content of those who gave 1 star to this book and those who gave 4 or 5. And you will see that no matter what review you read, you will end up buying this book.

An excellect recounting of the inspection process by the man who was there with no apparent bias. Makes very clear the problem he had with all of the political factions pushing for a particular outcome.

This is a remarkably even-handed discussion of the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the ensuing Iraq War of 2003. With the patience of a professor outlining an argument on the board, Blix presents all sides of the issues dispassionately and, so far as I can tell, unpartisanly.Blix originally believed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction, and so he eagerly accepted his assignment to head the UN inspection team. He and his searchers targeted the areas that international intelligence agencies assured President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were repositories of weapons. Finding nothing in any of them, Blix began to suspect that both he and the intelligence agencies were mistaken. Failure to find weapons of mass destruction after the fall of Saddam Hussein further convinced Blix that any such weapons that survived the 1991 Iraq War had been destroyed by 1994. Saddam had even offered (finally) documentary evident to that effect in February 2003, but it was too late to prevent the war the following month. Why, then, did Saddam refuse for the most part to cooperate with UN inspectors? Blix surmises that any number of reasons might've contributed to his stubbornness: pride, a sense of invulnerability, a fear that weapons inspectors were also spies, an unwillingness to accept foreign supervision. Regardless of the possible reasons, however, Blix is convinced that one of them was NOT that Saddam had anything to hide when it came to weapons of mass destruction.Blix is also convinced that President Bush wouldn't have gone to war had he not been persuaded that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. The war was no vendetta, says Blix, and so wasn't inevitable. Had he been allowed a few more months to inspect, he's certain he could've marshalled sufficient evidence to have prevented the war.Blix argues that the fall of Saddam is a good thing, but he also concludes that the balance sheet of the war is still in the negative. Getting rid of Saddam is a bonus, but it's outweighed so far by the increase in terrorism, the deaths of both civilians and military personnel in Iraq, and the social turmoil that continues in Iraq. Blix believes that neither the UK nor the US showed sufficient critical judgment in going to war. His final estimation is that there just weren't reasonable grounds for doing so.A well-documented, excellently-argued book. Highly recommended.