Leibniz: Philosophical Essays

I refer to this book in cite 139 on page 211 of my book, 'The First Scientific Proof of God.' Although this book on Leibniz was published in 1934 and was reprinted in 1973, 1979, 1981,1983, 1984, and 1987, it is apparent that the readers either didn't understand it or failed to propagate its importance. Since I propagate it in my book by citing Leibniz many times and in specific, on pps. 210-220, its propagation might go this time. I also talk about Leibniz on my website. Search for my website through my book on Google. In general, I expect that Leibniz and his works in this book will become the new world science once it is propagated and discussed.

A very good textbook, but with poor emphasis on Leibniz's mathematical work. I did't put four stars since it is a book intended for philosophers, or more precisely, students of philosophy, but I believe that no course on Leibniz can be complete without placing emphasis on his mathematical views, and their influence on his philosophical views.

Hackett offers once again an inexpensive translation in lucid prose. This volume features the important shorter works of Leibniz's corpus, including the "Monadology," and "Discourse on Metaphysics," together with Leibniz's correspondence with his contemporaries. Each of the works is prefaced by a short introduction, helpful for placing it in context. Editorial footnotes helpfully point out the nuance of Leibniz's language. Overall, great working translation for philosophical study or research.

Leibniz is indeed one of the most important and influential of philosophers and also one of the least examined, perhaps even among students of philosophy. He is most known for his contributions to mathematics, theology, and physics while his philosophical views are most often perceived through Voltaire's popular, but rather superficial mocking of his arguments regarding "possible worlds." But Leibniz' "best of all possible worlds" view is more subtle and robust than Voltaire was willing to see. The argument is not that the world is perfect -- certainly not if taken from any single, topical point of view, but that "in producing the universe [God] chose the best possible design, in which there was the greatest variety, together with the greatest order." One may dispute Leibniz' general view and/or aspects of his justification of it, but as Leibniz developed the argument along the lines of possibility, contingency, and necessity, it is difficult to see how one would logically disprove it. It has had to be enough for detractors to declare that they disagree with, or dislike the argument. The famous argument is a recurring thread and summation in this Oxford Philosophical Texts volume edited by Woolhouse and Francks. Here is certainly a book that belongs in the library of any student of philosophy. As is noted in the editor's introduction, a recent biographer has written of Leibniz -- "Even if he had only contributed to one field, such as law, history, politics, linguistics, theology, logic, technology, mathematics, science, or philosophy his achievement would have earned him a place in history. Yet he contributed to all these fields, not as a dilettante but as an innovator able to lead the specialists." But even in the reasoning of such a magnificent mind there are problems and weaknesses (which tells us a great deal about philosophy and the human mind!). I won't explore the main difficulties that I found. I share one of the concerns expressed by Antoine Arnauld in his correspondence with Leibniz, as well as a few others. Leibniz draws first from classical schools of thought, the Pythagoreans, Platonists, and Peripatetics (while wise ancient philosophers will always need rehabilitation, they "were not so far from the truth, nor so ridiculous as the common run of our new philosophers suppose."). He mostly rejects the Scholastics as well as the popular influences of European thought, Hobbes and Spinoza. With modification, he rehabilitates Aristotle's "entelechies," which become his "monads" (from the Greek, 'monas', meaning unity, or that which is one). A monad is the universe "from a point of view". Matter is understood as phenomena, not substance. Substance (for example number or mind) is irreducible, matter is a composite. Leibniz' view is amenable to Pythagoras and in many ways to both quantum theory (in the "quarks and gluons" model, the "solidity" of matter is merely a phenomena of the gluon force, and voids in space-time are not exactly voids) a

The greatness of Leibniz is undermined by the vastness of his oeuvre. It stands of no single definitive works. Like the monads that he espoused, Leibniz's writings are here, there and everywhere, each bit mirroring the whole--the universe that Leibniz envisioned. Short of an encyclopedia of Leibniz's oeuvre, this book can serve as a nearly-comprehensive collection of the 'goods.' The major pieces are kept in their entirety. Included with the likes of 'Discourse on Metaphysics,' 'New System,' 'Specimen of Dynamics,' and 'The Monadology' are formidable chunks of Leibniz's letters and occasional pieces. To do justice to Leibniz is to immerse oneself in this great labrynth of thought. Perhaps one day a Renaissance of Leibnizian studies will flourish on the account of this collection.