Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy

Dr. Zeev Maoz who is a former head of the Graduate School of Government and Policy, and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University as well as an Academic Director at the Israeli Defense Forces National Defense College, presents a comprehensive analysis of Israel's Foreign Policy and Security objectives. Any serious student or scholar who has interest in Israel/Palestine conflict must read this book. Detailed documentation and expert analysis, this book will show you that Israel's flawed policies and objectives are among the prime reasons why the conflict has not ended.

A truly great book! Maoz has shown that Israel, like other nations, has failed to take in the best interests of its people by failing to see the outcome of their actions. That's not to say they always tried to do the wrong thing, but unfortunately it comes across that way. The United States and its disastrous war in Iraq is another example. Read and learn!

I think even the detractors of this book will have to at least admit that this book is a very brave endeavor by the author. The analysis that Maoz gives us here is at times subjective which does leave the author open to criticism, but he takes such a scientific approach in analyzing the evidence that any critic will be hard pressed to find flaws in his methodology. The book is not for the casual reader or those with just a passing interest in Israel or the Arab/Israeli conflict. The author uses almost fifty pages at the very beginning of the book to explain to readers his methodological approach to analysis of Israeli defense policy. I for one have never read such a detailed analysis of an approach to analysis before. Any potential reader should be prepared for a dense work that requires a lot from the reader. If you decide to take on this book I think you will be rewarded with the best analysis of Israeli defense policy there is out there. The information is neutral and based on the best evidence available and presented in a rational and almost clinical fashion. Maoz goes into great detail about how the IDF has had too much influence on policy making decisions within the government, and how civilian leadership has played a subservient role to defense needs. He goes on to explain how this lack of civilian leadership has created a process by which military solutions to conflicts take a priority role over political solutions. This has affected Israel's peace making efforts in the region. Israel has been all to willing to embark on some extremely risky military adventures to seek an end or at least an improvement vis-à-vis its neighbors, but at the same time Israel has been unwilling to try even moderately risky attempts at political solutions. Maoz attributes some of this to the fact that Israel's founding elites instilled a siege mentality during the founding and early days of the Israeli state. Unfortunately this siege mentality has persisted even after the realities on the ground have taken on some fundamental changes. Israel now has a large conventional edge on all of its enemies, and Israel, for the foreseeable future, has no real existential threat from those states in the area. This does not mean that Israel is safe, but what it should mean is that Israel should have more political room to maneuver and seek political solutions that will further its security. When Israel has taken some risk for political solutions it has benefited enormously, as when Israel finally accepted Sadat's overtures for negotiations which lead to the Israeli/Egyptian peace treaty. This peace, even though it has been a cold peace, has lifted an enormous burden from Israel. This should have been the template for Israeli peace policy towards its neighbors but unfortunately Israel seemed to take no lessons from this peace, but instead Israel insists on focusing on Arab rhetoric which is not grounded in reality nor are these states pursuing policies tha

This is a truly weird book. It is really big and thick, with all sorts of references. It's very scholarly. And it even discusses some interesting issues. But I still don't like it very much. First of all, the topic is strange. Plenty of Arabs want to destroy Israel. Does it even make sense to ask what Israel ought to do? Israel is a small nation and it is at great risk no matter what it does. In any case, this book not only asks such a question but gives some answers. Zeev Maoz appears to believe that most of Israel's wars were simply folly. After all, there are indications that with hindsight, Israel had other options! Well, maybe that's true. But most nations make plenty of errors when they have to make decisions about whether or not to fight a war. In my opinion, Israel has done an above average job here. And even Maoz points out that he is not trying to deny that other nations (especially the Arabs) have often made far worse decisions than has Israel; he just wants to point out where Israel could have done better in the past and where it could improve in the future. I disagree most with the author when he characterizes various Israeli wars as optional. The Israelis might indeed have avoided war for a short time by doing something else. The Israelis might even have gotten a couple of pieces of paper in exchange for something of real value at various times. But such speculations are not only counterfactual (that's not what happened, so we can't be totally sure it could have), they also ignore much of what might have happened after that. As an annoying aside, this characterization of Israel's wars makes it look a little like the Israeli people and their leaders simply did not want to survive. After all, when the easiest way to die is to get into a war, it's suicidal to choose war when peace is available! I don't believe that the Israelis or their leaders have been suicidal, and I doubt that Maoz believes it, so I am wary of a book that might imply such nonsense. Time after time, Maoz criticizes Israel for doing something that seemed reasonable at the time. Israel's serious attempts to avoid or deter the 1973 war look as though they are dismissed out of hand. When we get to the Arab attacks on Israel in 2000, Maoz casually (and very dubiously) blames the start of the violence on Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount! I don't mind asking a lot of tough questions, but I think Maoz goes overboard when he implies that virtually everything Israel has done has been wrong. He should have done a better job of separating really clear errors from decisions which made far more sense (and may even have been ideal). Still, there is good news about the book. Maoz does ask about various Israeli strategies for retaliation against attacks (including limited ones). And I think these are very good questions to ask, even though they may, quite unfairly, imply that everything would be just fine were Israel to do the right thing al

Prof. Maoz analyzes the evidence underlying the basic beliefs about Israel's military policy and history, held by most Israelis and supporters of Israel. From a pro-Israel perspective, Maoz's work is a call for change within Israel to promote new institutions that would lead to non-military solutions. The chapter pointing out the flaws in Israel's nuclear policy is extremely important in view of the current nuclear build-up in Iran.