Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945

Field Marshal Slim's excellent memoire of the fighting against the Japanese in Burma and India during 1942-1945 is remarkable on at least two counts. First, the Allied armies were badly beaten and hustled unceremoniously out of Burma in 1942, yet reorganized in time to defend India and went on to liberate Burma in 1945. This feat was all the more remarkable for being fought over some of the most rugged jungle and mountain terrain in the world, under often horrendous weather conditions, at the distant end of the Allied supply lines. Second, Slim's account is exceptionally candid with respect to his leadership, to include mistakes made (his and others), to his opinions of his allies and opponents, and to the political wrangling that goes on in any coalition military effort. The China-Burma-India Theater of World War II did not include large numbers of American ground forces, and has therefore been left largely in the shadows of the fighting in Europe and the Pacific theater. However, the Allied forces inflicted a massive military defeat on the Japanese Army under extraordinarily difficult conditions; there is much to learn from the common sense, improvisational approach employed by Slim in planning and organizing his campaigns. Slim arrived in the theater as a brand new corps commander just at the start of the Japanese invasion. His efforts to cobble together a defense were repeatedly overturned by the relentless Japanese attack and by the scarcity of resources. Slim managed to extract his forces and in successive positions as corps and army commander, rebuilt them into the force that went back into Burma. Slim's account is comprehensive, even exhaustive, describing both the operational-level planning and administrative support and much of the tactical level fighting in the jungles. His high regard for his multi-national army, composed of British, Gurkha, Indian, Chinese, and American forces, and his care for their morale is evident throughout his account. "Defeat Into Victory" is a long read at over 550 pages; the casual reader may be overwhelmed by the length and level of detail. The student of military art without prior background in the China-Burma-India theater may have some challenge putting Slim's account into proper context. The limited selection of maps are a bit difficult to read but enable the reader to follow the course of the campaigns. This book is very highly recommended to the student of the military art looking for a very readable account of the Allied campaigns in Burma. Those who persist to the end will be rewarded by Slim's retrospective on the fighting in Burma and the surprisingly modern conclusions he draws from the experience.

Field Marshall Slim, Viscount of Burma, never lets us forget that it is the soldiers in the field that win battles: not politicians in their ivory towers, or generals in their bunkers far behind the action. Slim's theory is that politicians give guidelines for the campaign, and generals provide the training and backup so that the soldiers can get on with their business. He should, when possible, not get in the soldiers way. This is a marvellous account of how the Commonwealth managed to stem the Japanese tide in South-East Asia. The main part of the book describes how he managed to restore morale and discipline in the army that was so humiliatingly defeated in 1943. That part should be compulsory reading at any management school. His solution was simple: he accepted that the defeat was due to faulty planning of the general staff. He then set out to provide training and equipment to the front-line troops. Since he commanded a multi-ethnic international army, he saw that every unit was supplied according to its own special needs. He even put his own staff on half-rations if any field unit lacked provisions - which usually quickly solved the problem! As few generals and politicians he understood that war is about individuals and small units - they just add up to something bigger. Slim could really write, the book is full of small anecdotes and self-ironic humour. When he writes about the actions it is af we were really there in the midst of it. Finally, and most importantly: the book is totally devoid of any racism or demeaning of the enemy, it is incredibly respectful of his own native soldiers and of the Japanese enemy.

It has become fashionable inside the business community to laud the efforts of certain military leaders and their emulation as a route towards supposed success. And so we have biographies on Patton and Schwartzkof purporting certain lessons that "business people" can learn from the greats --- though in the case above, the one a prima donna, and the latter achieving the military equivalant of a heavywieght prizefighter beating up a toddler, one wonders what we are learning. Slim will probably never figure in a business seminar, but he certainly should. He was a person schooled in utter defeat and the lessons it teaches people. These lessons expressed in Slim's downhome, honest self-effacing style are really things that one can imbibe -- and learn a great chunk of military history to boot. Slim was wary of theory over experience. Even in defeat he tried things first to see if they would work after making plans to implement then. During his retreat from Burma in 1942, he ran a test convoy up the roads with exactly the same wieght vehicles as he would withdraw in the future. This allowed him to see what would happen when he eventually had to retreat down the same road -- the importance of the dry run. For Wingate fans you will find no blind adulation. Slim rightly recognised from a aerial perpective the waste of inserting men 100s of mile behind Japanese lines, rightfully insisting that they be better used and less expensively equipped as a regular fighting division. In the end he was proved right. A lesson in efficiency planning --- getting the best bang for you buck. Slim kept a lean chain of command and did away with several levels inside his Army HQ, he refused to have a Chief-of-Staff as had recently been adopted by the British from the Americans. He was able to also cobble together chains of command that may have looked wierd on paper, but worked. His relationship with "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell the ascerbic American General who hated "limeys." Makes great reading. Slim alone in the entire British Command could handle him. Personal courage was also not found wanting. He was frequently near the front and made it his duty to make sure that he had strong intelligence of the Japanese and a personal respect for them as fighting "insects." Noticably disturbed by Japanese attrocities against prisoners and wounded, he continually uses words of respect when describing Japanese resistance which was fantatical, yet "magnificent." Others, such a Wingate would learn this later in hard lessons. Besides the fighting, Stillwell had to supply an Army spread over 800 miles of Jungle at the end of supply lines thousands of miles long, with virtually no roads, in some cases only jungle tracks operating as the lines of communication. He did this a large part with American help and British self-sufficiency. But is was Slim's decisions that allowed those best suited for the positions to get on with the business of supply. And where he could not purchase such

Awhile ago, I read QUARTERED SAFE OUT HERE, the wartime memoir by George MacDonald Fraser detailing his experiences as an infantryman with the 17th Division of the 14th Indian Army as the latter pursued the retreating Japanese through Burma during the closing months of WWII. He had nothing but high praise for the army commander, Field-Marshal William Slim. This prompted me to purchase and read Slim's own account of the time and place, DEFEAT INTO VICTORY. The two books are a perfect pair for anyone interested in the India-Burma Theater of the war - perspectives from both the top and bottom of the British Army's command structure.Slim's memoirs, first published in 1956 while he was serving as Governor General of Australia, begin with his assignment to command the 1st Burma Corps during it's desperate fighting retreat from Burma into India in 1942 after the Japanese captured Rangoon. Then later, as chief of the 14th Indian Army, he oversees the regrouping and rebuilding of the force that finally decimates the Japanese invaders at Imphal in northern India, and subsequently chases the fleeing enemy back south through Burma. One of Slim's most notable characteristics is his evident lack of an overbearing ego. Several times in his book, he makes reference to his mistakes, errors in planning or judgement, and his deficiencies as a military commander. (Imagine that other famous British Field-Marshal of the war, the prima donna Montgomery, admitting such!) Much to his credit, Slim apparently learned hard lessons as he went along, and emerged as the better man and general for it. This, combined with his great concern for his men's morale, health, training and supply, justifies the high regard in which he was held by "rankers" such as Fraser. Churchill was wrong when he remarked, "I cannot believe that a man with a name like Slim can be much good."The author's history of the Burma war is comprehensive - perhaps excessively so for the casual reader such as myself. His narrative includes the movement of troops as far down as battalion level, which is way more than I needed to know. Because of this, I might have awarded 4 stars instead of 5 had I been less mindful of the contribution Slim's memoir makes to the history of an almost forgotten theater of the global conflict. A keener student of the Burma campaigns is certain to appreciate these details more than I did.Finally, there is the Field-Marshal's dry British wit, which shows all too infrequently. For example, when discussing his opposite number in the Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Kawabe, Slim writes:"I did, however, manage to get a photograph alleged to be that of Kawabe. It showed what might have been a typical western caricature of a Japanese; the bullet head, the thick glasses, and prominent teeth were all there... When I needed cheering I looked at it and assured myself that, whichever of us was the cleverer general, even I was, at any rate, the better looking."

William Slim is virtually unknown today - even among the history buff circles, he is a rate footnote. Yet, among those who have studied World War Two - and those few remaining who had direct experience beyond a limited theater view - Slim is regarded as one of the finest army commanders to have served on any front during the course of that war. Slim was among the few that endured defeat in the war's beginning - the agonizing, protracted withdrawal of Burma Corps over a thousand miles of jungle, mountain, swamp and river terrain in Burma and India in 1942 - and survived and had the opportunity to lead revitalized forces to victory in the end (British 14th Army). Revenge was sweet. Slim's memoirs are a treasure - full of criticism and praise in fair measure - with intelligent and honest commentary throughout. His assessments of the critical elements of a successful campaign are worthy of textbook study. Not only did Slim's men have to fight a fanatical, relentless foe in the Japanese - he had to contend with debilitating tropical disease, lack of air and land transport, non-existent infratstructure, shortages of all types of food and supplies, as well as neglect from his own country and army. Burma was in many ways the forgotten theater. Controversial figures such as the American Stilwell and the British Wingate are men that Slim knew well in Burma - and he does not shrink from giving his candid assessment of these figures - strengths and weaknesses. Above all, Slim's book is a testament to the courage, intelligence and fortitude of the fighting men - soldiers, airmen and sailors - of all nationalities (majority of the fighting on the Allied side in the Burma-India theater was by Indians). His comments on the nationalist movements of the Burmese, Indians and Chinese are also of interest, in view of post-war events in these countries, including the expulsion of British rule. Slim was a rare figure - an Army Commander bent on winning for all the right reasons - while always maintaining his touch with the front line solider. He was eager to assign glory to those that deserved it - those that did the fighting as well as those that toiled anonymously behind the lines to keep the forward troops supported. He was also rare in that he was ready and willing to admit mistakes were made, and how those mistakes were overcome. With so many critical decisions to be made in such desperate circumstances with such limited information - it is a wonder that any informed directives could be issued at the command level in that environment. His perspective on the Japanese is also worthy of further study. Slim had a distinguished war record prior to World War Two - he had served in several operations in World War One, in the Middle East between wars - he was familiar with how soldiers fought and died all over the world. His contempt for the Japanese - the atrocities they committed on a routine basis against not only captured, wounded soldiers but civili