Decent Interval

When this book was originally published in the late 1970s, it caused a firestorm of controversy due to its savage critique of the conduct of both the CIA and military advisory units within Vietnam. Written by a career CIA officer who resigned in disgust over the ways in which American policy both undermined and betrayed the very purposes we were supposed to be in Vietnam to promote, the book quickly became an international best-seller. Frank Snepp was the chief strategy analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon, and from his unique vantage point was able to discern most of policy discussions regarding the American approach to the ongoing conduct of the war assistance being provided to the South Vietnamese. What he discovered alarmed and surprised him, for the authorities were making plans to allow the fall of the Saigon regime even while reassuring their Vietnamese clients they would support them to the very end. As the title of the book indicates, the most salient characteristic of the American policy was to withdraw our forces in such a way as to allow a sufficient amount of time to go by before the North Vietnamese forces made a final fatal thrust into the south to take over, so that America would save face by not directly involved in the action resulting in the losing of the decade-long war. Instead, according to this strategy, there was to be a so-called "decent interval" of time separating the associated events of American withdrawal on the one hand, and the final campaign by the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) forces, on the other. Snepp was outraged by the treachery involved in such a strategy, and argued strenuously against thus, which would leave hundreds if not thousand of ardent and loyal South Vietnamese operatives at extreme risk, for they would be caught unaware when the final critical days came that the American forces would not come to their rescue. Snepp was even more surprised when he discovered that this strategy was not either the result of a local CIA operative such as the station chief, nor that of the CIA itself at the Langley, Virginia headquarters, but rather that it appeared to emanate from the highest levels of the executive branch of the government, from the office of Henry Kissinger and the office of the National Security Advisor to the President. This meant, of course, that it was a deliberate betrayal of the South Vietnamese by the American Government with full knowledge of the savage consequences this action would have for most of those who had worked so closely with the Americans for so long. For Snepp, this was treachery of the lowest and most unforgivable sort, a policy that served to punish our friends and reward our enemies, all done in the name of political expediency. Of course, in order to be effective, this strategy must remain secret, for having such information made public would expose both the Executive branch and the CIA for the craven treachery they were conspiring to commit. Thus, the pres

The author captured the dismay and controversy of the age i.e. the overwhelming desire to help everybody but not being able to. As an Air Force Security Policeman I was a guard on a C-130 as we loaded refugees up at Da Nang and Ton Sun Knut. On another assignment I had sniper duty on off loading refugees due to intelligence fears that refugees might be used as cover for an assualt.

As the CIA's chief strategy analyst in South Vietnam, Snepp is in a unique position to speak to the issues involved, and to chronical the final fall of the Republic of Vietnam. That the fault for that fall lies with us really goes without saying, even though without question he shows in great detail the ineptitude and corruption of many in the Saigon regime along with similar in our own ranks. Snepp shows all too clearly how the CIA (and the US generally) failed to honor its commitments in a thousand different ways, and undermined the RVN time and time again. In this, of course, Kissinger would agree; and yet Snepp painfully shows that it was Kissinger's own failures at the table in Paris that lead to much of what transpired in 1973-75. The account of the final days is riveting, just as it is tragic. You do not have a complete picture of what happened in Vietnam without this vital conclusion.

Frank Snepps book has had a lasting impression upon me. The US Ambassador Greene caused misery for a vast number of US employeed South Vietnamese by refusing to allow plans to be made for the US withdrawal from South Vietnam.Frank Snepp's book explains some of the unofficial activities of some good and some bad government officials during the winding down of the war. Some of the activities included dirty tricks such as creating fictitious spy lists and planting them into CIA field office safes just prior to their being overrun and the lists discovered. Others showed the weakness/cowardess of Vietnam's "best" army divisions and the heroic activities of their "worst" division. The book talks about the testing of a 10,000 pound cluster bomb that had to be pushed out the back of a C130 in its original crate because it was so big and of the devastating results from the explosion.Frank Snepp has written a gripping story about the end of the Vietnam war and how many people disobeyed orders and managed to help as many people escape as possible.It is unfortunate that the CIA had the book pulled from publication. It is a wonder someone in China is not reprinting the book.Randy Roscoe, Former Ssgt, USAF

Decent Interval, is an excellent description of the "cease fire" war years in South Vietnam from 1973-75. The book chronicles the suprisingly precipitous collapse of South Vietnam in 1975. Mr. Snepp takes us blow by blow through the unravelling of South Vietnam from the "beginning of the end" in the highlands to the last hours in Saigon before the North Vietnamese tanks rolled through the gates of the Presidential Palace. As the CIA's chief strategy analyst in South Vietnam, his knowledge of and involvement with multiple aspects of the war and its conduct make the information contained in the book invaluable. The book introduces the South Vietnamese, North Vietnamese and CIA personalities who made the critical decisions during those final months and days. Mr. Snepp discusses how President Thieu addressed and failed to address the ever increasing calamities of 1975. He also describes the sometimes shocking incompetence of many of South Vietnam's generals as well as the inadequacies of many of the CIA's "best and brightest".Mr. Snepp argues that the CIA specifically and the United States Government generally failed to honor commitments that were made to thousands of South Vietnamese who had put their faith in the United States and trusted in the assurances that they would not be left behind in the event of a North Vietnamese victory. Mr. Snepp pulls no punches in describing what he considers the undermining of South Vietnam by many of the United States Government's actions and inactions. It is his well reasoned position that the United States' failure to act combined with certain ill advised acts that were taken contributed significantly to South Vietnam's eventual collapse. However, he is very clear that much of the responsibility for South Vietnam's fall must in the end rest with the South Vietnamese themselves.The descriptions of Saigon's final days are particularly wrenching, exhilarating, tragic etc. This book is a must for anyone wanting an understanding of how the war in Vietnam finally ended on that morning of April 30, 1975. I highly recommend this book.