December 8, 1941: Macarthur's Pearl Harbor Volume 87

The author is known for his previous book, "Doomed From The Start" which is the history of the USAAF's fighters' struggles in the Philippines from December 8, 1941 until the surrender of Bataan. It was ground breaking hisotry and is the standard reference on the subject. This book looks at the results of just one day and asks "why?" Why was the Far East Air Force virtually destroyed on the ground the day after Pearl Harbor when there was plenty of warning about the attack on Pearl Harbor. The answer will surprise and dismay you. It is meticulously researched with numerous references and footnotes, but it is not dry history. There are plenty of first person stories woven into the book. It is well worth the price if you are an aficionado of WWII in the Pacific. A minor criticism is maps--there are virtually none--one small one that is so small in scale it is almost impossible to read and 50% of the airfields mentioned in the text are not shown. When will publishers learn that if you are publishing WWII history, include good maps that cross-reference the places written about in the text? Overall, a first class read and sure to be another "standard reference".

This is a follow up book to "Doomed From the Start" written by William Bartsch. This book takes the extra notes from his earlier work with interviews from both sides and numerous extracts from "Doomed" and Walter Edmonds book "They Fought With What They Had" and forms a very comprenhensive look at the events leading up to and immediately through the attacks on Clark and Iba Air Fields on 8 Dec 1941. The book starts in 1940 when the Air Corps begins modernizing the forces in the Philippines and looks at all the attempts by subordinate personnel to provide adequate forces, defense, and doctrine for the air forces of the far east. The book looks at the development of the Japanese operation plan and shows how junior officers and NCO's proved that the attack on Clark didn't require aircraft carrier support for escorts. This book illuminates enough blame for everyone above the rank of major in the chain up to and including FDR. The book points out a study conducted by Maj Hoyt Vandenburg (later AF Chief of Staff) after listening to briefings by Sir Hugh "Stuffy" Dowding on lessons learned by the RAF from the Battle of Britain which recommended action which if implemented might have delayed the final fall of the PI to a point that would have crippled the Japanese timetable most likely in a fatal manner. IMO a delay in taking Luzon by 6 months would have been fatal to Japanese intentions, a relatively secure Subic and Manila Bay would have provided a staging area for American submarines which would have made southern Japanese expansion untenable. The largest points to come out of the book may have been obvious before reading but are still worth noting: 1. American fighter aircraft and pilots were not up to the task of intercepting the Japanese even if suffecient numbers had been available for the intercept, most of the Americans never got above 18,000 feet, the Japanese bombed from 21,000. 2. MacAurthor or his chief of staff Sutherland was criminally negelent in releasing the Air Force to conduct offensive operations against Formosa...these may not have prevented the strikes against Clark but would have severely restricted future Japanese operations from there after repairs to the bases. Additionally it would have preserved the B-17's lost on the 8th. Overall this is an excellent book for those interested in delving into the formulation of a disaster that was 8 December1941. It left me screaming inside "IDIOTS, do un to others BEFORE they do un to you!"

A wonderful, masterful account of the disaster that befell the Phillipines the day after Pearl Harbor. This book is more a vast ciritque of the total failure of `I shall return' Macarthur then it is a history. This book includes wonderful personal experiences with military analysis of a total defeat for American arms. On December 8th the Americans at Clark Field and other locations should have been ready for attack by the Japanese but General `old soldiers never die' Macarthur simply ignored reports and claimed the Japanese could not strike his fortress of the Phillipines. This book is a study in Hubris that covers an oft ignored segment of World War Two. You will not be disappointed, this is a wonderful read!!!

This book is a "must read" for anyone interested in the events that took place in the Philippines only hours after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Most historians have focused on Pearl Harbor with little attention paid to the critical events that took place on Luzon only hours later. However, many students of military history believe that the December 8, 1941, Japanese air attack on United States air bases in the Philippines, one that resulted in the destruction of a significant portion of the Far Eastern Air Force, was just as strategically important, if not more so, than the attack on Pearl Harbor. William Bartsch has spent many years researching the events leading up to the Japanese air attack of December 8. Extensive interviews with both American and Japanese participants, and relatives of participants now deceased, have enabled him to relate an exciting, minute-by-minute account of events that took place on that fateful day. In addition to 424 pages of text, the book contains 45 photos, 10 appendices, 58 pages of text notes, 25 pages of source notes and a comprehensive index. MacArthur was informed of the Pearl Harbor attack at his penthouse apartment in the Manila Hotel approximately 9 hours before the Japanese attacked Clark Field at 12:15 on the afternoon of December 8. Louis Morton, a contemporaneous researcher of these events and author of the book, The Fall of the Philippines, characterizes the accounts of events during this time by MacArthur, General Brereton and General Sutherland as "conflicting." Rather than rush to conclusions regarding the placement of blame for the failure of American forces to successfully defend their Philippine air bases from incoming Japanese bombers, Bartsch has meticulously reconstructed the events of December 8 utilizing interviews and information gathered over a period of approximately 20 years. He has then drawn conclusions regarding the events of December 8 that are carefully considered and objectively reached over 60 years after the heat of battle has cooled. There will undoubtedly continue to be differing opinions regarding the reasons for the failure of the United States military to provide an effective defense against incoming Japanese bombers on December 8, 1941. However, Bartsch's scholarship has brought clarity to many of the issues involved and his book has filled an important gap in the history of WWII by providing the first comprehensive account of the military action that took place in the Philippines on that day. Although historians may someday write other books on this topic, Bartsch's fine book will probably remain the preeminent source for military scholars studying these events.

December 8, 1941: Macarthur's Pearl Harbor by William H. Bartsch aptly and accessibly studies the Japanese surprise attack against American forces in the Philippines that took place scarcely ten hours after the famous assault on Pearl Harbor. A number of historical questions are adroitly addressed including why Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur was caught with all his planes on the ground after he had been informed that morning of the Pearl Harbor attack. December 8, 1941: Macarthur's Pearl Harbor probes this episode of American military history with painstaking research drawn from both American and Japanese records, and uses this information to present a startlingly detailed portrayal of those tumultuous events in the opening days of American military involvement in the Pacific Theater of World War II.