Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942

In this text Professor Citino, although covering the German campaigns of 1942 in Russia and North Africa, does not make those activities the primary focus, per se, of his book. The books purpose is to provide perspective into historical German military history relative to what it has been from Napoleonic Wars. The book is actually more a part of a series as opposed to a stand-alone text. it is meant more of sequel to his "The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich" and "Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940". His discussion of the 1942 campaigns is in terms of the context of historical German military strategy, especially its weaknesses in the mechanized age when, unless one wins quickly, it cannot really pay off. Atrition and numbers, in the long term, would make it "obsolete". This is not to say that the book is not a good read on the German campaigns on the Eastern Front and North Africa in 1942, per se, but simply that this is not the book's primary goal.

Citino highlights operational manoeuvre as the Wehrmacht's early ace card supplemented by decision making that was devolved to officers in the field. This was a winning formula until the Allies superior materiel capabilities with their effective use of combined forces overwhelmed the German armies in North Africa and the Soviet Union. Ultimately, and most interestingly, Citino underscores the true folly of Hitler's adventures and the absence of any high level reflection by anyone in the Wehrmacht that recognised that there was no sustainable end point to the campaigns. A terrific read. Lucid, well written and plenty of lessons for present day policy makers.

Cetino is a master at his craft. His knowledge is deep and his research is thorough. I really enjoyed his book. He is not in the usual vein of triumphalist American authors. He places blame and credit where it is due and he is even handed in his assessment of all participants. His selection of campaigns is the key to his success and his discourse on why the Germans fought the way they did and why the Russians and the British fought the way they did is both incisive and highly readable. His coverage of the German campaign in the Crimea and the Caucasus is a very interesting coverage of a little known but very important and major campaign. His analysis of Alamein, while shorter, is also quite brilliant in its lucidity. he is the first author I know who has identified, quite so clearly, that Montgomery's WW1 experience taught him what worked for the British and what did not. He explains why Montgomery fought the Afrika Corps the way he did. The British way - slow and deliberate and with the application of massive force - especially artillery. Montgomery was indeed pedestrian but within these constraints he knew what he was doing and he did it passably well. Cetino explains how and why. Cetino spells out the relevant circumstances with clarity and makes fairly the telling point that the Russians paid for their eventual success with massive casualties. In the African campaign it was logistics, much of it from the US, that helped the British win at Alamein. The book is a very good read and a very balanced one also.

To get the full benefit of this outstanding work, I recommend the reader first review the author's earlier work, The German Way of War. In that volume, he analyzes the Prussian/German emphasis in its military history, service schools, traditions, and practices of focus on operational skills. Considering its Geographic location, its military goal was to execute quick, decisive wars which implied aggressive attack. While the book under review is an excellent stand alone product, I view it as a case study of the analysis the author promulgated in his previous study. He slices out the year 1942 to examine every major battle and campaign executed by the German army during that period. It concludes, of course, with the two defeats of Stalingrad and El Alamein. Because the campaign largely has been ignored thus far by historians, he includes the exhaustian of the army in the mountains of the Caucasus. Finally, he examines the British and Russian approaches to World WarII combat. The industrial might coupled with large conscript armies (here the impact of America is considered)overwhelmed the German approach to war making it obsolete on the attack. The army remained deadly in defense, of course. This author's pure writing skill makes the book a joy to read. His descriptions of the actual combat are easy to follow and provide good insight into the decisions made at that time with the information then available to the commanders. The maps are helpful and simple to comprehend. The footnotes are interesting and thoughtful. He's generous with remarks about other WWII historians. He's not fooled by the self-serving German General memoirs produced shortly after the conflict. If the book is reprinted, and I hope the demand is there, it would be helpful to add an index of the map symbols. There are occasional typos suggesting a more careful copy edit, but they don't interfere with the flow and are petty complaints. The author and the University of Kansas Press are to be congratulated on making this important addition to military history in general as well as WWII in particular. The book should be in every Library containing a military history section. Professional military personnel, historians and those interested in military history, or just history will benefit from reading Mr. Citino's contribution.