Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War

This book, rather like Caesar's Gaul, is divided into three parts. The first part explains how an Iraqi defector given the cover name `Curveball' ended up in Germany and how the German national intelligence service (BND) choose to exploit him. The second part concerns how the CIA reacted to the claims of Iraqi bio-warfare capabilities made by Curveball. The third part concerns the fruitless search for any indicators of viable Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or facilities to produce them. The book is quite well written and provides a lot of information about the whole sorry Curveball affair. Yet a word of warning is in order. Its author is a reporter not an intelligence operative, his windows into the secret world of intelligence are provided by informants who were or are on the inside of that world and who, like Curveball himself, have their own agendas. The book is enlivened by pieces of supposed dialogs and personal characterizations which may or may not be accurate. Drogin is too good a reporter not to know this, but too good a writer not to include them. They add drama and verisimilitude to his story. The book is a good read, but also supports a number of other accounts of the incredible ineptitude of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. Apparently the WMD team at CIA (WINPAC) had (has?) no idea of how to transform information into intelligence. They made the leap of logic that since the second hand reports of Curveball's debriefings (codenamed the `Hortensia' series) appeared internally consistent they constituted solid intelligence. They by all accounts made no real effort to verify or enhance these reports by other means and dismissed imagery information that did not support Curveball's assertions as Iraqi denial and deception. They also made no effort to consider if Curveball's assertions really made any sense given the nature of weaponization of biological agents. Late in the game they did provide the Bechtel Corporation with reproductions of Curveball's drawing of what he claimed were mobile production facilities (18Wheeler Trucks) and were reassured that yes they could be used for that purpose. What they did not ask and Bechtel did volunteer was what else could they be used for and how practical would it be run trucks full of bio-toxins over notoriously bad road. Finally they apparently made no effort to determine if Iraq had been seeking the technologies associated with bio-toxin production (e.g. containment technologies, vaccines, or protective gear). The National Intelligence Council (NIC) that produced the infamous pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) clearly did not know the difference between information and intelligence either. This is a sorry state of affairs indeed and not likely to be improved by the cosmetic reforms that have been undertaken by the U.S. Intelligence System since 9/11.

Bob Drogin's "Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War" is an examination of the refugee from Iraq, code named "Curveball," who contended that he had been involved in WMD biological warfare research and development. It is also another story of serious mistakes by American intelligence in the run up to the Iraq invasion after 9/11. In 1999, the Iraqi refugee ended up linking up with German intelligence. As the agents worked with the man who became code named "Curveball," they were convinced that he must be telling the truth about knowledge of biological weapons developed by Iraq. He was an engineer and, he claimed, had been involved in the development of systems to deliver biological agents in warfare. The details convinced the Germans; they communicated with American and British intelligence, but tended to jealously guard their source and not let other intelligence services get near him. However, over time, the German intelligence team began to wonder more and more about his veracity. After 9/11 and as the Bush Administration looked more closely at the possibility of regime change in Iraq, Curveball's story became an integral part of the case being developed against Saddam Hussein and justifying invasion. The threat of WMD was a key part of the justification for war. And Curveball's reports were accorded great weight in the United States. The book is written well. Its dependence on sources, some anonymous, who may have axes to grind is obviously something that readers must keep in mind. However, this is yet another in a series of books that clearly suggests that the Administration actively sought out information to support its already made decision to invade Iraq. And even though there might be axes to grind, the momentum of Drogin's historical account seems to be pretty well supported. Drogin concludes by observing that many criticized American intelligence and law enforcement agencies for not connecting the dots before 9/11. However, he claims (Page 281), "In this case, the CIA and its allies made up the dots. Iraq had never built or planned to build any mobile weapons labs. It had no other WMD. The U.S. intelligence apparatus, created to protect the nation, conjured up demons that did not exist. America never before has squandered so much blood, treasure, and credibility on a delusion." Harsh words. Also, was he actually the person who, as per the title, "caused a war"? It appears that the Administration had already made up its mind and Curveball's "intelligence" was simply one more argument in favor. Readers must decide if the author accurately makes his case.

Curveball doesn't presume to tell the complete story of how the US came to invade Iraq--but it does the best job of it of the books I've read. It shows how the intelligence supporting the decision to go to war was a house of cards built on an extremely shaky foundation and how the process of intelligence analysis and assessment was distorted by the desire of the intelligence community to tell the nation's leaders what they wanted to hear. The book is extraordinarily well written and engaging, but doesn't sacrifice its integrity by oversimplifying what happened. The easier path in a book about a colossal failure is to make it a simple, viscerally satisfying, story of actors who are stupid or evil. No question that Curveball tells the story of a colossal failure and that those responsible did stupid things and, in some cases, acted without the best of motives. What distinguishes this book is that it shows how real people who should have known better came to deceive themselves, the country and much of the world into believing that there was solid information that Saddam Hussein's Iraq possessed biological and other weapons of mass destruction. There's culpability here from top to bottom--with heroes mixed in who tried to make things right but were willfully ignored, suppressed and dismissed. That isn't to say this lets the President and Vice-President off the hook. They played their roles in the intelligence failure and the President has the ultimate responsibility for the decision to go to war--and no one can know whether better intelligence on WMD would have given him pause. But this is not a simple story of "the President lied" or "the CIA was incompetent"--and for that it's a book that squares well with how things like this really come to happen. As for the writing . . . this was the best written book of non-fiction I've read in many years. The story is complicated but it doesn't feel that way reading the book. It's genuinely as hard to put down as a well-crafted spy novel or mystery.

For all kinds of reasons--penetrating research, narrative flow, nifty phrases, occasional gentle wisecracks, helpful appendices-- 'Curveball" is a remarkable achievement. Equally appealing is the tone: Drogin leaves the reader to ponder the many complexities rather than arguing his own views. Even the footnotes are fascinating. The book also cleared up a disturbing concern of mine going back to CIA chief George Tenet's February 2004 Georgetown speech, a chunk of which I happened to catch on CSpan. He came across as a policy advocate, not the detached collector and evaluator of intelligence that's needed in the job. "Curveball" provides a context that helps explains this dangerous man. Of course, the book does a lot more than that, describing, much like a business school case review. how the "intelligence community" leadership can abandon common sense in favor of catering to the White House or competing with other agencies. One wonders if the same thing is going on today with respect to Iran.

Americans have slowly come to accept that we went to war in Iraq without proper thought, planning or justification. Curveball Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War lays bare, in gripping and damning detail, how ego and arrogance led us to war -- and in the process, how the same ego and arrogance alienated nations with whom we've been friends for years. Drogin has done a great service to the reading public, both in presenting the book like a very well written spy novel and by letting the facts themselves speak so dramatically about the state of our national security.