Crossing the Rhine: Breaking Into Nazi Germany 1944 and 1945--The Greatest Airborne Battles in History

I did not have high expectations for Crossing the Rhine but since I have a great interest in the European campaign, I had to give it a try. I am incredibly pleased that I did. Clark's book takes on Operations Market Garden and Plunder Varsity. And though much of this has been covered before, he adds new content, analysis and an engaging style that makes it read like fascinating fiction rather than history. This was the high water mark for airborne forces as military doctrine soon made mass parachute operations obsolete. However, their sole purpose was to disrupt and surprise and so they naturally morphed into special forces in most armies thus continuing the goal of disruption. Clark begins with an appropriate backstory on the history of airborne units, their strategy and tactics. It moves quickly into the bulk of the book which covers Market Garden. He brings fresh material to what was covered in "A Bridge Too Far" and other books on the operation. Blending first party recollection with unit histories and strategic analysis, Clark moves the reader from trench to command trailer with ease. I was struck for the first time by the absence of close-in air support during Market Garden. Much credit is given to the effectiveness of artillery but it seems strange that the allies did not employ the same airforce tactics used in Normandy and the breakout. He brings Market Garden to life and communicates extremely well the common soldier's difficulties in the field. Market Garden inevitably did not meet all objectives because of its three lifts over five days which robbed the airborne of its greatest assets: surprise and initial attacking strength. Chapter 8 'Riposte' itself was worth the cost of the book. This one chapter does a fantastic job of outlining the strategic situation in the fall of 1944. It is a valuable compact summary that provides amazing new facts (the U.S. had 30 divisions still waiting stateside for possible deployment at this time). It covers the question of Montgomery's ego versus competency. I for one believe that he made a series of egotistical decisions in order to maintain his reputation gained in the desert campaign. This is reflected in his desire for a sole narrow front strategy in Europe to be led by himself. It appears that the slow closing of the Falaise Gap and the failure to take Antwerp precipitated both Market Garden and the cautious approach to Plunder Varsity. I gained greater appreciation for Eisenhower and his diplomatic conduct in running the European Campaign and I never knew that Marshall threatened to resign if the British did not cease certain demands and behaviors. The 'third' part of the book, covers the airborne crossing of the Rhine in March, 1945. The size of the force assembled on Operation Veritable which was the preamble to Plunder Varsity was amazingly large. As a Canadian it was interesting to learn that General Crerar and the Canadian First Army led this operation of 300,000 troops, 35,000 vehicles

As a version that comes from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst the reader should expect a British slant in this retelling of The Bridge Too Far story. However, in Crossing the Rhine, Lloyd Clark adds a comparative perspective by linking it with Montgomery's late and successful attack across the Rhine River as the opening of the last chapter of World War II in the west. As far as Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem go there is little new information, only the contrarian view that Market Garden was the right strategy and was mostly successful. As for Plunder Varsity the author breaks some ground by presenting the operation as airborne-centric. Clark acknowledges that many authorities feel that given the huge human and material advantages Montgomery brought to the Rhine battle he would have succeeded even without the airborne component. That view, however, will remain hindsight, and Clark's version is detailed and objective enough for the readers to decide the issue for themselves. While stressed throughout, the arguments about Eisenhower's broad front and Montgomery's single prong assault on Germany are not really explored in any depth. This book is really just about the strategy and tactics of these two operations, what worked, what failed, what was learned, and whether in the end the airborne forces were decisive or just the First Allied Airborne Army in search of an objective. As such it is enjoyable, well written, and a good addition to the huge WW II library. By telling the tale mostly through the written or verbatim recollections of all the ranks and both the sides Clark does make the history personal, and the narrative moves briskly. The Battle of the Bulge appears as a brief intermission. As a Yank reader I did feel Montgomery gets the benefit of most doubts, but there is no real criticism of Marshall or Eisenhower and certainly no bias against the American land or airborne forces. As with many books of military history I found the maps to be completely inadequate with no tight connection to the text. The "54 black and white photos" include only a few that are very familiar and many new ones that are quite germane to the particular events. Mr. Clark's Introduction and Epilogue are very personal, but he has the good sense to leave himself out of the rest of the book. Since I was reading the American edition I assume there was previously a British edition, and there is also mention that the book was first published by Headline Review. If this book passed by that many editors and fact checkers I must ask how this sentence remains to embarrass the historian Lloyd Clark? On page 256 of this edition you may read, "Winston Churchill, who recognized the need not to antagonize the Americans more than was absolutely necessary (and not at all if the chances of success were virtually nil), felt the need to write to Theodore Roosevelt in the wake of Monty's faux pas:" A typo like that could only come from Sandhurst.

A fresh look at one of the most controversial operations in the entire history of warfare. Mr. Clark's book is a good blend of historical background information, editorial comments and interviews/quotes from private to Field Marshall, allied and axis. There are even insights from civilians who witnessed part of the battle. Mr. Clark's book brings Operation Market Garden to life, so you feel emotionally connected to the men fighting to gain or retain vital terrain. An excellent read that clearly demonstrates the narrow margin for success or failure of a military operation, especially W.W.II Airborne Operations. I can't wait to read Mr. Clarks other book on Anzio. Buy this book you will be glad you did. I have had the opportunity to email with the author, he is a fine gentleman. (LTC, USA (Ret), 82d ABN DIV ASSN.

What a wonderful book. If you want to understand airborne warfare in WW2 then this is for you. It is a book that looks at the airbonre attempts to cross the Rhine - which is clear in the subtitle - not a book about all of the Rhine Crossings. I found it extremely balanced with the Brits being criticised when there is evidence for it, and applauded when there is just cause. The narrative speeds along - Clark writes really well - but the way he slips from the generals to the soldiers is impressive. He also manages to talk about training, weapons and equipment with ease and interest. I feel the need to recommend this not only to anyone who is intersted in airborne warfare or WWII, but to anyone wanting to understand war. In short, brilliant.

There is something adventurous and onerous about "Crossing the Rhine," military historian Lloyd Clark, author of Anzio: Italy and the Battle for Rome - 1944, goes for two undeniably great stories -- one infamous -- the other ignored today. The story of Operation Market-Garden has been told countless times before, but in Operation Plunder-Varsity, the largest airdrop of the Second World War, there are plenty of new angles for readers to explore. Well-written and researched, Lloyd Clark's book is a stirring narrative of the Allied airborne divisions during their most fascinating period. Mr. Clark shows us the big picture. He writes, "They were a remarkable group of men carrying out a difficult and dangerous job in trying conditions." He notes, "Such soldiers were trained to fight for their lives as soon as they reached the ground and recognized that being surrounded by an enemy that outnumbered and out gunned them was a normal state of affairs." Mr. Clark details the battles day-by-day: the tactics, the objectives, the successes, the losses and the shifting strategic and operational arguments on both sides. For sure, he offers a rounded account of is subject. What he does not lack is the ability to tell a story. Readers with a merely casual interest in the Second World War are likely to read it cover to cover. This apt fusion of action and content make for a surprisingly apprehensive and fast-paced tale. In "Crossing the Rhine," Mr. Clark provides an enthralling conversation covering everything and anything about Montgomery's airborne operations. We witness the glider crashes; the house-to-house fighting; the burning panzers; the strafing Typhoons; the floundering assault boats; the danger of it all. The best parts of "Crossing the Rhine" occur when Mr. Clark tells us how Horrack's racing armored column failed to cross the Rhine during Operation Market-Garden and the British and Polish airborne units are sacrificed on the enemy side of the Rhine. Mr. Clark effortlessly brings his characters on both sides to life through colorful details and well-chosen anecdotes, while taking us on a muddy tour of the airborne drop zones and German-held bridges. "Crossing the Rhine" radiates anxiety and action. Though it seems so, Montgomery wasn't the only one with a vested interest in launching these operations. For Lieutenant-General Browning, Operation Market-Garden "offered a last chance to attain the experience that he lacked and he was therefore unsympathetic to anything that might trip up the scheme...he fell into the front rank of a powerful section of senior figures which included Marshall and Arnold, keen to see what the FAAA could achieve; Churchill, desirous of the destruction of the Dutch V2 sites; Eisenhower, wishing to further his strategy and attain a Rhine crossing; Lieutenant-General Lewis Brereton who at last had a plan worthy of his FAAA; and Monty, who was following his own agenda." To Mr. Clark's credit he reports beyond t