Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes

Far too often far too many books on military history fall exclusively into one form or the other. There is the official Center for Military History model where impersonal units conduct operations bereft of fear, confusion, bravery, wisdom, fortitude, fatigue, and other abiding human factors. ("History without human beings," is how one wag put it.) The other model, common in books for a mass audience, is bereft of such institutional issues as military education, force structure, campaign planning, and execution. Harold Winton's Corps Commander of the Bulge shows that a true expert can handle both: painstakingly detail operations, on the one hand, but discuss the different decisions different leaders make, on the other. Winton, in the process, does not shy away from taking on some daunting reputations, including Matt Ridgway, whom Winton's own father was a military aide. Ridgway had courage and endurance, no one questions. He also had a dysfunctional streak of rigidity, Winton makes clear. All in all, this is not only a very important book about a very important operation. It is a model for how military history should be written.

There is little to add to the previous excellent reviews except to express the wish the publisher had printed a separate detailed map book to accompany the text. For the lay reader, the author divides the subject into sensible portions. He points out a Corps is a fighting command not weighted down with the administrative and logistical demands of a division or levels of command above a Corps. The Prologue describes the American philosophy of command; introduces the six commanders in separate entries providing their background and military experience; sums up the different aspects of both allied and German planning leading up to the battle. The battle is dealt with over the balance of the book as reviewers have described. He ends with a brief description of the careers of the major players after the war. In that chapter, to my mind, he raises a fascinating question followed by a mind boggling supposition. As the war recedes more than a half century into the past, Bradley's reputation continues to shrink. What if Troy MIddleton had taken Eisenhower's advice in 1937 and not retired from the army? Since his credentials were far higher than Bradley"s, and he was considered, perhaps next to Marshall, the most highly regarded infantryman of the interwar period, he would have been the leading candidate to command the First Army in the Normandy invasion. He would have likely risen to command 12th Army Group. If that had been the case, it's very unlikely he would have allowed his staff to neglect the challenges of fighting in the bocage country prior to the invasion. Furthermore, he wouldn't have become nervous about closing the trap on the German 7th Panzer Army at Falaise. Despite the many outstanding volumes concerning the German Ardennes offensive, this book is recommended to any student of WWII as well professional soldiers and libraries.

After reading perhaps a dozen books on the Battle of the Bulge including the most recent Alamo in the Ardennes, I really enjoyed the presentation, style, and substance of Professor Winton's book. Rarely have I found presentations that encapsulate the functions of the corp commander and perhaps more importantly the movement of divisions between armies and corps to provide the level and complexity of force required in battle. This book captures also the personalities of the corp commanders and their bosses e.g. Patton and Middleton/Millikin/Eddy as well as Montgomery and Bradley at the army group level. Professor Winton has structured his book to capture all of these aspects well. You won't find this in any of the other treatments of the Battle. However, I will support another reviewer who complained about the number of maps linked to the text. Sometimes I had Toland, MacDonald and others open to figure out the battle space so be prepared. Still,a great read.

I agree with the first reviewer that this is one of the most refreshingly new ways at looking at a very studied battle. I have read many of the general histories (A Time for Trumpets by McDonald is my favorite). Looking at the men who commanded the six corps that bore the brunt of the battle, examining their history and education, explaining the corps system and it's reason for being where all very educational and interesting. Dr. Winston did a great job of explaining what each of these men were up against, the resources at their disposal, and how they executed their missions, be it defence or offense, carefully planned, or on the fly. Dr. Winston broke the Bulge battle up into three phases, explained what each corp commander faced in each phase and assessed each commander's performance for each phase and then did an overall assessment in the epilogue. He also tried to measure the effect of Allied air power in the battle, from direct support (ground attack, air superiority and air resupply) and indirect support (interdiction missions against communication and supplies). My only peeve with this book is the sloppy editing/proofreading concerning the identification of German combat units. If the reader was not familiar with the battle, he/she could find it confusing. Some Wehrmacht units were identified as Waffen SS and vice versa, the 9th Panzer Division was also identified as the 9th Panzergrenadier (which never existed). These errors were not systematic, which points to proof reading/editing. Doctor Winston has an excellent grasp of the Allied order of battle. There are numerous sources of the German order of battle easily available to the author, his editors and his publisher. So I found this factor annoying (I find sloppy proof reading/ fact checking in anything I read annoying) and considering Dr. Winston's background and intense interest in the Ardennes battle, disappointing. But besides that slight annoyance, I found this book an excellent read and would recommend it to anyone interested in this particular battle or wanting to know how the corps system functions.

Just when you thought that there couldn't be another useful book on the Battle of the Bulge, Professor Harold Winton proves us wrong with this fine portrait of the battle that focuses on the way it was commanded by the six American corps commanders who were involved: Gerow, Middleton, Ridgeway, Milikin, Eddy and Collins. This emphasis on what Winton calls "the middle level of command" allows us to see the battle as it developed operationally and provides the reader with perhaps the clearest and most understandable narrative of the Battle of the Bulge ever written. Winton helpfully divides the history of the battle into three phases and covers the activities and decisions of the officers in each phase: their relationships with their superiors and subordinates, what tactical demands the battle placed on them, and even how they held up physically and psychologically. Since the book also includes brief biographies of those officers, Winton is able to evaluate the effectiveness of how the US Army educated its officers for higher command between the World Wars - all six were CGSS and five of them were War College grads. Winton also takes the time to show the true role of allied air power in the battle. All in all, this book is a must-read for those who study the Battle of the Ardennes and the US Army in the Second World War. One small sour note: either Dr. Winton or his editors at University Press of Kansas - a military history publisher of note - should have been aware that Marlborough was not at Waterloo (see p.160).