Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry

P.W. Singer has written a very insightful and detailed look into the modernization and globalization of the private military firms. The private military firm is not a new concept but actually dates back thousands of years. These firms are better known under the more controversial name: mercenaries. It'd be unfair to say that all private military firms are like the mercenary companies of old. Sure there are still flight-by-night firms that hire themselves out to the highest bidder, switching allegiances on a dime, and committing acts of brutality that made them so infamous during the African civil war and wars of liberation in the late 1950's and through most of the 1960's. The modern private military firm as described by Singer has more in common with corporations that deal in outsourcing specific jobs. Corporate Warriors goes through in describing the many different types of firms. From the provider firms like Executive Outcomes (a famous early 90's firm created by former South African military operatives) which take a fron-line role in training, advising and fighting for their clients. Then there's firms like the US-based MPR who provide military assistance in the form of advisors that range from ex-generals to former veteren noncoms. The third type would be firms like Halliburton who provide non-combat services (mess hall, laundry, logistics, etc...) for the US Military and its allies. What all these types of private military firms have in common is in the way they are run. These firms are run like Fortune 500 firms and alot of the companies in the Fortune 500 make use of these firms' services. Whether for help in negotiating with the governments of third world nations to security detail for corporate officers. These firms in the last decade or so have seen a rise in their profits as the US government and its military services have begun outsourcing noncombat duties to outside firms. It is this new practice begun by the US and mirrored by its allies that Singer points should be a concern. Such firms are not bound by the rules of war and engagement. They also don't fall under the rules of the Geneva Convention in terms of prisoner status in the event employees of such firms become so. With the proliferation of PMF operatives and advisors in combat zones around the world it's inevitable that such employees will become front-line participants in such conflicts instead of staying out in the sidelines. One prime example of such an occurence was the ambush and killing of four Blackwater security operatives in Iraq. In fact, employees of these PMF's account for a very lrage percentage of civilian contractors killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another example where the line between military and civilian has blurred has been the use of civilian contractors to advise and conduct interrogations not just in Abu Ghraib, Iraq but also in Guantanamo Bay. Such a blurring of the lines has led to corruption and criminal acts. Singer points this out in detai

Throughout history, private interests have performed military duties and always proved a critical political factor. Celts and Germans worked in the Roman Emperor's personal Praetorian Guard, King Edward I employed professional companies of archers, and the Swiss fought all over Europe, and are still guarding the Vatican. It's only in the 19th and 20th centuries that the state has become the sole legitimate agent in the conduct of military operations. The 1990s, however, have witnessed the emergence of private organized interests at every level of military operations. The twist comes because today these private military firms (PMFs) are organized as twenty first century corporations, with business plans and long term profit objectives. Singer's analysis begins with an account of private military interests in ancient and modern times. This gets us used to the idea that PMFs have been around before and are really nothing new. In the second section, Singer classifies PMFs in three segments, each characterized by how far its activities are from actual fighting. First and most obvious there are the military provider firms that place frontline military units (e.g. Executive Outcomes) second there are the consulting firms who train and shape a client's military (e.g. Military Professional Resources Inc.) and third there are the firms that provide logistical and support services such as food delivery (e.g. Brown and Root). Lastly, Singer examines the implications of using PMFs, which of course being corporations are motivated by profit. Singer illustrates how seemingly simple precepts result in fiendishly complex moral problems. Do we feel uneasy at for-profit military firms? Of course we do and so we are tempted to dismiss any question of using them. But In 1994, one of the more unsavory firms, Executive Outcomes, created a plan that for some 150 million dollars could have stopped the Rwandan genocide and saved hundreds of thousands of lives.(*) The UN Security Council balked at the costs, nothing was done until the genocide was well under way and half a million people were butchered. Do we support relief organizations such as CARE? Do we give them money? I do. But how should we feel about the Red Cross and CARE using that money to hire PMFs as protection? Is it right for them to support PMFs? Is it right of us to expect them to go into dangerous situation with inadequate UN or local military protection? Singer's conclusions are only tentative, and given the emphasis he's placed on how complex the moral dilemma is, this is only proper. He neither condemns nor supports the rise of PMFs, he merely states that they exist and are on the rise, he describes how they operate, and he points out the practical and moral dilemmas that arise from making use of them. He ends with a rewording of the proverb that war is too important to be left to generals: war is too important to be left to private industry. In other words, he warns us that while PMFs are h

Most folks will automatically assume this is a book about the latest generation of mercenaries. While that's certainly an aspect of this industry, there's a far more surprising side to this story: Their role in the restoration of peace, and in the reconstruction of wartorn countries. Thus, private military firms (PMF's) are actually one of the 8 sectors of restorative development, often referred to as the global "restoration economy", which currently accounts for about $2 trillion annually. [Restorative development is defined as "socioeconomic revitalization based on restoration of the natural and built environments".] This shouldn't be so surprising, given that most of them come from engineering or construction roots. But, why the dichotomy of good and evil? It's simple, really: When PMF's are used to advance "new development" (such as exploiting someone else's natural resources, which often requires a "regime change"), they are often operating on "the dark side". When they are advancing "restorative development", they are usually the "good guys". The same dynamic can be found in the ordinary (non-PMF) civil engineering community.Corporate Warriors does a wonderful job of documenting this fast-growing, highly profitable "ancient" industry, which is experiencing a rebirth as a major global force after 3 centuries of slumber.

Corporate Warriors is an exceptionally well written, well sourced book that will forever alter the way you view the present and future of American foriegn policy and of contemporary war on a global scale. It is a very balanced assesment of the privitization of war, which both exposes some very frightening aspects of the deal-making surrounding it's major players, yet demystifies other components and makes the case for a responsible, accountable use of these corporations. The lingering questions that one is left with at the end of its reading resonate with essential issues concerning globalized capitalism, namely its insatiable demand for the expansion and reinvention of its markets. Here, violence becomes a commodity and market economics come head to head with the social contract and moral conflicts unimagined just a few decades past.

Singer's categorizations of military assistance organizations confer clarity in a fragmented, heterogenous field of activity. When one thinks of quintessential 'government-provided' services, one thinks of education, prisons, policing, and the military. While privatization in the first three such areas has been studied extensively, Singer has provided here an essential overview and analysis of how privatization has unfolded, to a much greater extent than we may realize, in the military sphere. 5 stars- as readable as it is insightful.