Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government

Too often our discussion of rule of law and democracy have equated constitutionalism with a respect for rights. In this book, Brown suggests we distinguish between constitutional text and liberal constitutionalist ideals. For example, Brown makes the argument that often rulers are able to get away with authoritarian practices not in violation of their country's constitution, but because that constitution is already weak and illiberal. In many Arab constitutions, executive leaders and kings retained significant power, while legislatures were reduced to mere advisory boards. Furthermore, the executives creatively used ambiguity to further their power (for example, in an early Tunisian constitution, the sultan claimed the power to issue decrees with force of law since the Constitution did not address this issue). Brown's framework is useful beyond the Middle East. I hope Brown, or somebody following him, applies his framework to China, which is also increasingly trying to institutionalize an authoritarian order based upon an authoritarian constitution.

Brown's argument is impressively supported: although most Arab countries have constitutions, the constitutions themselves do not function as Americans would expect. However, the cynical rejection of these documents as cosmetic devices is flawed, as Arab governments do use these constitutions and they have real meaning, with some prospects for further development.With all the recent talk of 'democratization' in the Middle East, one would do well to read Nathan Brown and revisit the agenda. What is needed may not be democratization (as elections) but constitutionalism (as in legal restraints on power).Highly recommended, particularly for those seeking a nontechnical introduction that goes well-beyond the redundant, think tank inspired cheerleading that passes for scholarship on democracy.