Colossus: The Price of America's Empire

I ordered a copy of this book described "Like New!" and got a copy that was worn with significant amounts of highlighting in it to the point where it's distracting.

Niall Ferguson is one of the most exciting and interesting 'thinkers' in the world today. He is a historian with great knowledge but the most interesting part of his work is a whole set of ideas which challenge the conventional historical wisdom of our day. One of Ferguson's innovations is to bring back and make centrally important to the reading of history, the concept of Empire. As he sees it this category has been central to Mankind far longer than that of 'nation- state' In a previous work he looked at the British Empire and again surprised most in our politically correct world by seeing the positive functions the British Empire played. The rule of law, bureaucratic reliability, the flow of capitol for investment and development were part, as he saw it, of the British gift to its colonies. In this present work he looks at the great power of the world today, the Colossus which is the United States. In military terms it overshadows all other great powers taken together. Economically it is still the great engine of the world though it is to a degree being challenged by the rise of Europe and China. Culturally too, thanks to the hegemony of English it is the prevailing world - power. Ferguson finds fault with the United States in a way most unusual. He does not curse it as an 'imperial exploiter' but rather sees it as a reluctant giant not willing to fulfill its true global responsibilities. He faults the U.S. for having too few people willing to serve abroad, and help the world. He faults the U.S. for the weakness it shows through having too much debt. He faults the U.S. for not knowing its own imperial role properly and not transforming the world for the good to the fullest degree possible. All of this is tremendously interesting, but sounds a bit odd given the current U.S. involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the defiance it is facing from a would- be- nuclear Iran. It is possible to argue that America's feet of clay are more and more apparent, even in the military realm where it is most supreme. The whole non- proliferation issue may be broken open by North Korea and Iran, leading to a world with tens of nuclear states. Ferguson wants the American citizenry to be more informed about the world, more involved in it, more responsible for it. It seems to me that he is not wrong in his demands, but perhaps a bit unrealistic in expecting them to be realized. But what Ferguson does is he provides the reader a way of truly thinking anew about the world- and of deeply considering new perspectives.

This is a compelling and worthwhile read. It is not an "anti-US" book, but provides constructive analysis of foreign policy. Niall Ferguson is a professor at NYU plus a fellow at Oxford and the Stanford Hoover Institution. He has authored six other books on politics, history, and economics. In this book he attempts to bring together economic data, history, and political concepts to prove some points about the role of "empires" in the spreading of economic and political benefits. One of his main points concerns the success of past empires such as the British Empire in the spread of democratic institutions, democratic ideals, trade, investment, and economic growth. The British Empire was in fact a vehicle that spread positive economic and social development across the globe. It provided a political and economic framework for the development of many countries and regions. When there was de-colonization, some of the poorer countries that were not yet self sufficient failed to sustain develop on their own and have remained mired in war, disease, etc. and run by various undemocratic repressive regimes. These states - some even with the benefit of oil wealth - among others are now "failed states" and are problematic to themselves and other world citizens. The author claims that the UN is really quite a small and an ineffective political institution having a budget of less than 0.1% of the US federal government. It is not an institution (yet) where we can solve the world's problems. The US on the other hand, although far larger than any other country economically and militarily, is caught in an imperialistic ambivalence in which the US can perceive injustices and can in fact invade countries with overwhelming military force, but then lacks the ability to remain focused for any length of time once the war is over. Once the quick military victory is won, it wants to bring the troops home and in general it fails to follow through. The invaded country is not left in a state of political equilibrium or economic self sufficiency. Lacking the needed stability and permanent reform, such countries remain problem "failed states" - like Afghanistan. He claims that the US is an imperialistic nation but is in a state of self denial. Even though the rest of the world views the US as imperialistic, the US itself fails to grasp or wants to avoid that concept because of the potential negative self image connotations. So the US remains ambivalent and confused in its foreign policy, and according to the author lacks the ability to carry out comprehensive and coherent foreign policy. Symptomatic of that is the concept of a limited war - sending for example 250,000 troops to Iraq when the generals said send 500,000 (my figures). Also he thinks that US suffers from an "attention deficit" syndrome, plus self doubts, internal confusion, and looks for quick military solutions. It remains largely fearful of any long term conflict that produces American casualties similar to Vi

Colossus, by Niall Ferguson, is in a sense a sequel to his previous book, Empire. In Empire, Ferguson presented the history of the British Empire and drew the conclusion that British rule had a net positive effect on the former colonies. He justifies this conclusion by pointing out the economic and political benefits conferred by the transmission of 19th century British practices and institutions, especially honest and competent government, the rule of law, and free trade. In Colossus, Ferguson presents the United States as the reluctant, and possibly transitory, successor to British imperial power. Despite the reluctance of most Americans to acknowledge, much less advocate, an imperial role, the US currently has the key attributes of an imperial power: 1. Absolute dominance in military power (which appears likely to persist for the foreseeable future). 2. Nearly absolute dominance in current economic power (which appears likely to diminish in relative terms over the next few decades). 3. Preeminence in cultural power (derived in part from the dominance of the English language and in part from the size and success of the US economy). The ability to exercise imperial power may be a necessary condition for its existence, but it is not a sufficient condition. See, for example, Fareed Zakaria's From Wealth to Power in which he examines the evolution of international role played by the US. Ferguson's message in Colossus is that an American imperial role would be a good thing for the world in general. His concern is that the American people and the federal budget may not support such a role. Popular support for foreign, let alone imperial, involvement has never been strong in the US. Our only large and lasting commitment to a world-role seems to have started with our involvement in World War II and run through the Cold War up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now that we no longer have a clearly defined enemy whose military power approaches our own, the willingness of the American people to support long-term and costly foreign involvement, appears to be returning to pre-WWII levels. To contrast the American and British support for empire, Ferguson notes that a career in the Indian Civil Service attracted many of the top Oxford and Cambridge graduates in the 19th century. How many Harvard or Yale graduates today are seeking even temporary assignments in Iraq or Afghanistan? The long-term demographic and fiscal problems presented by the Social Security and Medicare budgets may limit our ability to fund a major military involvement in world affairs some time in the next few decades. This thesis tracks very well with that of Paul Kennedy in his book, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. Colossus is well worth reading, whether or not you agree with the author's wish that the US would adopt a stronger imperial role. The argument that imperialism is not always bad is an interesting counterpoint to Fareed Zakaria's argument in The Future of Freedom t

Ferguson's thesis is basically as follows: the world is a very dangerous place because it contains menacing terrorist and criminal organizations along with numerous states which are either (a) unstable or failed states and thus breeding grounds for the aforementioned (e.g. Afghanistan), or (b) all-too-stable states which give support to the same. Given that (1) the UN's membership is made up of tyrants (e.g. Zimbabwe), dysfunctional governments (e.g. Congo) and states which are simply irresponsible (e.g. Russia), and that (2) Europe is too weak both militarily and morally to keep order, the United States has to do it. Yet the U.S. itself may be unable to fill this role due to its financial imbalances and the unwillingness of individual Americans to serve abroad or even pay attention to what is happening. Overall evaluation: The fact that I give this book a "five star" rating should not imply that agree with it entirely. Ferguson sets forth several main theses, with which I agree entirely, and along the way makes numerous judgments on ancillary issues, several with which I disagree. I am a specialist in Middle East affairs, and I think Ferguson's understanding of the region is basically sound and much better than most who write about these things. I disagree with a few factual evaluations, but I only noticed one blatant factual error: the Abu Nidal Organization (formed in 1973) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (formed in 1967) did not arise in the 1980s with Hizbullah and Hamas, and furthermore they were (the ANO doesn't exist now) and are not Islamist or identified with Islam in any significant way (as misstated on pages 123-124). This book is valuable and worth reading for two reasons. First, Ferguson lays out why it is that some global hegemon is necessary and beneficial to the world, and why the U.S. can and should fill that role. He notes that regions of the world where U.S. military hegemony is lacking tend to be violent, poor and unstable. Not merely Europe but the other more developed regions of the world have benefited from this military umbrella. He also discusses how the British empire, despite the brutality and exploitation which often came with it, also held many economic and security benefits for nations under British rule. Ferguson's argument is not that the U.S. should try to copy what the British did, but that they should learn from their predecessors in hegemony, keep the good, get rid of the bad, and do better for themselves and the world today. Second, Ferguson argues that despite the ability of the United States to be a force for good in the world, its foreign policy, or "empire," as he puts it, has serious weaknesses due to its three "deficits" - its financial deficit, its manpower deficit, and its attention deficit. The financial deficit comes not from military spending, but from the estimated $45 trillion in unfunded liabilities from Medicare/Medicaid and, to a lesser extent, Social Security. The man

You will correctly surmise from purusing other reviews of this work that Niall Ferguson's books attract very well informed and thoughtful readers who are not at all reluctant to let him have it if in their view he strays too far into the counterfactual world he helped revive and refine with his works such as "Virtual History." My own take on the rather strong negative reactions engendered by "Colossus" here and elsewhere is that they are generated--like many counterfactuals--by Ferguson's message being taken too seriously on the one hand and not seriously enough on the other. "Colossus" is an essay on possibilities, not a prescription for world domination. It asks--and attempts to answer--the question of why the United States is such a reluctant world leader (in terms of active intervention in its affairs) and explores the possible implications of its shedding its historical aversion to international activism. What I find lacking in negative reviews is an appreciation, however reluctant, of the value of this inquiry whatever the likelihood of its practical application. And this failure to "get" the message I attribute latently to our historic isolationism and explicitly to the same cause Ferguson highlights as one of the principal reasons why we are unlikely to change our minds: our national attention deficit disorder. Irag provides the perfect illustration of one of Ferguson's most telling points: we were hardly there before we said we were leaving and then reinforced our apparent disenchantment with the enterprise by becoming politically irrational and transfixed by prisoner abuse and the failure to find WMD's. No reasonable person can argue that if we leave Iraq prematurely, we will have wholly failed to achieve our stated goal of bringing democracy to the Middle East, which conclusion raises the even more compelling public policy question of if we could have foreseen that home front and/or international political pressures were going to prompt us to cut and run, then why did we undertake the enterprise in the first place? You can't go by me: I am an unabashed and unrepentent Ferguson fan. Every time I pick up one of his books, I feel like I am taking a walk on a pleasant Summer evening with an old friend who happens to be unassailably erudite and enviably eloquent and I am listening to him expound his well-informed views. Neither in these fanciful strolls nor in my critical reading of his works do I feel compelled to agree with him, but I am inexorably forced to think about what he is saying and consider the wonderfully diverse and provocative implications of his musings. Finally, what troubles me is not whether this or my fellow readers' reviews will prompt you to buy and read this book. No, the question I ask is whether our policy makers ever choose a book like "Colossus" as their summer reading. Our recent foreign adventures suggest to me at least the exercise would be very much worth their--and our--while.