Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction

I'm in a grad course where a majority of the students are military and therefore well-schooled and knowledgable on Clausewitz's theory/book "On War." Although this is not a substitute for reading Clausewitz's original work, it is a solid and useful introduction that gives context and insight into why Clausewitz wrote what he did and the essence/relevance of his work. (At 80 pages, this "Intro" is short enough/worthy enough to read prior to any discussion or dialogue on Clausewitz's theory of war.)

Sir Michael Howard collaborated with Peter Paret on the authoritative translation of Carl von Clausewitz's ON WAR, and in this book, yet another volume in Oxford University Prees's fine "Very Short Introduction" series, he provides a distilled examination of Clausewitz's life, thought, and works. It is amazing how much insight and illumination he packs into so small a book. Well worth reading as a model for a compact biography as much as for its enlightening treatment of changing ideas about war and the man who helped to change those ideas as much as anyone in history.

Years ago, I read a book entitled "On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War." The author, Col. Harry Sumner, relied heavily on Clausewitz in critiquing the US effort in that war. Having been led by other military historians to believe that Clausewitz was more or less clueless about strategy, I was somewhat taken aback by Sumner's heavy reliance on Clausewitz. Then came Desert Storm, and even my untutored eye could see that the US military had taken the teachings of "On Strategy" to heart. One could say that the US victory in Desert Storm was essentially "Clausewitzian". Maybe Clausewitz had been getting some undeserved bad press. "Clausewitz: a Very Short Introduction" rehabilitates the Prussian officer's reputation, giving his biography and distilling his thought into a manageable amount of reading. Clausewitz was no armchair theoretician. He was a professional soldier who saw extensive combat during the Napoleonic Wars, and he knew what he was talking about. He may even be the first author to recognize Murphy's Law. He called it "friction," and he wrote that it plagued every sort of military endeavor. For those of us who are unwilling to grapple with the unabridged Clausewitz, this little book is just what the general ordered.

Clausewitz is notoriously difficult to understand, according to Prof. Howard, because so much of what he wrote was not intended for publication. As Clausewitz himself stated, he wrote a "collection of materials from which a theory of war was to have been distilled." Professor Howard, the co-author of the standard English translation of Clausewitz, begins that distillation process in these few pages. He first places Clausewitz in context, with a review of his family origins and military experience. He was commissioned as an officer in the Prussian Army at the age of 12, fought in his first campaign in 1793 at the age of 13 against the forces of Revolutionary France on the Rhine and then in the Vosges. In 1806 he was captured following the French defeat of Prussian forces at Auerstadt, a subsidiary of Napoleon's great victory over the Prussians at Jena. He then spent two years in captivity as a prisoner of war in France. When later the Prussian king allied himself with Napoleon, Clausewitz resigned from the Prussian Army and joined the Russian Army, where he participated in the Russian victory over Napoleon at Borodino. When the Prussian King, Frederick William III, eventually joined the Alliance against Napoleon in 1813, Clausewitz became an advisor to General Blucher during the Leipzig campaign, though still in Russian uniform. After being allowed by the King to rejoin the Prussian Army he became chief of staff to the Prussian III Corps, which acted as a blocking force at Waterloo. He then spent 12 years at the Prussian Army War College, where he spent much of his time writing his most famous work, On War. He died in 1831, at the age of 51, in a cholera epidemic in Breslau, where he had been sent to institute a cordon sanitaire to prevent the disease from spreading. Clausewitz' ideas were formed in the cauldron of the transition from formalized 18th century warfare to the total war of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era. The successive Prussian defeats had a profound effect on him, stimulating a rethinking of the theory of warfare as it evolved in his lifetime. There is much debate about how much of his work applies only to the particular circumstances of his era and how much is applicable to warfare in general. He is frequently contradictory and ambiguous, which is not surprising, given the extreme complexity of the human social phenomenon he is attempting to analyze. These are a few of his better-known concepts: - the FRICTION of war (now often called the "FOG of war") - successful warfare always involves a FIGHT, although paradoxically, an "unfought fight", such as the nuclear exchange that didn't happen during the Cold War, can have as much effect as an actual fight - the necessity of attacking the enemy's CENTER - the power of the DEFENSE - the necessity of SUPERIOR FORCE for VICTORY - the importance of MORALE - the concept of WAR AS AN EXTENSION OF POLITICS Prof. Howard pro

Clausewitz is notoriously difficult for the novice to master -- some would argue that no one has ever entirely "mastered" Clausewitz. Be that as it may, a legion of frustrated amateur strategists can attest to the difficulty of picking up Clausewitz's "On War" and trying to read it through without a guide. In the "Clausewitz" volume in the Past Masters series, the novice as well as the experienced strategist can gain an introduction to the master's life, experiences, and writings that will make the first reading intelligible and that will serve as a quick review of Clausewitz's main concepts in a format that can easily be read in an evening.This is a book that should stand next to "On War" in every strategist's library.