Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War: How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World

So while Adolph Hitler was gobbling up Europe, intent on world conquest, England thrust up its greatest son, Sir Winston Churchill, a statesman for the ages, to oppose the evil tyrant, crush him, and save the world. It is a great story. Pathetic little Winnie grows up to become Man of the Century, the great guardian of civilization against the forces of darkness and depravity. It is the story as I learned it through numerous accounts, and that I accepted and even cherished. The story that gave rise, at least in part, to the notion of "The Good War". More's the pity, therefore, that it turns out to be pure fable. Indeed, in Buchanan's telling each and every detail is false. Let me briefly identify some of his main points, tracking with the elements of the myth as presented above. Hitler was not gobbling up Europe. He was instead reversing the judgment of Versailles, both a colossal blunder and a grievous injustice that embarrassed men of good will everywhere. Hitler was not intent on world conquest. He was intent on reversing Versailles and crushing Bolshevism in Russia. He tried repeatedly to avoid war with England, and failing that, to make peace with her, because he felt that England should continue as a great world power, and that England and Germany were natural allies. Churchill can't be considered England's greatest son. He was certainly a man of utterly singular gifts. Unfortunately, however, they were harnessed to singularly poor judgment. Churchill's heroic exertions yielded nothing but carnage and ruin. If the goal of statesmanship is "peace that leaves the nation more secure," as Buchanan has it, and I think reasonably, then Churchill was anything but a great statesman. He was certainly a great war chief, but one who lead his nation away from peace and into war and disaster. Churchill did not oppose *the* evil tyrant -- he opposed *an* evil tyrant. But there were two great tyrannies afoot, German Nazism and Russian Bolshevism, and they were irreconcilably natural enemies. Ethical dilemmas presented to nations and individuals alike sometimes compel us to choose the lesser of two evils. Churchill chose the greater evil. He nurtured Stalin with revolting solicitude, thereby ensuring that his incomparable terror would ultimately have a vastly greater scope. And in fact there was no need to choose at all. Had Churchill just stood aside, the world could have dealt with whichever mutilated beast survived their inevitable clash with much less difficulty. As for crushing Hitler, Churchill was certainly instrumental to the cause. But he was equally instrumental in perpetrating some of the greatest war crimes of both World Wars, including the starvation blockade of Germany after the armistice of WWI, and the carpet bombing of her cities in WWII. Both had the conscious objective of annihilating non-combatants. Churchill did not save the world. Instead huge chunks of it disappeared into slavery and death behind what he subsequently termed

Buchanan stakes out some pretty controversial positions here. But, agree or not, he raises questions seldom dealt with in public, and ones that go to the heart of the West's presumed moral authority in its two wars with Germany. Crucially, his is not an apologia for Hitler or the Third Reich. Their wretched horrors during WWII are acknowledged without reserve. Rather, it's an effort to put the diplomatic moves preceding WWII into a more balanced and accurate perspective than the American public is accustomed to. The results amount to a much more ambiguous mix than the history books usually allow, and should come as an eye-opener, particularly regarding Churchill's punitive role. Churchill is often treated as a god, and not a minor one at that. A reckoning with the British politician's career is long overdue. I doubt that any non-American head of state has been more lionized in our press than the former prime minister. Of course, the focal point of hagiography is Churchill's undeniable role as a wartime leader. It's a role the author Buchanan doesn't dispute. What the author does dispute is the wider context, particularly Churchill's vaunted reputation as a statesman. It's here within an unfolding sixty-year period that Buchanan lays bear the actual record--and contrary to legend, a dismal one it is. From the British politician's earliest service through 1955, the author records again and again gross errors of judgment that helped propagate WWI, instigate WWII, facilitate Soviet expansion, and finally terminate the British Empire. It's a sobering account, to say the least, darn near the equivalent of saying Jesus erred on the Mount of Olives. Nonetheless, it's an account that can't be ignored. Then too, Hitler is viewed less as a demonic force than as a rabid nationalist intent on retrieving German lands wrongfully expropriated by the treaty of Versailles, and as a dictator ultimately backed into a corner by Britain's reckless guaranteeing of Poland's 1939 borders. Contrary to received wisdom, Buchanan asserts that war with Hitler's Reich was not made necessary by mad global designs, the usual formula for blame. Instead, primary blame is laid on a series of British missteps originating at the ministerial level. The author's thrust here depends on accepting the view that the German Chancellor was interested only in extending influence eastward as a bulwark against the Reich's true enemy, the Soviet Union, leaving the West and their colonial holdings basically intact. This too amounts to a revisionist account and a more difficult one to substantiate. Nonetheless, the author forces a key question usually passed over as an article of faith, viz. was war with the Reich in some sense inevitable or rather the unfortunate result of diplomatic blunder. Now, all of this would remain academic were it not for the lessons drawn from that 40-year period. Most notably, Britain's empire collapsed from accumulated reversals brought about by blundering diplomacy

From all of the other reviews I have read on this book it is certainly obvious that the author has hit a hot button issue and stirred the pot. This is the first book I have ever read by Pat Buchanan, and it has a very impressive premise. It is filled with over 1200 notes, and has a vast bibliography. Does the author have a point of view? Obviously, but then what author/historian does not wish to interpret history in their own way. While many reviewers give much time to WW II, the real issue is WW I and the resultant Treaty of Versailles. Such a pathetic war, such a pathetic treaty, one that was so bad even the US Senate refused to ratify it, and other diplomats knew all the Treaty did was ensure another war in 20 years. The dismantling of the old Empire/Monarchy system led to many of todays bastardized countries. Countries that contain people with no common language, culture or background. And, if you wish to criticize the premise, just look what recently happened with the Georgian invasion by Russia, and now we have US giving its own "Polish Guarantee" for missle defense. The book definitely shows that there were other views with regard to Churchill and the two World Wars, and Buchanan comes down on the side of those who feel that the wars were unnecessary. It has been over 60 years since the WW II has ended, we have seen the files, seen the paperwork and correspondence from that era, and people are now properly wondering if that war was fought for the wrong reasons. Buchanan certainly points out all the atrocities that Hitler and his Generals ordered to happen, but to me the basic premise was that Hitler could have been avoided had their been a better and more civilized peace to end WW I. The book did take me a long time to read, but that is due to the numerous details and notes that are in the book. The author makes a very fine defense of his premise, a premise that can never be proven correct or incorrect since those decisions are always subject to personal opinion. Being married to a woman who came from Romania I can tell you that the horrors and hardship that their country had to deal with under Communism, as well as other Eastern European countries that were dominated by Communism for over 40 years, were certainly not worth the sacrifices made to rid the world of Hitler. Again, these become personal reasons and are hard to quantify to someone who has not lived in those conditions. Definitely a stimulating read, and from all the comments I think the author has certainly brought a very relevant issue to the fore, the repercussions of which still need to be debated and studied. Blaine DeSantis

To the victor belong the spoils of history. Buchanan poses some hard but vital questions about that received orthodoxy and he's shouted down as anti-Semitic. In the end he merely wants to know when is war necessary, what justifies the horrors of war, then and now, and at what cost individually and nationally. Why was war "necessary" to stop Hitler but "unnecessary" to stop Stalin? Of course Nazism had to be stopped. And "for their crimes, Hitler and his collaborators, today's metaphors for absolute evil, received the ruthless justice they deserved" (xxi). Communism had to be stopped too. And the Cold War was won at a fraction of the cost of the World Wars. Today Buchanan fears we have forgotten our history and are thus doomed to repeat it: why was war "necessary" to stop Saddam Hussein but "unnecessary" to stop Kim Jong-il? And what price might yet be paid? Surely these are necessary questions!

The question Buchanan addresses is not whether the British were heroic - that has been settled long ago for all time. Rather, the question is "Were their statesmen wise?" (Was WWII an unnecessary war?) The second reason Buchanan gives for writing the book is to collapse the Churchill cult among America's elite that asserts defiance of the U.S. must be met very harshly, and such leaders seen as new Hitlers. Churchill was the most forceful advocate in the British Cabinet for entering any Franco-German War in 1911. Most of England's leaders were against such, but relented in the face of popular pressure. Churchill saw an opportunity in this for himself to shine as a war leader - building on his prior record in the Boer War and elsewhere. Buchanan, however, sees a chain of "if only . . ." involving leaders from all the involved nations that not only brought WWI but the ensuing foundation for WWII as well as the rise of Lenin in Russia (followed by Stalin, et al). The British rationale included preserving France as a great power (an early application of the "domino theory"), preserving British honor by standing behind a 70+ year-old treaty with Belgium (Germany saw moving its troops through Belgium to attack France on its weak side), retaining popular support (became bellicose when Belgium was involved), and Germanphobia. The conflict also became seen as "Good against Evil," and making the "world safe for democracy." Following this logic, leaders of the Dominions, without being asked, also were swept up in the war hysteria that ultimately dismembered not only the British empire, but three others as well. Buchanan asserts that had England not entered the war, Germany would not have taken Lenin from Geneva to St. Petersburg to take advantage of the chaos and push Russia to sue for peace, and the U.S. would not have entered. Even if the Bolsheviks still came to power, the victorious German army would have quickly removed them. Unfortunately, the mistakes continued. The mood of the country required an onerous peace treaty with Germany. One-tenth her people and one-eighth the territory were taken, as well as it overseas empire and all private property of its citizens in those colonies. Its army was restricted to 100,000, much of its navy seized, it was forbidden to build tanks, heavy artillery, or an air force, and Germany was assessed impossible reparations and forced to accept full responsibility for causing the war. P.M. LLoyd George and John Maynard Keynes, among others, saw the settlement as sowing the seeds of future conflict. The U.S., for its part, demanded that England not renew is 1902 alliance with Japan - pushing it into belligerency. Hitler achieved great popularity by forcing other nations to allow former German areas to rejoin Germany. Chamberlin's error was not in reaching agreement with Hitler in Munich ("appeasement"), but failing to use the time it bought to rearm. Then, frustrated by Hitler's continued moves and emb