Cemetery Hill: The Struggle for the High Ground, July 1-3, 1863

Cemetery Hill was critical to the Battle of Gettysburg. Controversy has ensued to the present day about the Confederacy's failure to attempt to capture this high ground on July 1, 1863, following its victory over two Corps of the Union Army to the North and West of town. Subsequent events during the Battle, such as Pickett's charge, the fighting on Little Round Top, and the fight for the Wheatfield, have received more attention than General Early's attack on Cemetery Hill during the evening of July 2. Yet, the fighting for Cemetery Hill was critical and may have constituted the South's best possiblity of winning the Battle of Gettysburg.Terry Jones's "Cemetery Hill: The Struggle for the High Ground, July 1 -- 3, 1863" (2003) is part of a series called "Battleground America Guides" published by Da Capo Press. Each volume in the series attempts to highlight a small American battlefield or portion of a large battlefield and to explain its significance in a clear and brief narrative. Jones's study admirably meets the stated goals of the series.The book opens with a brief setting of the stage for the Battle of Gettysburg. This is followed by chapters describing the Union and Confederate armies and the leaders who would play crucial roles in the fight for Cemetery Hill. There is a short discussion of the fighting on the opening day of the battle, July 1, 1863, which focuses on the failure of the South to attempt to take Cemetery Hill and the adjacent Culp's Hill following its victory of that day.The chief subject of the book, however, is the fighting for Cemetery Hill late on July 2. Jones explains Cemetery Hill's role in Robert E. Lee's overall battle plan. He discusses the opening artillery duel on the Union right followed by the fierce attack by the Louisiana Tigers and North Carolina troops under the leadership of Hays and Avery on East Cemetery Hill. This attack reached the Union batteries defending Cemetery Hill and may have come within an ace of success given the depletion of the Union defense on the Hill to meet threats on the Union left. Elements of the Union 11th Corps and 2nd Corps reinforced the position and drove back the attack. Southern general Robert Rodes was to have supported this attack on the west but failed to reach his position in time to do so. General John Gordon's position was in reserve behind the troops of Hays and Avery but these troops were not ordered forward.The book deals briefly with the third day of the Battle -- the day of Pickett's charge -- in which the Southern troops did not renew their efforts against Cemetery Hill -- such an attempt would have had scant chance of success in daylight. The final chapter of the book consists of Jones's views on the events of the battle, particularly the failure of the Lieuenant General Richard Ewell of the Second Corps of Lee's Army to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, a decision Jones finds was correct, and the causes of the failure of the July 2 attack (poor coordination