The Peenemunde Raid: The Night of 17-18 August 1943

The Peenemunde Raid by Martin Middlebrook is the telling of the British raid on the German rocket facility at Peenemunde. In this book, Mr. Middlebrook uses his solid formula for telling of the British raids, Lead-up, The Raid, Aftermath. In the Lead-up sections, Mr. Middlebrook tells us about Peenemunde and Germany's rocket program, the British learning of the German rocket program (V2's, not the V1's) and their plans for the raid, and finally the Luftwaffe it's self (note: this raid saw the first operational use of Schrage Music [Slanting Music]; the vertical firing of cannons on night fighters). Interestingly, Mr. Middlebrook did not give a detailed breakdown of the RAF and it's aircraft and the Luftwaffe section was small compared to his other works. In the Raid section, we get to read about the flight of the bombers to the target, their performance over Peenemunde, and their fights with the Luftwaffe. Of interest in this section is that for the RAF, Peenemunde was a small target and RAF was targeting three different sections, the workers facilities, the scientist facilities, and the test/work facilities. To support this operation, Bomber Command used a Master of Ceremonies (a bomber who's pilot provided comments and directions to the rest of the bomber stream on their performance over the target) and had one group (Number 5 Group) bomb using Time-and-Distance rather than traditionally following the Pathfinders. These sections of the book make strong use of stories from the survivors of the battle. The final sections, the Aftermath, provides Mr. Middlebrook's analysis of the battle and it's results. In these sections, Mr. Middlebrook points out how the RAF never raided Peenemunde again, however the American's did raid the facility three times in 1944. Mr. Middlebrook further points out that the RAF probably should have requested that the Americans follow up the next day with a raid of their own on Peenemunde (this would have replaced the raid on Schweinfurt, interestingly, the Schweinfurt raid contained almost the same number of aircraft that raided Peenemunde in the Air Corps first raid there in 1944 and achieved good results). The Peenemunde Raid is a very nicely written book. Yet once more, Mr. Middlebrook has delivered a solid book describing the battle between the RAF and the Luftwaffe over Germany. This book is not as strong as his books on Nuremburg or Hamburg, but much better than his book on Berlin (a good book covering a campaign vs. a battle). Because of this I'd call this book a solid 4 stars.

As are all Middlebrook books about the air raids on Germany, this one is especially interesting. It should be made into a movie,

The Peenemünde Raid is an excellent account of the British bomber raid on the German V-2 development facility on the night of 17-18 August 1943. This was the only large-scale RAF night precision-bombing attack in the whole war. In early chapters, Middlebrook details the development of the German rocket research facility at Peenemünde in 1937-1943 and the British intelligence effort directed against it. Incredibly, in November 1939 an anonymous German, who mailed secret documents about Peenemünde to British intelligence, gave the British a golden opportunity. Unfortunately, the British believed the documents were fakes and disregarded them. It was not until March 1943 that the British became aware of the rocket research at Peenemünde. Churchill promptly ordered RAF Bomber Command to attack the site as soon as possible. Bomber Command had never attempted a large-scale precision night attack before and indeed, this was the only occasion it was tried. Three other innovations were employed: time & distance runs, a master bomber and moving aim points. However Middlebrook makes the point that the American 8th Air Force, which was trained for daylight precision attacks, was not consulted because Churchill wanted Peenemünde to be an "all-British" operation. If true, this was a stupid case of national pride overriding operational common sense. On the bright side, the British mounted a highly successful Mosquito diversion over Berlin which drew off most of the 200 German night fighters launched and there was no fighter opposition for the first half of the raid. British intruding night fighters also had a good night and shot down four Luftwaffe fighters, including two aces. The Germans badly misjudged where the raid was going, partly since the Luftwaffe low-level commanders did not know the significance of Peenemünde. The raid did inflict significant damage on the housing area but it failed to hurt either the experimental works or V-2 production buildings. About 150 Germans (incl. 2 scientists) and 600 foreign laborers were killed. The RAF lost 41 aircraft and 290 men, almost all on the exit route when the night fighters finally showed up. The moonlight night made it something of a duck shoot. Middlebrook believes that the raid cost the Germans about 6-8 weeks worth of delay in producing the V-2s, which he says equates to saving perhaps 800 civilians in England. After the raid, the Germans dispersed the production to underground facilities in central Germany. The USAF made three raids in 1944, which hit the facility with much greater accuracy. I believe Middlebrook sketches out the facts but fails to draw a conclusion; namely, that had the Americans attacked Peenemünde in 1943 the damage to the facility would have been more severe. Overall, this book is not quite as good as Middlebrook's other books on RAF bomber raids.