Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics,

i had to write a paper for a geography class and figured why not do it on yugoslavia. while researching, i came across this book, and thought it was a marvelous read. it is a fascinating look at the decline of yugoslavia from Tito, who ran the country remarkably well and who had a miraculously peaceful tenure as "Emperor." then Milosevic showed up and [messed] it all up. the thing i find very excellent about this book is that it describes very well how milosevic got that power. he used nationalism to his advantage to get the serbs behind him. this nationalism lead to the bloody split-up of croatia, slovenia, bosnia-herzegovina, macedonia, and finally kosovo. this book shows one of the best (or worst, depending on how you look at it) examples of nationalism and the effects of nationalism. it is especially good to observe what happened to Milosevic in light of recent events throughout europe, with the hard-right gaining popularity, in such places as Romania, Hungary, and even in more tolerant France and the Netherlands. it is a worthwhile read to observe similarities between what milosevic said and did and what these new right-wing leaders are saying and doing.

This is an excellent book by a Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada. 'International History Review' said of the first edition that it was "far superior in its factual coverage and balance to its various competitors in the field. .. He has told the story as completely and as impartially as we are liable to get." Cohen gives a brief history of Yugoslavia in the first chapter. The rest of the book gives a detailed account of Yugoslavia's breakup and the war.Yugoslavia existed as a state from 1918 to 1991. Under Tito it had a devolved and federal constitution. This gave parity representation to each of the six republics in the Yugoslav federation, even though Serbia was by far the biggest. Tito selected people for jobs by 'ethnic arithmetic' and rotated top officials annually. But these policies signally failed to unify Yugoslavia. The constitution encouraged those who wanted to split the country. They had a two-track strategy. They aimed to move from federation to confederation as a step towards independence; at the same time they formed separate institutions designed for complete independence.Outside forces seized on these internal failings. In January 1991 the US and German Ambassadors pressed the Yugoslav National Army not to intervene to keep Croatia in Yugoslavia. In early 1991 Germany and other countries sold arms to Croatia and Slovenia. On 25 June 1991 Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally declared their independence. The Croats were desperate for foreign intervention: "The Tudjman government believed that immediate internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis was absolutely crucial." When the Yugoslav Government deployed the National Army to hold the country together, the EC secretly threatened to cut off all aid to Yugoslavia. On 4 October 1991, the opening day of the EC Conference, its chairman Lord Carrington presented an agenda "premised on the assumption that Yugoslavia no longer existed." The EC announced that all the Yugoslav republics "are sovereign and independent with international identity". As Cohen wrote, "the EC had apparently made a political decision to dismember the Yugoslav federation." Hurd warned in December 1991 that recognising Croatia and Slovenia would escalate the war. Carrington warned that recognition would weaken diplomatic efforts to achieve a ceasefire and a settlement, and would also spread the war to Bosnia. Despite, or because of, all these good reasons, the EC, including Britain, recognised Croatia and Slovenia in January. The UN did too, despite its "internal divisions about the propriety of intervention in a sovereign state's domestic disputes." The war did spread to Bosnia. In July 1991 the Moslem Bosnian Organization tried to negotiate a Moslem-Serb accord to prevent war in Bosnia and to preserve Bosnia's territorial integrity. Karadzic accepted this for the Bosnian Serbs, but Izetbegovic, the leader of the Bosnian Muslims, rejected it. Izetbegovic is a member

I really enjoyed this book and I hope it will help me on my Project.