Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton

Chandler's book is a case development of his basic theme, treated in broader range in his "From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond," that democratization is not the same as democracy: they are, indeed, polar opposites. Here Chandler outlines the blatantly colonial political structures created by NATO powers for their own benefit and control. Any benefits brought to those they governed were incidental. The first reviewer has done an excellent job presenting Chandler's insights. Here I'll only add that intervention began before the first NATO boot ever trod Bosnian soil, and was instrumental in pulling the former Yugoslavia apart, playing to "ancient hatreds" in much the same way that the British broke the Indian jar before granting sovereignty. The British, at least, did grant sovereignty, and did not use communal violence as an excuse to reimpose empire. Reading Chandler's book one sees there is little practical difference between NATO democratization and the top-down paternal authority of Tito's Yugoslavia; or, for that matter, the Turkish conquest. An old Bosnian saying has it that "where the Turk trod, nothing grows." The same seems to hold true for these NATO interventions, from Bosnia to beyond.

Chandler's book is an outstanding analysis and critique of the political/administrative system set up in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the signing of the Dayton Accords in late 1995. There is a very useful breakdown of the (too numerous) power structures at work in the country, from the `local entity' governments of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska to the astoundingly confusing layers of international administrative bodies and organizations. The rather obvious result is that little gets accomplished with all of these parallel governing institutions in place. Chandler's central argument is that the deep involvement of the international powers in Bosnia through the Office of the High Representative, NATO, the OSCE and other bodies is actually making matters worse, rather than laying down the foundations for peaceful coexistence and Bosnian self-government. In this vein, for these international institutions the process of "democratization" has become an end to itself rather than the ideal objective of establishing a functioning democracy that would require no international tutelage. Chandler also correctly points out that the Dayton Accords, although declaratively committed to a multiethnic, unified Bosnian state, have in fact solidified the country's division into ethnically-based units. However, the book is less persuasive where it implies that a major withdrawal of international troops would not necessarily mean a resumption of hostilities. Indeed, Chandler focuses very little attention to the mutual fear, mistrust and hatred which escalated in the early 1990s and led to the war in the first place. Nonetheless, this is a very useful, and damning, overview of an international experiment in peace-making and state-building - a must-read for anyone interested in Bosnia's future.