Bomber Command: Churchill's Epic Campaign

In this era of political correctness and "sensitivity," it may strike many as repulsive that hundreds of thousands of German civilians were the target of tons of bombs night after night from British aircraft. But the reality is that the campaign was intended to terrorize the German populaion into demanding that their leadership end the barbarous war they started. Ultimately, as Hastings notes, there was no such thing as an innocent German civilian. Each in their own way contributed or supported the slaughter and enslavement of millions by German soldiers and bureaucrats. Hasting's contribution is to strip the British effort down to its barest essentials: its beginnings as the only effort the otherwise defeated and defenseless British could muster to the excesses of the bombing in the last few months of the war when almost everythng that could be destroyed had been destroyed. Hasting has a wonderful approach, weaving general history into individual stories of the bombers, the planners, the civilians and soldiers. For everyone with an interest in accurate history, "Bomber Command" is essential reading. Jerry

First of all, it is easy to see how this work won the 1980 Somerset Maugham Award for Non-Fiction. I was totally riveted throughout. After reading the book in nearly one sitting, I felt exhausted and numb. The book is an indictment against the entire theory of strategic bombing in WWII and the wholesale slaughter of civilians specifically. While Max Hastings devotes much time to "Bomber" Harris who conducted the night-air campaign without reflection or apologies, his sharpest barbs are for those politicians (Churchill included) and senior military planners that made policy. These hid behind an unspoken but widely understood policy that wide-area terror bombing was the only avenue available to Bomber Command for most of the war but refused to discuss the subject honestly in the public arena in the hopes that they could maintain some sense of moral superiority over their enemy. Hastings also correlates Bomber Command's policy and operations with that of the USAAF, who he writes also hid behind a pretense that collateral casualties were a regrettable but unavoidable tragedy of war. Of course the hypocrisy of this position was laid bare following the continued slaughter of unprotected German cities in 1945 long after everyone knew that the bombing would make no difference to the outcome or even pace of the war, it became bombing just for bombing's sake, or in the case of Dresden, showing the Soviets what Anglo-American air power could do; slaughtering refugees fleeing from the advancing Soviet horde. In fact, the Associated Press reported in February 1945 that the Allied Air Chiefs had embarked on a terror campaign against the German civilian population, but Hastings points out that this news scoop was 3 years late (it had of course been policy soon after the British realized they could not hit specific targets at night). The most mind numbing account is late in the book in which Hastings describes in detail the bombing of Darmstadt. The Allied armies were within 100 miles of Darmstadt and the civilians were under the mistaken impression that they would be spared. In September 1944 Bomber Command made Darmstadt its next target for destruction. As Hastings makes the point, the horror is not that the attack was particularly special or difficult, it was the routine of it all that made it so terrible. The entire process reminds me of the banal evil more often associated with the murder of the Jews; being led into the concentration camps were "the system" would process and prepare them for organized and efficient death. Such was the case of German cities by late 1944. The Luftwaffe had nearly run out of aviation fuel and could only put up a meaningful defense on occasion. The Anglo-American armies had overrun the Luftwaffe's radar belts, so even when fuel was available, the Luftwaffe night-fighters could receive no warnings or directions. The "system" identified a German city for destruction, the bombers went up, everyone did their job and went home. Numb

This book is a history of the British Bomber Command. The horror of world war one led the British to build a strategic air force as a means of avoiding the sorts of casualties faced in that war. It was hoped that by using air craft Germany could be made to surrender. This book is an examination of the failure of that strategic concept. In the first days of the war the British tried a daylight raid on Bremen naval yards. It was generally thought that bombers could get through in daylight due to their speed and defensive armament. This turned out to be a false assumption and a large number of the British Bombers were shot down. Further raids confirmed the vulnerability of unescorted bombers and from that time on it was decided that British Bombers would fly only at night. For some months bombers flew out at night and tried to bomb various military and industrial targets. The bombing was so inaccurate generally hitting farmland and forests that the Germans were not able to even work out what the intended targets were. The British carried out evaluations and found that only a small percentage of bombs were falling within miles of the targets. As a result a change in strategy was adopted and that was to bomb the German civilian population. The reason for that was that cities by comparison were easy to find and the use of incendiaries could lead to destructive fires which could destroy housing stock.The only problem with the strategy was that it resulted in the deaths mainly of the elderly women and children. The structure of German cities was such that the burning and bombing of cities only had a marginal effect on industrial production. (The situation was different in Japan where industry was dotted throughout cities and the fire bombing led to the collapse of industrial production in that country)The German night fighter effort was reasonably successful against the British Bombers so that the casualty rates of British air crews was very high. The book argues that in general terms the campaign was a poor use of resources and had limited effects until near the end of the war. By late 1944 the German air force was practically destroyed and allied bombers by that time had such a preponderance that they were able to destroy the transport network and to destroy production. The book is well written easy to read and a fascinating look at a topic that has been dominated by myth makers not truth seekers.

This is an excellent book that objectively traces the history and rationale for the area Bombing campaign against Germany that would lead to the deaths of 52000 aircrew and more than half a million civilians.The book also relates the revulsion and guilt felt by many aircrew when confronted, after the war, with the results of their bombing missions.Ironically these same aircrew still idolise their Operational commander - Bomber Harris, who never set foot on an operational squadron during the War.Arguments are also related about the disagreements that Bomber Harris had with his American colleagues who wanted the Area Bombing campaign transferred to destroying synthetic oil plants and ball bearing factories. Harris wanted to continue bombing cities even when there was not much left to bomb.When first published this book was severely criticised in England, for daring to suggest that the effort put into Area Bombing could have been better spent elswhere.This is a thoroughly readable and thought provoking book.

I read this on the advice of a friend after a tour of northern Germany during which I wondered why so many of the beautiful churches had been levelled in WWII. This book gives a detailed narrative of the strategy and tactics, as well as the horror on the ground and in the air of this controversial air campaign. Interesting and thought-provoking to read. Written by an Englishman.