Body & Soul: Human Nature the Crisis in Ethics

I received this book from my girlfriend to better understand Christian rational for the existence of a `soul' in human beings. In `Body & Soul' J.P. Moreland does a wonderful job explaining the body as a substance versus a property thing. The book is divided into 2 Parts. The first part of the book (about 2/3rds of the actual text) basically goes through the theoretical/metaphysical/scientific explanations for determining `personhood'. In the last third of the book (Part 2), Moreland delves into current ethical issues that play a role in a person's view of `personhood' whether they follow a substance dualist position or a physicalists/genetic determinist position. I found this area of the book to be the most likeable for those that aren't used to the university level writing - with every other word either being an `ism' or an `ology'. I didn't have a problem with this, but I can certainly see people whom may not have such an extensive vocabulary may find Part 1 difficult to read. But really, the only difficulties I can see, would be to understand what all the `isms' and ology's really are - so it would be extremely useful to keep a dictionary hand and write down the definitions for the various terminologies once an uncertain word first appears. Being a human geography student, I am quite familiar with this technical writing style, and I think by following the above is the best way to get the most out of this book. Moreland definitely deserves credit for his extensive research in this book. A lot of references and endnotes further explaining and elaborating on key areas were very useful to me. Moreland obviously has a lot of respect for his counterparts in what is seemed as a fragile and tense area of ethics. He includes numerous citations by popular feminists, ethicists, scientists and philosophers alike that clearly reject Moreland's view of person as a substance thing. I found that the majority of the book tends to view the definition of a human `person' as a dichotomy between: 1. `Self' as Body/Genes (Physicalism/Genetic Determinism and Reductionism) 2. `Self' as Immaterial Soul (Substance Dualism) Though I find nothing wrong with his understandings and realizations for such a structure of ontology, I believe Moreland left out another categorization that defines `personhood'. That being: 3. `Self as Socially Produced' (Social Constructionism) This is the view of the person as described by Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Im a away, this view can be classified under #1 (Self and Body/Genes) because Foucault does state the `person without the body is nothing', but everywhere else he gives reason for viewing the `person' as a social construction. Although I do question many of Foucault's and Derrida's assertions, I think their view of the `person' could have been addressed in the book as well. But then again, this book was already quite thick. Maybe Moreland can go into his analysis of social constructionism in another futu

Throughout Human History most people have believed that we are both physical and spiritual beings, that in fact the immaterial part of us can live on even when separated from our bodies by death. The rise of science, however, has called into question the existence of the soul. Concurrent with the demise of dualism has been the rise of advanced medical technologies that have brought to the fore difficult issues at both edges of life. In this careful and thoughtful treatment J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae argue that the rise of these problems alongside the demise of Christian dualism is no coincidence. They therefore employ a theological realism to meet these pressing issues and to present a reasonable and biblically accurate depiction of human nature.

In "Body & Soul," authors J P Moreland and Scott Rae present a spirited defense of substance dualism, a model of consciousness that has fallen out of fashion with most academic philosophers. The authors also discuss the repercussions of dualism and its primary competitor, physicalism, on ethics and free will.What are the arguments for dualism? Well, firstly, our mental states possess properties not held by our physical brains. For instance, if I close my eyes and imagine a green pasture, nothing in my physical brain turns green. Moreover, as my thought of a green pasture is not an empirical phenomenon, it cannot be verified by the methods of the hard sciences. It doesn't have an odor, a length, a height, a weight or a physical location in space. Secondly, I am in a position to know my mental life in a way not available to anyone else. I, and I alone, am privy to my mental states. A brain surgeon may know more about my physical brain and its operations than I do, but he cannot know my mental life as well as I do. He doesn't experience my fear of being operated on, or my hope that I make it through the operation alive. Furthermore, I cannot be mistaken about my mental states. If I have an experience of a grey rug, the rug itself may actually be white due to poor lighting. But I cannot be mistaken that I am experiencing what I take to be a grey rug.Thirdly, our mental states possess the property of intentionality. The intentionality of our mental states is the most powerful argument against physicalist accounts of consciousness. Our mental states possess the property of aboutness or ofness. We don't just think; we think "about" or "of" something. Our thoughts point beyond themselves to objects and things, even those that don't exist. Intentionality is troublesome for the physicalist, for how can our brain waves be "about" or "of" anything? If a neuroscientist could examine the brains of two classical music lovers, how could he tell one was thinking about the melodies of Bach and the other of Beethoven?And finally, the most interesting argument for dualism is the argument from qualia. When we see a red apple, it "looks" red. When we taste a chocolate bar, it tastes "chocolatey." When we smell a rose it smells "rosy." Philosophers call such things as the look of red, the taste of chocolate, or the smell of a rose "qualia." Moreland and Rae argue that qualia are experiences within our minds. For example, every time you place a wedge of a lemon in your mouth, you experience the sour taste of lemon qualia. This is a correlation between physical qualities and mental qualia. The physical qualities of lemons are very different in nature from the mental qualia they are correlated with. The "taste" of a lemon is not itself anything like the chemical composition of a lemon -- although it is caused by the lemon's chemical composition.Physicalism, in contrast with dualism, holds that our mental states are identical to our physical bodies. Some physicalists cla

This is one of the more difficult books that I have read recently. Sections of the book can be difficult and require focus; this is NOT beach reading.The authors' intended audience:"We have chosen to write the book at what we consider to be a fairly high academic level because we are convinced the view of a human person we affirm must be articulated and defended at that level for it to gain a hearing both within the Christian community and in the secular academic setting. Still, we hope a nonspecialist will be able to gain much from the pages that follow." (page 14)There are one or two sections in the book that defend the existence of an immaterial soul from the Bible (against those Christian thinkers who deny it) however; this book is not primarily an explanation/analysis of Scripture. As the authors themselves state, 'In this work we have attempted to make a case for the view of a human person that is both consistent with biblical teaching and that makes philosophical sense.' (page 343)To skeptics of the existence of the soul, to those who would argue that science has rendered the concept false, to those who argue that the concept of the immaterial soul is a foreign Greek concept that has nothing to do with the Bible, read this book. Moreland and Rae present a very strong case for the soul (their particular version of this: Thomistic substance dualism), they refute or significantly weaken most of the commonly offered critiques of their view and refute or critique the views that compete against theirs.There are 521 footnotes spread over 345 pages of text; averaging roughly 50 footnotes per chapter. I really liked this aspect of the book; the authors would frequently refer to other relevant literature and refer the reader to investigate it if interested. The book is divided into two sections:Part 1: Metaphysical Reflections on Human Personhood (about 66% of the book)Part 2: Ethical Reflections on Human PersonhoodThe Chapters:1. Establishing a Framework for Approaching Human Personhood2. Human Persons as Substances or Property-Things3. Human Persons in Naturalistic & Complementarian Perspectives4. Substance Dualism & the Human Person: Free Agency5. Substance Dualism & the Human Person: Personal Identity6. Substance Dualism & the Body: Heredity, DNA & the Soul7. The Moral & Metaphysical Status of the Unborn: Abortion & Fetal Research8. Reproductive Technologies in Substance-Dualist Perspective9. Genetic Technologies & Human Cloning10. Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide & the Care of Persons at the End of LifeChapters 1-3 lay out all the necessary philosophical distinctions (this section is probably the most difficult to follow, but it is worth it. Many of the concepts used here come up again and again later in the book) to discuss personhood. The relevant philosophical options of personhood are laid out and explainedChapters 4-5 constitute a defense of the substance dualism view; which basically says that in addition to physic

I am a few pages shy of finishing BODY AND SOUL. Part one argues for Thomistic Substance Dualism (differentiated from Cartesian Substance Dulaism), and it's written by J.P. Moreland.Part two takes the arguments for substance dualism and demonstrates the logical implications substance dualism has regarding abortion, euthanasia, human cloning, etc.The book is crucially important for anyone thinking through the bioethics of these issues.As important and fascinating as the book is, there are some weakneses. The first thing that will strike the reader is that part one (Moreland) is far more difficult reading than part two (Rae). Basically, part one assumes a more advanced philosophical background of the reader. This is not to say that a reasonably intelligent person with little background in philosophy cannot benefit, but it will take some work, re-reading certain paragraphs a few times, etc.I think it would be a worthwhile assignment for Mr. Moreland to rewrite part one to get the hay down out of the loft, so us cows can get to it:-) Part one would also flow better into part two as a result.It's interesting to note that Moreland, in a lecture I attended, did lay out the basic themes of the book in more user friendly language. I think his position is well articulated in the book, book it would be of greater benefit to many more if he would put out a version more like his lecture.By the way, here is a VERY important piece of advice: The average reader will follow Moreland's reasoning MUCH better if you get a hold of his lectures on the same subject, or at least get a copy of a taped radio program in which he discussed the book (The web site for STAND TO REASON).Just about anyone who is reasonably intelligent can follow part two of BODY AND SOUL more easily--FAR more easily. In part two, Rae does a good job of laying out conservative bioethics. But the arguments that are the crucial background to Rae's bioethics are, again, found in part one which is, in many respects, the most important part of the book since so much in bioethics stands or falls on the substance dualism articulated therein. A few crucially important premises put forth by Moreland in BODY AND SOUL: The soul is the "driver" behind the DNA of a person. As I understand Moreland, this explains the apparent teleological purposing end for which the DNA strives. This "driver" soul makes more sense than a purposeless physicalism.The brain/soul relation (the most fascinating aspect of the whole debate) is not problematic when properly understood. The effects of alzheimers/brain damage, etc., does not rule out the immaterial soul. The soul affects the body (Worry, thoughts, etc., which by definition are immaterial, affect physical health), just as much as the body affects the soul (brain damage affecting behavior, etc).For instance, a car needs a properly functioning driver, as much as a driver needs a properly functioning car. Either can be damaged and affect the other.A purely physicalist view