Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing

If only you could bring yourself to ditch those losers from your portfolio, and hang onto your winners. If you can, you are unusual. Unprofitable habits afflict nearly all investors, beginners and pros alike, writes Hersh Shefrin in this intriguing study of the role of emotions in investing. Shefrin balances the jargon with plenty of real-world examples and wisely cautions you not to delude yourself into thinking that his tips will make you rich. Viewing investing through the prism of behavior finance, he analyzes emotionally-laden decisions made by private investors, money managers, bankers and other professionals handling stocks and various other forms of investments including options, foreign currency and futures. Shefrin offers juicy case histories, so his tour of behavioral finance is mostly enjoyable and useful. At times, though, the book bogs down in the author's attempts to legitimize behavior finance, a relatively new school of thought. For instance, he charges failed investors with committing "heuristic bias" or falling prey to "representativeness." That quibble aside, we recommend this intriguing tome to investment decision makers on any level. Whether you are running billions or managing a retirement account (which, as Shefrin notes, most people do badly), maybe this book will buffer you against emotional investing and pocketbook pain.

Wondering what Brealy & Myers or Sharpe left out? Don't expect your broker (or fund manager, excepting Richard Thaler) to fill you in. This book is a must read for any active (or passive) participant in the markets, or any other citizen who is affected by said markets. Meaning all of us. Shefrin provides a masterful exposition of the application of cutting-edge cognitive psychology to the behavior of retail and institutional investors, analysts, mutual fund managers, CEO's and even heavily-advised university investment committees. The result is the theoretical demolition of the efficient markets hypothesis in even its weakest form, and the related CAPM(s), catching up to their long-noted empirical failings. As it turns out the market does have a memory, and that's not just an anomaly any more. Not every trade is zero-NPV: trust the market price at your own peril. Think dividends are irrelevant? Think again. What we're left with is a fascinating account of how market participants actually behave: holding on to losers too long, trading too much and trading on "noise," and most alarmingly, undersaving for retirement. What is significant is that these phenomena are so prevalent that they can no longer be dismissed as irrational with the hope that "more sophisticated" money will magically correct the market. To the contrary, what Shefrin describes is proved to be the psychological norm; if you believe you're different, you're either very lucky or overconfident about your lack of overconfidence. One quibble, in an area that I have looked at before, is in Shefrin's discussion of takeovers. First, I found a bit of confusion between the question of whether the takeover premium should be tested by reference to the post-announcement combined value of both firms, or just the buyer. Since the buyer's CEO is initially fiduciary for just his shareholders, I see only the latter as relevant. More significantly, Shefrin does not provide any means to rigorously discriminate among his hubris hypothesis and other, more rationalistic theories, such as agency costs and private benefits. And his brief treatment omits many puzzling follow-up questions: if CEO psychology has the potential to systematically destroy shareholder wealth, what should we then conclude about the investors and analysts who allow them to get away with it? Just a governance problem, or is there yet another psychological story to be told? But the desire to delve further into the subject is just indicative of Shefrin's compelling and readable narrative. For bottom line types, I'm afraid the answer to your question is no, he doesn't explain how to get rich. But you'll surely do alot better with a single yellowing copy of Graham & Dodd than all the reams of abstruse, dogmatic journal articles ever spewed by the Chicago School.

I had mixed feeling about this book. Content wise, it's incredible. It's full of real life stories, data, analyses, propositions of many so called market anomalies. However, I really find some of the chapters too long, especially those after chapter 5. The author had copied his style of thesis writing and actually many of his own theses (he's a renowed professor after all) into a book which has a big audience group of investors or traders who want quick fix or certain level of entertainment and personal improvement. In these respects, the "Psychology of Finance by Lars Tvede" and the "Devil take the hindmost by Edward Chancellor" are "easier" but not definitely better alternatives. Anway, this is one of the very few "serious" books about behavioural finance that is relatively practical. If you are abound of time, go for it. Otherwise, you may try the two books I mentioned above. p.s. I like the following the most: In April 1997 Financial Times ran a contest suggested by economist Richard Thaler. Readers were told to choose a whole number between 0 and 100. The winning entry would be the one closest to two thirds of the average entry. The winning choice is 13. The real point of this game is that playing sensibly requires you to have a sense of the magnitude of the other players' errors. Hope you got it right.

Hersh Shefrin does a superb job of giving a quick overview of the range of behavioral phenomena in the first chapters of this book. After that the story becomes less focused and the reader is well advised to read those subjects that truly interest her/him rather than trying to read the book cover to cover.

This book builds on the current literature in Behavioral Finance and reviews the most relevant academic articles. It is interesting for the researcher in empirical finance and the best book to understand the behavior of individual investors. Another fascinating and recent publication in this field is by Andrei Shleifer: "Inefficient Market"