Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-45

Mr Hoyt has written a concise, informative summary that is so engaging that if you have any interest in the subject, you'll find it hard to put it down. The book starts in Dec 1941, right after the Pearl Harbor disaster, when Churchill travels to Washington and convinces FDR to go against his military advisers and go with the Germany first policy. From that point on, the two countries will argue and try to manipulate the other on strategy for the rest of the war. The author will continue his story past the Sicily landings, Salerno, the Anzio / Rapido debacle, the liberation of Rome to the very end of the war. In his unique way, the author renders history of this campaign in its unvarnished reality with its many snafus and few highlights. He will clearly show: The series of Allied arguments in determining if the Med is the correct front to attack. That the British dominated the Casablanca Conference, installing a completely British staff to freeze Eisenhower from any true authority. That Churchill and Alexander truly didn't understand the scope of the Med campaign would evolve into. The distrust by Alexander of the US fighting capability after North Africa and how it will effect his future planning. The extremely poor Allied planning of Operation Husky that allowed the Germans to escape. Montgomery squashed a good plan for a poor one so he could control Patton and allow himself the honor of taking Messina. That the long delay from defeating the Axis in North Africa and the July invasion gave Kesselring time to reinforce Sicily and Italy. That the changing of the battle plan by Montgomery on Sicily was at the expense of Patton's 7th Army and the Allied effort. The unpreparedness of the Allies in negotiating with Italy for it's surrender was extremely costly. That Churchill was definitely the one to revive Operation Shingle from a slow death. That at first Clark didn't realize the trouble the Salerno beachhead was in for those first few days. That it was a constant daily uphill battle to win a few feet of ground at the expense of many casualties. That it can also be said the Germans were equally successful in tying down the Allied forces in Italy. That Stalin favored Overlord over Italy not for its win possibilities but for it would keep the bulk of Allied forces away from Eastern Europe. There is so much more to learn from this book. There is few personal experiences shared and as an overview there is not much depth to the engagements but there are engagements, rivers, terrain and towns discussed that I haven't found in full length books. There are photos, an Order of Battle, a Notes section and an Index but there are no maps. If you're looking for a political and operational summary of this important campaign, you should definitely consider this book.

Mr.Hoyt's book is a welcome and needed history of the conflict in Italy. Discussion of the motives,tactics,and deployment are thourough. What is of great interest to me is the enormous amount of discord regarding this operation among the allies-- Churchill was for it, Ike was at best lukewarm, the british generals wanted to run it as did the americans. Ultimately, the allies proceeded with it because of Italy's collapse and the perception of an easy victory, plus the inability to open a front in the west in 1943. What occured, unfortunately, was a very long war of attrition against a worthy opponent -- Field Marshall Kesselring and some of the better components of the wehrmacht. The germans were able to contain the allies in superb defensive positions at Cassino and also at Anzio, where inadequate numbers and lackluster leadership led to bloody stalemate. Despite winning the war elsewhere, Italy was indeed the "backwater" of the war with more troops and munitions going to the war in the west as well as public attention--the capture of Rome becoming a historical footnote on the day before D-day. General Clark's portrayal as a glory hound and someone more than willing to use his soldiers in the pursuit of this[Rapido River is a good, but not the only example ] is evident in this book. The campaign remained costly in human lives and suffering for objectives increasingly of questionable strategic value until the end of the war. It would appear in retrospect the campaign was the product of misguided British ambition and American indecision and naievity, a quagmire that once entered, they could not extricate themselves from. In addition, one has to wonder if the men and material expended could not have been used more judisciously elsewhere in the ETO. That is what I think Mr. Hoyt conveyed in this landmark work on the war in Italy. It should be in every military historians' armamentarium without a doubt. I might add that the individual heroism of american and other allied soldiers is not questioned - quite the contrary - only their use by allied leaders in Italy.

Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-1945 by independent historian and author Edwin P. Hoyt is a meticulous and exacting survey and analysis of the campaign waged by Allied forces in Sicily and Italy. Combining extensive detail and military theory, Hoyt forcefully contends that the Normandy campaign was both unduly costly and ultimately unnecessary, and that in the final analysis it lengthened an already devastating war. An intriguing analysis, Backwater War is an impressive and welcome contribution to personal reading lists and Military History collections.