Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage

The authors in this book point out that if the South had focused on defending itself instead of attacking Union troops during battles (not even counting the two failed invasions of the North by Lee) they might have had a chance. Yet the authors also show that the South had no choice - their generals took from West Point (and the Mexican War) all the wrong lessons - that tactical offensive would always win the day. Before rifled weapons, when the musket was the main weapon of the ground forces, men COULD get close enough to use the bayonet and use it well. I have seen studies that showed many battles during the Pre-Rifle period (American Revolution, War of 1812) was decided by the bayonet - those killed were mostly killed by the bayonet. Muskets were too ineffective. Rifles changed all that. It changed everything but American generals, mostly those of the South, refused to change their ways. But then why didn't the people say something to make them change their ways? The authors suggest that this also had to do with the culture of the South - that they were Celtic in their ways and thoughts. So the people approved of the tactics, even when it meant defeat! While that part of the book seems weak, most of it I can agree with. This book DOES list a ton of facts and I suggest it only for those who already know a lot about the American Civil War.

Probably better suited for more serious students of the Civil War, "Attack and Die" by Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, provides an excellent expose' about how the Confederates "bled themselves nearly to death..." by attacking with greater frequency than their Northern counterparts. The book also presents a very compelling argument about how the use of outdated offensive tactics, learned during the Mexican War, and antiquated in the face of major technological improvements to muskets and cannon, had a devastating effect on the South. Another interesting, and controversial, aspect of the book is the authors' conclusion that the tendency for offensive warfare was deeply rooted in Southern culture, and Celtic heritage. While the authors lacked sufficient evidence to be convincing on this point, they were far more convincing about how the advent of the rifle made bayonet attacks obsolete, the offensive use of cavalry ineffective, and entrenchments and fieldworks highly prized by Northern commanders. Although, as the authors point out that there were good reasons for the South to adopt a defensive strategy, they elected to pursue the offensive to the detriment of their cause. Certainly, it is difficult to argue with the fact that the South lost 175,000 men during the first 27 months of the war due to their propensity for offensive action, or how they lost 97,000 men vs. 77,000 men for the North during the first twelve major battles of the war, or how Pickett's famous charge resulted in the loss of 62% of his command at Gettysburg. It's no wonder that these tactics prompted D.H. Hill to respond with, "it was not war, it was murder," in reference to the losses the Confederates took after repeated attacks against heavily entrenched Union troops on Malvern Hill on July 1, 1862.This book is an insightful and worthy addition to the study of Civil War strategy and tactics.

Attempts to explain why the South lost the Civil War have been a crowded cottage industry since the war ended. Northern industrial might, excessive Southern democracy, poor political leadership, faulty economic support, have all had their advocates and periods of popularity. Attack and Die is a fresh appraoch to the question. The analysis of McWhiney and Jamieson combines a shrewd analysis of southern culture, changes in military technology between 1846 and 1861, with an impressive array of statistics to explain the Southern defeat as springing from their dependence on outmoded tactics that worked in the Mexican War but did not work fifteen years later. The reason: the change in that fifteen years from the musket to the rifle as the basic infantry weapon. Studies like this demonstrate that there is still a vast amount of material to be collected, analysed, and theorized upon about our Civil War.

and it should be read in tandem with McWhiney's CRACKER CULTURE: Celtic Ways in the Old South, which expands upon this monograph's radical (to some) premises. But McWhiney and Jamieson elucidate what I've always suspected in a cogent and salient manner, and this book is a MUST for any Civil War buff of historian of American social history.Kevin McGowin

This book examines the disastrous Southern military tactics which cost the Confederacy its independence. McWhiney argues that the reason the South stuck to these tactics for so long had to do with the Celtic ancestry and folkways of Southerners and of Southern culture. His thesis is a bit of a stretch, unless one has read his other book, Cracker Culture, which argues the Southern-Celtic connection more convincingly. Nevertheless, this is a fascinating and vital book