The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon

Rothenberg expands on the typical Napoleon book about war by concentrating on the human factor by explaining what the soldiers went through in victory and defeat. Rothenberg also dissects the French Army like few of his contemporaries by starting with the pre-revolutionary make-up through the advances which made Napoleon famous and victorious. Well written and educational, necesary as a companion to other classics as Swords Around a Throne by Elting, How Far From Austerlitz by Horne, European Diplomacy by Ross, and biographies by Markham and Schom.

Gunther Rothenberg's "The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon" is a highly readable survey of the changes in the art of war during the 23-year conflict spawned by the French Revolution and the Wars of Napoleon. Despite its brevity, "The Art of Warfare" is remarkably comprehensive, addressing weapons, tactics, strategy, and supporting military services such as engineering and medical care. Rothenberg provides a short synopsis of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and commentary on the military establishments of the principal combatants. Rothenberg rightly devotes much of the book to the innovations of the French Army as it evolved under the necessity first of defending the Revolution and then under the hand of its martial Emperor, Napoleon I. The concept of the nation in arms made possible mass armies which often overwhelmed the small professional armies of its adversaries. Lack of training led to an emphasis on shock in battle, produced by fast moving infantry columns, massed artillery fire, and operational maneuver against the flanks and rear of opponents. Rothenberg notes the effects of a persistent French failure to build a robust supply system. French soldiers in the field were expected to forage to survive. The Army as a whole was forced to disperse to find food, and Napoleon had to rely on exquisite timing to mass his forces in time for battle. The lack of a supply train imparted operational mobility, but when foraging failed, as it did in Russia, or provoked guerrilla war, as it did in Spain, French soldiers starved or were picked off in ambush. The many success of the French Army prompted varying degrees of emulation by the Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and British armies. The Prussians sought most to copy the French methodology, while the British prefered to enhance the professionalism of their forces rather than build a mass army. Rothenberg wrote "The Art of Warfare" in 1978. Close students of the Napoleonic Wars will find a few mistakes, and the volume has a surprising number of misspellings. However, these imperfections really do not detract from what is an excellent work. This volume is highly recommended to the student looking for a manageable introduction to the Napoleonic Wars, and to the serious student as a superb companion volume to the longer operational-level histories. The casual reader with some background in military affairs may also find this book a worthwhile read.

I have several books titled 'Art of Warfare' covering several military history periods, and for the life of me I cannot understand why they are all so thinly bound! I wish Gunther Rothenberg had kept going, but perhaps there is only so much to say on certain topics without getting into the details of decisions made by the commanders themselves. In any case, this book is a prized part of my Napoleonic history collection, and serves as a useful complement to Elting's 'Swords around the Throne'.

Rothenberg's book is a highly respected source for those interested in the nuts and bolts of battle in the Napoleonic period. No maps or plates, not a general history. Often mentioned in bibliographies of more recent Napleonic works.