Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918

Gerald D. Feldman examined the dynamic triangular relationship of the German army, industry, and labor during the World War I period. The social and economic conditions of Germany during the time period beginning in 1914 and ending in 1918 are elucidated through this extensive study. Feldman has the advantage of the extensive West German archives, American libraries, and hindsight to explain the interactions between these three entities during the time period in question. Writing the book decades after the war, Feldman was able to evaluate the political arena knowing the results that each decision would have on the German republic and the war. The greatest fault in the sources is the lack of access Feldman had to Eastern German records. The book is broken into four parts, which correspond to the chronological order, and allow the section breaks to felicitously denote the shifting dynamic between the labor, army, and industry. The book allows the quiddity of the changing time periods to be dually noted by the section breaks.The progressing of the argument is built upon the well-supported fact that the failed military planning in World War I caused the political landscape to change. The political arena changed because the government could not solve the problems of the lack of food supplies, the distribution of food, the lack of arms, labor disputes, and a generally disgruntled public. At this point Germany became a military-run state; the office corps was negotiating the contracts and setting the terms not only for the economics of the war, but for the general German economy and social life. The first part of the book details the lack of competency in the Prussian War Ministry; they were ill prepared for World War I. However, this rather conservative ministry was so determined to succeed in modern warfare that it made concessions to labor despite the opposition of the industrialists. The industrialists were at odds with labor because the industrialists were concerned with profit only. The clash between these two opposing groups forced them each to play "pressure-group politics" with the military to gain individual advantages. If the army had been prepared for modern welfare the rise of labor would have never overcame the stranglehold the Prussian Junkers and industrialists had on the German government. The three-class electoral system allowed the avarice of these two groups (Prussian Junkers and industrialists) to influence politics for their own betterment. Once the military assumed responsibility for Germany the German office corps' lack of expertise in political affairs suffered even more because of their poor military and armament planning for the war. This very factor is what allowed labor to gain power in the pressure-group politics that defines this time period. The military's lack of military planning caused the industrialists to relegate power to labor. The industrialists were worried for their safety in a time of war. Th