Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000

This is the best historical narrative I had ever read on the subject. It does jingle very well with my own recollections about this period. It is informative with a lot of details. According to Mr.Kotkin the final stages of the collapse were two-fold: first commie-romantic-idiot Gorbachev destroyed whatever was remaining of the existing system while trying to improve it, and then the Soviet elite saw better prospects in joining Eltsin in finishing the system off instead of fighting for its meager spoils. There are a few amusing/annoying/bizarre parts. First, Mr.Kotkin seems genuinely upset that the system did not even try to use its repressive powers to preserve itself. Second, the author simply could not make himself to accept Soviet elite's switch to Eltsin as a reasonable action. Third he often goes off into incoherent ramblings condemning all parties including his fellow sovietologists. But again, the blemishes are minor and they are clearly separated from the presented narrative, which is simply superb in my view.

"...What no one, from national-security experts to ordinary citizens such as my mother, dared to dream was that within ten years of Brezhnev's death, the Soviet Union would collapse and simply cease to exist. How and why did this momentous event occur? Princeton University historian Stephen Kotkin takes up these salient questions in his concise, readable, and informative book Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000."Kotkin dismisses the oft-cited explanations that emphasize increased U.S. military spending and the failure of central planning, arguing that as late as 1985 the Soviet Union was `lethargically stable' (p. 2). Instead, he blames attempts -- first initiated by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization effort and culminating in Gorbachev's policies of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization -- to reform a system that was inherently incapable of reform. To offer only an explanation of the Soviet Union's collapse, no matter how compellingly argued, however, is unsatisfactory because that explanation leaves too many questions unanswered. Why were the reforms undertaken? Why did the Soviet elites not resist them? What effect did the Soviet legacy have on the reforms? By considering these questions, Kotkin provides a deeper understanding of the Soviet Union's astonishing collapse...."The man to undertake the reforms was Mikhail Gorbachev. Perhaps the most revealing comment on Gorbachev is a 1988 statement by Milovan Djilas that Kotkin quotes: `Gorbachev, unlike Brezhnev, strikes me as a true believer' (p. 31). Perhaps he was a true believer because, as Kotkin points out, he had witnessed many socialist and Soviet triumphs: for example, Sputnik, manned space flight, and communist takeovers in China and Cuba. Whatever the reason, this belief entailed that Gorbachev would not be satisfied with `lethargic stability.' He would seek reforms, and, unlike Khrushchev, he had the political skills to carry them through. Perhaps surprisingly, he attempted reform for a largely receptive population who maintained a `strong allegiance to socialism' (p. 44) despite deteriorating economic conditions (for example, it typically took ten years to get an apartment). Neither Gorbachev nor the populace realized that reform ultimately would lead to collapse...."According to Kotkin, what made Gorbachev's reforms so risky, far riskier than Gorbachev ever realized, was that he, unlike Khrushchev, did not have an ideological safety net. Whereas Khrushchev could say that socialism's failure was owing to Stalin and that reforms would restore `Leninism,' when Gorbachev acknowledged socialism's need for reform, the only possible conclusion was that socialism itself was inherently flawed. In the end, the Soviet Union could not afford the superpower competition. Its economy was underperforming, and its ideology was bankrupt. It withdrew from Afghanistan and gave up eastern Europe. In August 1991, conservatives tried to restore the old order, but their attempt failed with B

In a relatively short book, Stephen Kotkin brilliantly brings to light the economic and socio-political factors that led to the death of the Soviet Union, and how, unlike the violent demise of the former Yugoslavia, Gorbachev and other progressives in the Soviet government managed to turn the possible apocalyptic death of the Soviet experiment into a relatively peaceful half-transition to a market economy. Kotkin also explores how that transition crippled the pseudo-prosperity of the Soviet republics(though he focues primarily on the Russian SSR and the East European neo-states, with only moderate mentioning of the effects of the collapse to the Soviet Socialist Republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus). Professor Kotkin also exposes in an eye-opening view the failures of Perestroika(Gorbachevian Soviet Reform) and Glasnost(openness), and how Gorbachev attempted to steer the USSR's reform policies to reflect the true ideas of enlightened socialism. In addition, his description of the extent of corruption in post-Soviet Russia also makes you see how ineffective Russia's economic system really is. The book is a definitive description of the twilight time of the USSR, and is a must-read for those who wish to expand their knowledge of Soviet-era market reforms, and also for anyone who is outright curious about Soviet-era economic and political history.

How easy it is to forget recent history; how easy it is not to know what happened in the first place. Looking back at the collapse of the Soviet Union, we Americans think we had something to do with it. We think we "won" the cold war. Media reports at the time focused on our conduct, not what actually happened over there. Too many American's think that Reagan saying "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall" actually influenced Soviet policy. Kotkin, in his short, but detailed, book focuses on what happened in the Soviet Union, and why its collapse did not result in Armageddon. The story involves the ideals of Gorbachev, his political ability, the objectives of the Soviet leadership at a personal level, and a collapse that took decades and is continuing, but was inevitable because of the shortcommings of the system. It is ironic that the American political right which always predicted that a communist system could not work, fails to accept the Soviet collapse as a result of the failures of the system, and insists on claiming we caused it. We cannot understand the world today if we do not understand how and why things happen in other countries, and insist we are the cause of everything. It is unfortunate that there is no English language biography of Gorbachev that fully explains how someone brought up through the system came to the same conclusion as the American political right. At least with Kotkin's book, we have a descritpion of the events. It would be interesting to have a book that probes his personality and character.

I bought Armageddon Averted because I had to write a term paper on the fall of the Soviet Union. This book was far more useful than any of the readings that had been assigned in the class. Kotkin uses a very accessible, easily understood narrative to chronicle the fall of the Soviet Union. He begins with Brezhnev, so that the roots of later events can be better comprehended. He then proceeds to provide a chronology of the Soviet Union's fall, throwing in a tremendous amount of brilliantly trenchant observation and commentary.Kotkin's got a tremendous eye for telling and ironic detail that makes the book tremendously enjoyable, as well as enlightening.