Anticipating surprise: Analysis for strategic warning

2004's "Anticipating Surprise" is a distillation of a much larger, and classified, study on the challenge for the U.S. Intelligence Community of providing strategic warning. Author Cynthia Grabo's working experience covered the Cold War from Korea to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This condensed version, put together by the Joint Military Intelligence College, alludes to some later examples of warning problems. Those looking for quick and easy solutions to the conduct of analysis for strategic warning may be disappointed. As Grabo notes in a summary chapter, "Nothing is going to remove the uncertainties of the warning problem." Anticipating surprise is hard work; Grabo explores the topic in clear simple language, pointing out some reliable methods and some obvious pitfalls. After explaining the basics of the warning problem, Grabo devotes several chapters to the use of indicators of pending enemy action, whether military or political. She notes both the difficulty and the criticality of providing the decision-maker with a coherent, positive judgement on a warning problem. Grabo includes a remarkably lucid discussion on the problem of deception, the discouraging conclusion of which is how often deception is successful. A follow-on discussion on assigning probabilities to various outcomes is unusually accessible for what is often an arcane topic. A final chapter sums up the discussion and offers some take-away points for the professional practioner. "Anticipating Surprise" is very highly recommended professional reading for the intelligence officer. Persons in the academic community or the decision-making business may find this short book to be invaluable preparation for understanding more focused studies such as the report of the 9/11 Commission. This reviewer recommends reading it in conjunction with Roberta Wohlstetter's outstanding "Warning and Decision" dissection of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Just a note to say that I was pleasantly surprised at how quickly the book arrived. It was as-described in the posting. Many many stars to the dealer. JCG Washington, DC

If there was an intelligence failure associated with the 9/11 disaster it was a failure of intelligence warning. Yet in all the calls for intelligence reform that have been made since that disaster none have seriously addressed the issue of the analytic techniques for identifying and warning of potential threats to U.S. security. Cynthia Grabo took the concept of intelligence warning as deadly serious and, in the early 1970's, wrote down her observations on the best analytic practices for developing warning intelligence. She was, until her retirement in 1980, considered the final authority on warning intelligence. This book is an abridged and declassified summary of her work and her thinking on warning intelligence and is as valuable today as it was thirty years ago. Although the Cold War is long over the analytic techniques required to identify threats and build warning information are just as relevant today as they were in the 1970's. Unlike so many of the books and other documents on intelligence `reform', this book addresses the basics of analysis and actually deals with realistic processes of intelligence production. More importantly, it recognizes that analysis of warning intelligence is a unique set of skills and crafts that represent a specialized and relevant career field. If the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI) were actually a functioning organization this book should be read by DNI executives and its lesson applied to create a dedicated `intelligence warning' center as the principal center reporting to the DNI. Warning intelligence is no less relevant today than it was when Cynthia Grabo attempted to codify the methodologies of producing it. On a personnel note, this reviewer never had an opportunity to meet Ms. Grabo, but can testify to the fact that she and her writings were considered the definitive word on warning intelligence by many of us both during and after the Cold War.

This book is great on several counts: first, it was extremely readable without the jargon that usually comes with these types of books; secondly, this is a textbook that teaches you how to do intelligence analysis for forecasting; thirdly, it is realistic and the author's 30 years of experience comes through in the telling of examples and instruction; and finally, although the book was previously classified and sat on the shelf in the intelligence community for many, many years, it seems like it could have been the predecessor for the 9-11 Report. Overall, a real gem of a book for anyone interested in doing intelligence analysis or knowing how it is suppose to be done.