An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; In Two Treatises. in Which the Principles of the Late Earl of Shaftesbury Are Explain'

Chamberlin's text, published initially in 1950 by Regnery, appeared in paperback form as part of the "A Great Debate Book" series in 1962. This gem is today very long forgotten, and as the saying goes, ... we are doomed to repeat history by that fact. Chapter XIV "Crusade in Retrospect" is recommeded as the starting point in this text, and bears witness to this surmise. Of course, Chapter XI "Poland: The Great Betrayal" and Chapter IX "The Munich Called Yalta: War's End" only bring even more depth. Some other nuggets include, for example: Pages 340-341, as taken from Marshall's "Report on the Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific": "No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan ... When Italy entered the war Mussolini's strategic aims contemplated the expansion of his empire under the cloak of German military success. Field Marshall Keitel reveals that Italy's declaration of war was contrary to her agreement with Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree that it was undesired ... Nor is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan;. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea, and air forces in the Far East. In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan. Not only were the European partners of the Axis unable to coordinate their plans and resources and agree within their own nations how best to proceed, but the eastern partner, Japan, was working in even greater discord. The Axis as a matter of fact existed on paper only." This is followed by, also on page 341: 'So, in the judgment of General Marshall, the Axis did not represent a close-knit league, with a clear-cut plan for achieving world dormination, including the subjugation of the American continent. It was a loose association of powers with expansionist aims in Europe and the Far East.' Given the information above, Chapter V "Again and Again and Again" ends, on page 123, with: "That Roosevelt's deception was justified is open to debate. This is a question which everyone must answer on the basis of what America's Second Crusade cost, what it accomplished, what kind of world emerged from it, and how real was the danger against which it was undertaken."

Almost as tumultuous as the war itself, the postwar was no time for peace. "America's Second Crusade" is a reprint of William Henry Chamberlin's critically applauded book from after the end of World War II about the United States, Soviet Russia, and the United Kingdom's plans for peace following the massive world wide conflict. Critical of the concessions made to the soviets, "America's Second Crusade" is a window to the politics of the time, and a thought provoking read, recommended.