Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army

i would recommend this book to anyone who is interested in military strategy or ancient history. i read it in a day because i simply could not put it down. engels provides a case for alexander's movements based on what is logistically possible through the movement of troops and supplies. well researched (he pulls from sources as diverse as ancient greek text and us. army records), the book opened my eyes to what warfare in those days must truely entail. this is not an introductory book on alexander's campaigns, however. the author assumes you have good knowledge of what the pervailing theories are of the routes that he took, and doesn't waste time explaining details that might not be known to someone who hasn't already read and studied this time period.

Engel's little book is one the best investigations into the effects of logistical factors on warfare that I've ever read. Reducing the energy needs of any body of men and animals to a formula,applying logical constraints to deductions about the movement and function of these groups, and by rigorous historical investigation into the geography, history and climate of the relevant places involved, Engels picked out the motivations and concerns of Alexander (and his enemies) as he marched across the shuddering corpse of the Persian Empire. Don't be put off by the implied technical details above. This is a very readable book, a story, even. It's one of my favourite reads. Engel's conjectures are thought provoking, but always backed up by hard evidence. Anyone studying warfare in any time prior to the modern period (where trains and the internal combustion engine changed everything) needs to read this book to understand how things worked.

This book is very important. Supply and logisitics are VERY important to any military history and here it is! The book starts out with a general chapter on the Macedonian army and its logistic system (such as how much food the army needed, the time needed to rest and feed the animals, how fast it moved and the methods that could be used to deliver and transport such supplies needed by the men and animals). The other chapters deal with each region, for example Chapter 2 deals with how the system worked in Greece and Turkey, based on archaeological work done in Asia, careful study of the landscape, climate and the military operations carried out by Alexander. The Appendixs deal with such subjects such as rations and routes taken by the army. Along with 16 maps in the end, the tiny book, only about 194 pages long, is STUFFED full of data. It is a must for any fan of Alexander the Great or anybody into military history.A great book to read along with J.F.C. Fuller's 'The Generalship of Alexander the Great'.

Imagine this: You're Alexander the Great, setting out on campaign with your mighty army. Glory and profit await you if you succeed, and as you know from history, the real Alexander did succeed. His army was renowned for its efficiency, speed and lethality; his expedition through Asia was the longest military campaign ever undertaken; he fascinates military historians to this day. But when you put yourself in his place, ask yourself what was required of Alexander to realize his achievment. Was his fame won through superior force of men and arms alone? Could he take his army anywhere he desired, at any time? Had he merely to set his stern, clear gaze upon a point on the horizon and say: "There we shall go"--or was there more to it? Start with a mundane consideration: how do you feed your men? It's not as clear-cut as it might seem. Suppose you have an army of 10,000 men. Suppose, further, that each man's consumption rate is 3 pounds of grain per day's march. Now realize that this must mean just what the numbers tell you: each man of your 10,000 needs 3 pounds of grain daily, 3 times 10,000 is 30,000--so you need an incredible 30,000 pounds of food, each and every day. If you don't get this food, your men will weaken and die. There's no way around it. A quarter million pounds of food over the course of a week's march isn't easy to come by, especially in Alexander's day, is it? After all, you can't have the food airlifted to you. You have no motorized vehicles to speed you along, either, bear in mind. Your own feet must take you, slowly and over rough terrain in hot weather, to your destination. If and when you reach and conquer a town, its food stores become yours; but such settlements are few and far between, and practice subsistence level agriculture, in any case. Do your men carry all their food provisions with them? Food isn't all that your men must carry, and a man's back can only bear so much. Do you use pack animals? They have their own food requirements, which are greater than a man's, and in less time than you'd think they will eat what they haul. The fact is that waging war is never merely about raising an army and fighting an enemy; it's also about getting to the enemy without dying of dehydration and malnourishment along the way. How Alexander surmounted such problems of logistics--the supplying and transporting of his army--is the subject of Engels's fine book. With rigorous scholarship, utilizing sources both ancient and modern, including the most recent geographical and archaeological data, Engels shows that logistical concerns conditioned Alexander's every choice of strategy and tactics, timing and direction, necessitating the most careful, long-range planning. As Engels states, "a military route is not a mere line drawn on a map but a narrow corridor with sufficient agricultural and water resources in the immediate vicinity with which large numbers of men and animals can be supported.

Despite the somewhat obscure title, this is a great read. Engels traces the journey of Alexander and his army across Asia and, using mostly quantitative analysis, explains how they managed to keep themselves fed through it all. In some cases, as in the Gedrosian desert, they didn't -- with devastating results. I've read many books on Alexander but this offers a fresh perspective, explaining not only what happened but why it happened. If only more history were written this way.