Against Deconstruction

John Ellis has spent a long and distinguished career debunking what he saw as trendy, illogical, and just plain faulty theories of literary criticism. For him, if any theory purports to explain the relation that a text has with its readers, that theory should be able to withstand a rigorous dissection by those who are more interested in truth and logic than in following the crowd. In AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION, Ellis takes to task the theory called deconstruction, as initially promulgated by Jacques Derrida in 1966. Even before deconstruction took firm hold in academia, Ellis, in his earlier THE THEORY OF LITERARY CRITICISM (1974), sounded a warning that theories which claim a special exemption from analysis and wrap themselves in mystic splendor are likely to be far less sophisticated than at first glance. Ellis shows disdain for any theoretician who stridently asserts that "logic, reason, and analysis are insufficient to discuss Derrida" (9). He further takes offense at the prevalent mode of deconstructionist thought that implies it need do no more than dismantle previously existing worn-out theories without offering a viable and presumably more useful alternative. A recurrent theme, Ellis sees in Derrida, is the latter's refusal to investigate alternatives to his own animus toward logocentrism. Ellis also exposes Derrida as one who shamelessly claims to be a firm originator of a dramatic and even heroic basis for judging texts in terms of their inherent contradictions as indicated by their binary opposites. Such binaries, Ellis notes, are neither original with Derrida nor a particularly fruitful way to limit academic discourse to polar opposites while totally ignoring a vast range of shades of meaning that are interspersed between them. Finally, Ellis lists many rhetorical tricks, flourishes, and deceptive practices, all of which add up to a theory that has succeeded in entrenching itself in literary discourse despite its many flaws. Clearly, as long as Derrida's followers can repeat the mantra that "all interpretation is misinterpretation," then the validity of deconstruction as a useful tool in literary analysis will endure only for as long as it takes enough people to see that the literary emperor truly has no clothes.

There are many books, pro and con, about current literary theory. Most of them are written by literary academics. This one is by a philosopher. The significance of this difference is in the tools which the author brings to bear on the problems or on his intolerance of slipshod thinking and sleights of hand. This book is also rare in that respect. The usual attitude of professional philosophers to Derrida is to let his arguments "fall of their own weight." However, fervently held beliefs do not fall of their own weight or even by the weight of argument. Ellis is to be complimented, therefore, for the extreme patience he shows in plodding through every detail of the claims of Deconstructionism and painstakingly refuting each one. This book will, of course, have no effect on the true believers. Nothing will. But for the undecided and the not-yet-converted this book may be a lifesaver. In the end, Ellis concludes that genuine theory "ought to employ analysis rather than rhetorical drama." (p. 158). Instead, in Deconstructionism, "theory" becomes in large measure a new vehicle through which older, unthinking attitudes are clung to and genuine change resisted." (p. 154) Ellis' book is analytical rather than constructive. For constructive answers to the problems that led to Deconstructionism and the other newer attempts at theory, see A Book Worth Reading.

Because I've read the work of John M. Ellis very closely for several years (including *Against Deconstruction*), I'd like to offer a corrective or two to the review below. Just how carefully the reader read the text in question is unclear, but the review betrays some very fundamental confusions. For instance, the review states: "Twentieth century analytic philosophy has, with its emphasis on necessary connections between words and things, reduced the subtle beauty and infinite complexity of language to a stereo manual. Derrida is the greatest living philosopher of our current age, along with perhaps Noam Chomsky."Now, Derrida and Chomsky may or may not be great philosophers; what *is* certain is that their views of language are very much at odds. Derrida speaks of "infinite signification" in the absence of a "transcendent signifier"...a fancy way of saying that since words don't map directly or "neutrally" onto referents, then signification (meaning) is "infinite". On the other hand, Chomsky's UG (Univeral Grammar) argues for a "principles and perimeters" view of the brain and human intelligence: in plainer English, he means that the brain has discrete "modules" or sections that are responsible for equally discrete "modules" or sections of intelligence...so, for instance, one part of the brain handles syntax (grammar), while another handles spatio-visual data. This idea, take it or leave it, is very much like the "stereo" idea that the review below mocks...and the same review, of course, praises Chomsky. AND it categorizes Chomsky and Derrida as two great philosophers...well, given that the two are so much at odds, they can't *both* be on the money about language and signification. If Chomsky is right about language, then deconstruction is very much wrong, and visa versa. Yet the review lumps them together and shows no knowledge of the wide gulf between the two approaches.So, take the review below with a grain of salt, to say the least. Read *Against Deconstruction* yourself and make up your own mind. Whether you finally agree or disagree with Ellis's view of post-structuralism, you'll almost certainly learn an awful lot about language and linguistics; Ellis's rescue of Ferdinand de Saussure from the misunderstandings of poststructuralism alone is worth the price of the book.

John Ellis' book remains a good beginning for individuals caught up in the deconstruction phase of their lives. Deconstruction is simply untenable, and Ellis simply elucidates this. His arguments are clear, concise, and often redundant, but then this is the obverse of deconstruction, so it may need repeating. There are other challenges to deconstruction that Ellis does not make, challenges more in line with the philosophy of language and mind (e.g., Kripke, Searle, Ryle, et alia) that are more decisive, but also more complex. This simple tome, however, has enough to get one started, and if the deconstruction bug is still not eradicated, there are other compelling arguments elsewhere to bolster some of the gaps.

In this slim, clear-headed volume, John M. Ellis gives a strong and well-informed account of the many outstanding logical, philosophical, and critical-theoretic objections to Jacques Derrida's theory of deconstruction. Juxtaposing his own lucid common-sense forms of discourse and analysis with those of the deconstructive mode, Ellis seeks to demonstrate here that deconstruction's goals are not only unreachable, but also pointless to pursue: the rear cover excerpt speaks of the essential critical act of "finding the new, rather than debunking the old". And at that, the author excels."Against Deconstruction" is written in an exceedingly clear and precise scholarly style, one that tastes of cool, classical Greek rhetoric. Each sentence is an enjoyable lesson in how to write clearly and think sharply, as is Ellis' clean large-scale organization; for this reason alone I would recommend it as an instructive rhetorical model for students and writers. Ellis' mental camera zooms in on the contemporary critical scene, first documenting the strange patterns of denial and argument that have appeared since deconstruction's rise to popularity in world academe. Next he examines Derrida's brainchild itself, untangling the Gordian knot of deconstructive theory and practice. Moving from logic and reason to linguistics and interpretation, Ellis subjects deconstruction to a rigorous logical and historical analysis, finally diagnosing it as a reactionary product of the French educational system, a product that has little value anywhere outside that environment. In his judgment of deconstruction's proper place in the critical landscape, Ellis articulates an elegant set of criteria for such judgments, and there lies the book's best feature. His formulation asks, "How do we appraise a critical method? By what criteria do we judge the value of statements of critical theory, and individual works of criticism?" Ellis' answers to those questions are excellent and well-presented.