A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War

The problem with many books about WWII is that they tackle far more than could ever be effectively covered in one volume. WWII was more than just battles, it turned the global politcal/economic system on it's ear; it sparked drives for independence in dozens of countries while ripping empires apart; and it redefined the culture of practically every nation involved. As I have stated, when an author tries to tackle all these topics, they inevitably give many short shrift.The beauty of this work is that Murray and Millet focus solely on the military aspect of the war. In so doing they shed much needed light on some of the pivotal moments of the war, and the people involved. They have an obvious mastery of modern tactics, but the reader is never buried in an onslaught of military jargon. Furthermore, popular mythology surrounding the various personalities making the critical decisions of the war never colors their commentary. They go out of their way to judge each person on their merits, and their contribution to the war effort.They also do an excellent job of outlining the logistical battle waged by the allies. As a result of WWII, logistics is frequently referred to as an American military artform, and the authors do a superb job of explaining why that is the case.If you are looking for a broad history of WWII this isn't your book. But if you are a serious student of military history who wants to understand the strategy, tactics and personalities that determined the outcome of WWII, "A War to Be Won" is truly outstanding.

Dr. Murray and I appreciate the favorable readers' commentary on our history of World War II, and we often benefit from readers' suggestions for correction and improvement as the book moves into additional printings. I am distressed, however, that Mr. Shahid Zaki has misrepresented to you, and in personal correspondence to me, my analysis of the national composition of General Slim's Fourteenth Army in Burma, 1944-45 (pp. 489-92). First of all, I characterize Slim's army as "non-European" and credit it with the defeat of "the finest Asian army to take the field in modern times." I identify seven of Slim's twelve infantry divisions as part of the Indian Army, the force Mr. Zaki claims I slight. Mr. Zaki makes two errors in his commentary: (1) I do not say that the majority of Indian Army units were cavalry or armored regiments, but that among such mobile units in Slim's army, Indian Army units provided the majority. For the entire Indian Army, infantry predominated; (2) Mr. Zaki misses my other point, which was that Slim created a multi-national, multi-ethnic army that came to depend more and more on its Indian Army infantry battalions as the 1945 campaign developed. Initially, however, Slim created mixed infantry brigades that included one British battalion, one Gurkha battalion, and one Indian battalion. Unless one counts all the Gurkha battalions as Indian Army - which they were not - Indian Army infantry battalions were not in the majority when Slim's 1945 offensive began. Slim's two British divisions had sixteen European infantry battalions and three of other nationalities. His seven Indian Army divisions had nineteen British battalions, seventeen Gurkha Rifles battalions, and twenty-seven Indian Army battalions. One should add that Slim's most unappreciated force was two African divisions and an independent brigade, which provided twenty-one more non-European, but also non-Indian battalions. This calculation excludes General Orde Wingate's six-brigade (reinforced) Long Range Penetration Group, which included Gurkha but not Indian Army infantry battalions. Over the course of the 1945 campaign, General Slim placed increasing responsibility on his Indian Army infantry battalions as their combined arms, offensive capabilities improved. He could also draw Indian replacements or new battalions for his army, but not more British, Gurkhas, and Africans. Counting individual infantrymen (not battalions), I suspect Indians became the majority infantry nationality in Fourteenth Army by war's end. Nevertheless, Mr. Zaki is simply wrong when he claims "that the Fourteenth Army in Burma was comprised mostly of combat units of the Indian Army." Mr. Zaki makes a common error of military history non-professionals, which is accepting commercial publications as infallible sources of statistical and order-of-battle data. You may be sure that Dr. Murray and I have learned this lesson the hard way, but we learned

Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, two veteran American academic historians, are to be commended for producing this authoritative, one-volume military history of World War II. It is a wonderful achievement! Their book is nearly 600 pages long, and it would be impossible to address every issue in a brief, 1000-word review. I will, therefore, confine myself to the authors' treatment of the effectiveness of the United States' military operations, with the understanding that this is representative of the authors' approach to the broader issues and topics.According to the authors, "World War II was a conflict of resources as well as ideologies." Virtually every reader is familiar with the ideological dimension, but Murray and Millett focus much attention on the war's political economy. One of the Americans' greatest contributions to the Allied effort was, when possible, to address military problems "through their legendary productivity." The authors emphasize: "So vast was American war production that the United States not only armed itself but shared its output with the other Allies." Murray and Millett write: "Logistical superiority was crucial to the Allies' victory, and America's role as the `Arsenal of Democracy' made a crucial difference. Not only did the United States carry the burden of most of the naval campaign in the Pacific and an increasing load of the combat in Europe as the war progressed, but its Lend-Lease program was essential to the military operations of its allies and to the functioning of their wartime economies." There are numerous examples of the wartime application of American productivity. For instance, in 1940, over a year before the U.S. entered the war, it "recognized that the German assault on world shipping posed a significant threat to its own strategic position," and the Americans' development of the Liberty ship - which was constructed in sections and then welded together - proved to be a mass-production concept that revolutionized shipbuilding." Similarly, in April 1942, when, the "Navy was unprepared to handle the U-boat onslaught...for many reasons, including the fact that it had too few escorts," the United States embarked on a program to produce 60 escort vessels in 60 days, and when it achieved that goal, it announced another such program." According to Murray and Millett: "A major dimension of the industrialization of warfare was the commitment to develop and deploy new weapons that would give one's armed forces distinct operational and tactical advantages over the enemy," and, of course, the design and construction of the atomic bomb by an international team of scientists remains one of the most remarkable scientific and technological achievements of all time. Examining the war with Japan is the best way to assess American military performance during World War II because only in the Pacific did the United States fully deploy every element of its air, gro

This excellent book continues the approach to warfare taken by the authors in their outstanding three-volume edited series: "Military Effectiveness" published about a decade ago. That book looked at the First World War and the Second World War (including the interwar period) from the standpoint of each participating nation. It set up the standard of "military effectiveness", taken at the levels of grand strategy/national policy (to include industrial and economic preparation) strategy (operational war plans) and battlefield performance (operational or theater level of war and tactics of divisions to brigades). They have applied this thorough and enlightening analysis to the present volume. This focus makes for an excellent "operational history" of the war. The emphasis is on the work of armies, corps and divisions in theater-level operations, as opposed to the tales of derring-do at the company or platoon level. However, one gets a good sense of the plight of the men at the point of contact. The field commanders are thoroughly and fairly assessed. Montgomery, for example, is given his due as a great planner and a great leader of men, but a testy martinet when it came to inter-allied coordination. I would say that our British cousins would not find any Monty-bashing here. Rommel likewise is fairly handled. Guderian's halo is removed;his role as a "good Nazi" does not detract from his reputation as a hard-charger, but his brashness in dealing with his colleagues in other units is brought out. Throughout, there is a constant interplay between the pre-war plans and preparations with the results of each operation. National temperament and command styles are neatly summarized. There is no waste of words. The text is gripping, concise and lively. There are no anecdotal asides --- one gets the impression that these two are writing from accumulated expertise over a long period rather than from note cards with colorful "filler" spliced in-- a fault of too many World War II books of late. Appendices on military organization, weapons systems, the art of war and the documentary sources are mini-encyclopedia in themselves.This book is indeed the definitive book on how the "war to be won" was, in fact, won by the allies and lost by the Axis. Highly recommended for both the knowledgeable buff and the novice.

This is an amazing product by two of this country's most prolific military historians. Millett and Murray have teamed together before as teachers, lecturers and authors, but this is their finest hour. More than 600 pages, a dozen well crafted maps and 64 photographs are employed to produce a stunning operational narrative of this century's bloodiest and most deadly conflict. From the early days of the war in Europe to the final blasts in Japan, this duo combines their 50 years of teaching experience and punchy prose into a highly readable, entertaining and educating package. Nowhere will the reader find a better combination of sweeping coverage and sharp conclusions about all the Second World War's major campaigns and operations. Furthermore, nowhere will the reader find the striking and damning conclusions the author's lay at the feet of Generals Bradley and Clark, as well as the pithy and well earned barbs directed at Field Marshal Montgomery. This tightly composed volume is now and will be the best single volume operational history ever written on WWII. It will quickly displace the work of John Keegan and Gerhard Weinberg, and rightfully so. It will be enjoyed by veterans of the war, students of history, and all military professionals. Recent books by great historians like Stephen Ambrose have highlighted the human dimension of what the Greatest Generation was like and how they faced daunting demands of martial combat. In A War To Be Won you will find exactly what they faced and how it was done. Very few historians have the experience, breadth and tenacity to take on such a monumental history. This pair has done it and done it admirably. Their scholarship and insights will not be easily surpassed.