A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962

Alistair Horne's "A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962" was re-published last year and speaks to us clearly, yet again. This new edition includes the original preface written in 1977 in which the west was coping with its misunderstanding of the third world (most recently displayed in Vietnam). It also includes a preface to the 1996 edition, when Algeria was in the throes of another civil war, and brings us to the present with a new preface describing the post 9/11 world and parallels with the US-led effort in Iraq. Horne makes three key points in this regard: 1) In Algeria, once the FLN terrorists realized they could not effectively attack the French armed forces, they instead attacked the civilian populace loyal to the French. 2) FLN terrorists made maximum use of the porous borders of Algeria to gain sanctuary in Morocco and Tunisia. 3) The gradual appearance of torture and counter-torture in the morally degrading environment of Algeria gradually infected the French armed forces. The French military ultimately succeeded militarily in defeating the FLN terrorists and guerillas, but didn't win this war. This was largely because the methods that the French employed at the tactical level were at cross purposes to the larger political settlement that was required to solve the conflict. Horne brilliantly describes the Battle of Algiers and the successful tactics of the French paratroopers. Names such as Bigeard, Trinquier, and Massu loom large on these pages. But more importantly, Horne highlights how once the civil administrators in Algiers had given almost complete power to the army to restore order in Algiers, a Rubicon of sorts had been crossed and civil-military relations were never the same again. The military tactics of "clearing and holding" while capturing terrorists amongst the population created vast numbers of people who had been needlessly detained and pockets of refugees in certain parts of the country. Imprisonment and refugee camps were two environments in which radicalism and extremism fomented only to come roaring back in an even uglier form. In a diabolical paradox, the tactical successes the French Army achieved created the strategic and political conditions that prevented the emergence of a "moderate middle" that could negotiate and/or compromise an end to the conflict. Therefore, the methods of French military success actually hindered their overall effort. The book also has a great deal to say about the role of the French Army in the French nation. With the history of France from 1914 on not being one of great military triumphs, the Army was self-conscious of its ability to achieve victories for the state. At the same time, the government had gone through frequent turbulence by rotating through four different republics and, in the course of the Algerian War, the fall of the Fourth and rise of the Fifth Republic with the return of de Gaulle. Thus the French Army, particularly the elite units and

Alistair Horne's "A Savage War of Peace" -- a narrative of the Algerian death struggle with France in the 1950s and early 1960s -- is history at its finest. Clearly written, passionate and authoritative, this book is a shining example that objective and powerful history can be written on "current events" (the book was first published barely a decade after the French pulled out of Algeria).As the US-led coalition in Iraq struggles to impose order, comparisons with France's ultimately unsuccessful attempt at holding on to Algeria in the face of Islamic insurgents have become fashionable. Such analogies, however, should be used cautiously. There are a number of salient differences in the two cases. None looms larger than the relatively large and vocal pied noir community in Algeria that Paris had to contend with, first politically and then militarily. In some Algerian cities in the 1950s, such as Constantine, a majority of the residents were of European extraction (although not necessarily French). These pied noirs had roots in Algeria for generations and had a powerful lobby in Paris. A simple political withdrawal from Algeria in 1955 was thus (in my opinion) a political impossibility. The ugly war that erupted was, in the end, tragically unavoidable.Horne would certainly disagree with this assessment. Myopic intransigence by the French and pied noir leaders is a leitmotif of the narrative. Yet, the author just as consistently praises the FLN leadership for laying out their aims at the 1956 Soumman Conferences and never wavering from them. Algerian inflexibility, it seems, was a virtue; for the French/pied noir community it was a sin.There is so much to praise in Horne's work (the minor disagreement above notwithstanding) that no review, no matter how flattering, will fully do it justice. If you are student of military history or have a keen interest in colonial / counter-insurgency conflict, "A Savage War of Peace" is as good as it gets. Unfortunately, this book is no longer in print, so you may have to scour used bookstores and various online resources to obtain a copy, but it is worth the effort. There is also a decent chance it will be re-issued in the near future. Failing that, there is always the local library. The important thing is to get your hands on a copy. If you love history, you won't be disappointed.

Of all Horne's French histories, this is probably the most epic. The bleeding sore that was French Algeria led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic and almost led, on three separate occasions, to a right-wing military takeover of all metropolitan France. On the other side, the ruthlessly bloody tactics of the Algerian nationalist party, FLN, make the Viet Cong look chivalrous by comparison. There are many memorable characters in this story, including the pied noir supporters (Massu, Soustelle), the French Army leaders (Challe, Salan), and the Algerian leaders (Abbas, Ben Bella, Boumedienne). But the giant of the Algerian story is and will remain General Charles De Gaulle. His political comeback in 1958, during which he founded the Fifth Republic and made his historic address ("Je vous ai compris!") to the pied noirs, bisects the whole narrative: this book falls cleanly into two sections (before and after May 1958), and De Gaulle's leadership in extricating France out of this morass was and remains monumental.

I've read most of this author's works. His trilogy--The Fall of Paris, The Price of Glory, To Lose a Battle---is excellent, but the author reaches his pinnacle in "Savage War". He shows a masterful understanding of politics, strategy, tactics, and national feeling. I have met men who served under Salan, Massu, and Challe, and the portrayals of these leaders by the author harmonize with what I've been told. The subject may seem remote in time and in interest, but the author has written a gripping story, and also gets "down and dirty" into the details. This is a rewarding book for anyone with an interest in military as well as political history.