A Realist Conception of Truth

William Alston offers a minimalist account of the nature of truth, clearly distinguishing such an enterprise from epistemology. Alston gives a persuasive case for his alethic vision, challenging popular alternatives that tout deflationary and epistemic conceptions. While some might feel that he secures a rather thin account, it is indeed secure, offering a basis for further work and providing a difficult challenge for anti-realists. Also, those looking for critical interaction with the work of Hilary Putnam and Michael Dummett will find this book helpful.

Far from washing his hands, William Alston here undertakes to provide a defense of what is, after all, the most common-sense answer to this question. Offering up an account of what he calls "alethic [from the Greek word for 'truth'] realism," Alston maintains that a statement, proposition, or belief is true precisely in case it states the way things really are.By my reading, his account of truth falls somewhere between a "deflationary" theory and a full-blown "correspondence" theory. (Indeed, in his opening chapter, Alston briefly relates his own theory to each of these, and is at particular pains to distinguish his account from Alfred Tarski's superficially similar one). And in what I take to be an extremely important point, he insists that _propositions_ are the primary bearers of truth-value and provides a brief discussion of the ontological status of these interesting entities. (However, he concludes that his account does not depend on any particular theory of the latter, and also notes that his account would be essentially unchanged if something else -- sentences, say -- were taken to be the primary truth-bearers.)The meat of this volume consists of replies to various _epistemic_ accounts of truth -- that is, those which would conflate "truth" with some sort of epistemic status (Alston names "justification, certainty, knowledge, rationality, general consensus . . . "). Against such accounts, Alston insists that these epistemic categories are all very nice (and no doubt important as regards knowledge and its justification), but they form no part of the conception of truth itself; "[n]othing more is required for the truth of [a] statement, and nothing less will suffice," than that the statement's content actually _be_ the case.Many of his readers will be most interested in his replies to the anti-realist views of Michael Dummett and Hilary Putman in chapters 4-6, and indeed these replies are excellent. Moreover, his seventh chapter is a fine piece of work which shows, among other things, that "epistemic" conceptions of truth one and all presuppose his own "alethic" account. And his closing chapter on the _importance_ of truth is an effective reply to those who would de-emphasize the concept for various reasons.However, my own interest is largely in Alston's third chapter, in which he deals with "an epistemic objection to alethic realism." On the whole this is a fine chapter, in which he shows (pretty successfully) that his "alethic realism" does not require either "unmediated" or "infallible" access to "facts."My interest here is that he takes, as his foil, the views of Brand Blanshard as expressed in his 1939 work, _The Nature of Thought_. As I am a longtime reader and admirer of Blanshard, I must pick on Alston a bit here.I must admit at once that _some_ (not by any means most or all!) of Alston's points are very well taken. However, I think he could have strengthened his case further if -- instead of