A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law

This book was not exactly what I expected; it was better. It contains an essay by Justice Scalia about the judicial role in deciding statutory and constitutional questions. His essay is followed by comments by other individuals which, in turn, is followed by Justice Scalia's response. The most fascinating part of the entire book was the recognition by the writers that judges have taken it upon themselves to legislate and decide what government policy "ought to be" in rendering judicial decisions. Some of the writers seem to think this is acceptable and expected. To an attorney who has watched courts reach intellectually dishonest decisions in cases where there is potential economic or political impact (for example, one appellate court went so far as to render an unpublished opinion in one case -- apparently to conceal its dishonesty in letting a state divert millions of dollars from a state retirement plan -- then followed up a few months later with a published opinion by the same judges with a precisely opposite holding on an important legal question decided in the first case), the concerns expressed by Justice Scalia were more than theoretical. While our legislators may not be the sharpest knives in the drawer, at least voters can remove them from office or persuade them to change their minds. There is no such opportunity with unelected judges who not only can manipulate facts and law in their rulings, but can issue decisions that never see the light of day and thus escape public scrutiny. Both liberals and conservatives have plenty to fear from judges who believe that they are a law unto themsleves.

I think that it is good to read widely and get divergent perspectives. Thus, Christians and Jews should read the Quran and Muslims should read the Torah and the New Testament. Conservatives should read the Nation or the New Republic and visit the DailyKos website and liberals should read the Weekly Standard or National Review and visit RealClearPolitics. The same perspective applies with Breyer's book. Regardless of your perspective, you should read this brief and easily understandable statement of judicial philosophy from a sitting Supreme Court justice. (And, it would also be good to read the counterpoint from Justice Breyer for the same reasons.) I find this book to be a more interesting and powerful presentation than the recent book by Justice Breyer. In Breyer's book we read just his perspective and much of it is a response to this book by Scalia. In Scalia's book we are given Scalia's approach to judging and then we are given critical responses to that approach by several different authors, not all judges themselves. It is clear that Scalia likes the clash of argument and finds great benefit in that clash. This book is brief and extremely well written so that even someone untrained in law can still easily follow the arguments and counterarguments. Anyone interested in our Supreme Court would find this book (and Breyer's) to be extremely useful and enlightening. For myself, I found that reading both books left me believing that while both Justices approach the world in different ways, we are in good hands. Given the incredibly politicization of the Supreme Court, I found these books to be reassuring of the intelligence, character, and skill of these two Justices.

I loved the format of the book! Scalia presents his judicial interpretative process, and honestly admits hypocrisy when he occasionally votes ideology rather than using his system. Then, rather than providing a half-hearted attack on his ideological opponents, he invites them to respond to his thesis, each with their own chapter! You may not agree with Scalia, but you can't doubt his moral courage based on his invitation for criticism in his own book. I also appreciated the chapter on the structure of Germany's Constitution to help us understand why principle, rather than statue, plays such a big role in American judicial interpretative processes. Everyone that cares about the Supreme Court should read this book. I have yet to find a better book to learn the motivations and processes utilized by each ideological camp. After reading this book, my ability to understand the logic of the court, for both rulings and the opinions, has been greatly enhanced. While unintended, Scalia also helped cement my personal belief that a blend of original meaning (aka textualism) and abstract principalism, and not Scalia's textualist approach alone, is by far the optimal method for judicial interpretation based on our Constitution.

This book is a real treat for anyone who loves legal (constitutional that is) thought. It would also make a great introduction into what several of the greatest thinkers in the Anglo-American legal profession think. The book is mainly a lecture by Scalia where he lays out his theory of 'textualism,' that is closely grounding constitutional interpretation to the original meaning of the words of the constitutional (or statutory) text. It is a spirited explanation of the theory and includes defenses against some of the more common attacks on the theory. But the book gets better. Four legal experts, Laruence Tribe, Ronald Dworkin, a historian and Glendon all give their comments on textualism. Scalia then replies to these comments at the end. A wonderful look into debate between five incredible minds who often diasgree.

Thirty-one years after the resignation of Earl Warren and the ascension of Warren Burger as Chief Justice of the United States, judicial activism continues apace. The signs are everywhere today in the headlines: One day we read that the people of California that they cannot deny illegal aliens non-emergency welfare benefits, the next day that they cannot refuse to take account of a person's race in public education and hiring; the day before last, that the people of Arkansas cannot limit the terms of their own congressional representatives; thereafter, we learned that the people of Colorado cannot constitutionally withhold privileged legal status from homosexuals. Day by day the republican ideal of the American constitutional order erodes as evermore precincts of our politics and policy are drawn under the superintendence of what Nathan Glazer has called the Imperial Judiciary. The present moment is auspicious for an affirmation of judicial restraint in a democratic society increasingly enveloped by a juridical ethic that the federal constitution is an "evolutionary" -- perhaps revolutionary -- document, the meaning of whose provisions are determined principally by our law-trained elite -- lawyers, law professors and judges. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and America's foremost conservative jurist, has done just that in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, a thin volume that contains his lively and lucid defense of textualism and originalism in constitutional interpretation, along with the commentary of four academics -- Laurence Tribe, Ronald Dworkin, Mary Ann Glendon, and Gordon Wood. Swords ring clearest when the Justice responds to his critics in a concluding essay, in parts sharp, witty and sound. No less than Judge Robert Bork's 1990 bestseller The Tempting of America, Justice Scalia's essay and response to his critics is easily accessible to the general reader. Judicial activism is a term of abuse -- in some quarters, approbation -- almost as often used as misconceived. A favorite trope of the juridical left is that conservative jurists and academics are in fact the true radicals, intent on effacing at least the last forty years of development in constitutional jurisprudence. This, of course, is a Merriam Webster kind of conservatism, one that conserves the status quo, be it decadent or virtuous. The interpretive philosophies of originalism and textualism espoused by Justice Scalia and others, however, are calibrated to conserve the constitutional order of the Founders by confining judicial decisions to the text of the Constitution, as its provisions were generally understood by those whose consent made it law. Judicial activism is measured by the variance of court decisions from the limited range of meaning which the Constitution's text, properly understood, can bear, and not by their variance from certain decisions of the Warren Court or other extra-constitutional principles now in vo