A History of Warfare

Few books in the market provide a better general overview of the history of warfare since the dawn of war-making. In this ambitious piece of work, Keegan ranges effortlessly across epochs and continents to tell the story of more than four millennia of world history. If all this sounds a little daunting, the book is written in an accessible style that constantly engages the reader and ensures that you'd probably not need to go over a paragraph twice. One of the great strengths of the book is its thematic layout. What might have been a long and humdrum narrative is enlivened by intelligent chapter divisions that deal with the different `ages' in warfare according to specific themes. This breaks the account into more manageable portions. The overall structure and coherence of the narrative is always preserved. Keegan offers something more for the informed reader through the inroads he makes into military philosophy. Notably, he highlights the limitations of Clausewitz's `war is merely a continuation of politics' by demonstrating the intimate connections between war-making and culture. This book is a must-read for any military history enthusiast, or anyone else interested in a first taste of this genre.

The book deserves a place among Keegan's other classics, "The Face of Battle" and "The Mask of Command". He has proved once again that he is the preeminent military historian in the world today, perhaps of all time. Because of the book's daunting scope--covering warfare from prehistoric times to the nuclear age--it is not overly specific. However, Keegan weaves the story of war with the story of human civilization very nicely, and proves that for most of our history, war has been our primary occupation. He denounce's Clauswitz' theory that war is merely the continuation of politics by showing it is something much more basic. War, according to Keegan is cultural. Wars may be fought for political reasons he says, but the driving force behind them is a nation's/people's culture. If you do not believe in this theory or are just a big fan of Clauswitz, this book is still a fascinating read because it connects the whole history of war in one relatively slim volume. This is a rare accomplishment, and it provides and excellent base of study for any time period of history.As for presentation, the book is divided into four main parts with interludes between them, discussing the major advances in military technology. Titled Stone, Flesh, Iron, and Fire, he mainly discusses the advance of weapons from bronze, to iron, to gunpowder, the rise and fall of the horse, and the institution of national armies as major turning points. The book can drag at some points, but on the whole is a quick read, though you may want to read some parts twice just because there is a lot of information here. In short this is a must own for any history buff!

Most of the negative commentary you will see by customers revolves around Keegan's blasting of Clausewitz. Because there are a lot of Clausewitz fans who don't take kindly to the criticism. What is really the case, however, is that Keegan is merely [mis]reading Clausewitz in much the same manner that ultra-rationalist military commanders of all stripes have [mis]read Clausewitz for far too many decades. The only thing Keegan does differently, after [mis]interpreting Clausewitz in much the same manner, is to then shows how fallacious the logic is. It is true that Clausewitz included many qualifying phrases, and Keegan somewhat conveniently overlooks them. But the fact that Keegan overlooks them is a mere reflection on how so many military commanders also overlooked them, and I can hardly blame Keegan for the same mistaken intrepretations *MORE THAN* I blame all those military thinkers who were too quick to cut to the chase scene on Clausewitz's meaning. And all of that is but a small portion of the book. If you overlook that part, the book is absolutely fantastic, a completely riveting read. Keegan uses the rest of the book to illustrate historic examples that refute the ultra-rationalist approach, and then builds an alternate approach to undertsanding the nature and sources of warfare.But if you find yourself really annoyed by Keegan's attack on Clausewitz, because you think the attack is richly undeserved, then you won't be able to get out of the starting gate. You'll detest the misintrepretation, and perhaps that will be enough to ruin the rest of the book for you.Which is really too bad because, at its core, Keegan's book is an utterly fantastic tour through a history of warfare. I would go on, but read some of the other comments for a more substantive review of the book's contents. My purpose was merely to clarify the source from which most of the negative reviews came.

Well written text which should be, and probably is, basic text for War College class reading. Excellent criticism of Clauswitz, explaining later frustrations such as Korea, Vietnam, and Afganistan. Too critical of Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," not fully appreciative of his contribution. Sun Tzu does believe in a decisive battle, the heart of the Clauswitz philosophy, he also recognizes the full spectrum of war. Seldom, he would say, is decisive battle possible. This is what we see in modern war, since WWII. Keegan reconizes this in his conclusions, but does not explain well the Chinese philosophy. Good luck, it is an excellent text, very articulate and readable.As an ex-military officer, I hope they include this material in War College material.Dirk Willard

Having finished my fourth reading of this outstanding book, I am again in awe of Keegan, who not only tackles a daunting subject --- nothing less than the entire history of armed conflict, from the dim mists of prehistory to the recent strife in the Balkans --- but manages to put it all into an impressively brief, insightful and readable narrative. Keegan does not debunk Clausewitz; rather, he shows him to have been a product of his age, his class and his nation, and his writings to have been suited to the post-Napoleonic era, but potentially disastrous in the Nuclear Age. (If international success is the same as military success today, than how can Saddam Hussein still be the leader of Iraq?) By approaching warfare as social and cultural anthropology (rather than from the far more narrow --- not to say blindered --- perspective of military theory alone), Keegan is able to show how each society's expression of warfare is both unique and has ramifications and consequences for all other societies, especially including our own. Buy and read this book. You'll be glad you did.