A Grand Delusion: America's Descent Into Vietnam

Sure the book is lengthy, but so was American involvement in Vietnam. The value of Mann's work is as a single volume history that focuses laser-like on the backdoor political story, an aspect of the conflict that usually gets much less attention than headline-grabbing military or protest developments. All in all, the book sheds much needed light on 30 years of deceitful shenanigans in Washington that left 3,000,000 Vietnamese dead, 50,000 Americans dead, and generations of wounds, emotional and physical, that will probably never heal. As the book shows, Americans are correct in not trusting their government, especially as it behaves abroad. Mann walks us through a revealing series of presidential administrations and policies, starting with Truman's, and ending with Ford's. Each has a role in gearing up the meat grinder, some more honorably than others, but none comes off looking good as the country spirals ever downward toward disillusion and defeat. Ditto for the senators who opposed the war (Fulbright, Mc Govern, Mansfield, et. al.), lawmakers who, despite hours of pious rhetoric, could never get their legislative act together. Scarce mention is made of military or protest developments except when either influences major political decisions. As a much needed political chronicle of that 30 year span, the book succeeds admirably. Mann's perspective is primarily a liberal one (which probably explains one particularly misleading review), but favors no individuals, liberal, conservative, or radical. He emphasizes the extent to which official hands were tied by red-baiting rhetoric of the cold war, in which every communist, be he nationalist or internationalist, was seen as taking his marching orders from Moscow. Such cramped thinking refused to distinguish a national liberation movement from an international communist conspiracy, thereby setting policy on a one way track from which there was no exit. On these matters, Mann is on solid ground. But on the allied topic of the domino theory, there is more truth to that theory than liberals such as Mann like to admit. The problem for defenders of the theory is that southeast Asia is not where the dominoes fell. Rather they fell in Central Africa (Angola, Mozambique, the collapse of the Portuguese empire) and Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador, to a degree Guatemala). As more recent documentation has shown, rebel movements in each of these contested venues were boosted considerably by US defeat, demoralization, and subsequent lessening of a will to intervene. So in the rather ironical sense of being right for the wrong reasons, conservatives understood better than liberals the global stakes of intervention in southeast Asia. Be that as it may, Mann has written a very readable and revealing account of how Washington got us into that bloody mess in the first place.

A riveting narrative and an encyclopedic source of information regarding how we became involved in Vietnam, including who made the decisions each step of the way, and why they made them. Unprecedented, definitive and indispensible to anyone interested in both politics and the war in Vietnam. Although the book has been criticized for leaving out other subjects relating to the war, such as its impact on the U.S., and the details of the fighting in Vietnam, those topics were properly left by the author to be treated elsewhere. A true masterpiece!

This is a wondeful book, very well written, and readable. Because it's written by someone who has worked in Washington and knows the political process, I gained a surprising understanding of the political machinations and intrigue behind our involvement in Vietnam. Mann clearly understands that his readership is not the professional historians, but the casual reader and people, like me, who are devoted afficiandos of Vietnam lore.If you are interested in congressional history, this book will also be appealing. In addition to discussing Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, Mann also devotes more attention to the congressional side of Vietnam than anything I've ever read. Mansfield, Fulbright, McGovern, Church, Morse, Russell and others are very prominent characters and central to the story.At times I thought this read like a novel.

The domestic American politics of the Vietnam War has been largely ignored by so many myopic historians who have devoted most of their time to diplomatic and military histories of the war. Many of those histories are also ideologically tainted and repetitive.Thanks to political historian Robert Mann, we now have a truly fresh, non-ideological pespective on the war. His very readable, well-written political history will undoubtedly change the way we look at this tragic episode. Mann's masterful account helps the reader understand the whys and hows of one of our nation's most politically charged military conflicts. He does a wonderful job of explaining how presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon were haunted by the political ghosts of the political turmoil over encroaching communism in Asia in the early 1950s. The political damage suffered by Harry Truman and his Democratic Party in the 1950 and 1952 elections remained strong memories for future presidents who were determined not to let the same fate befall them.This book will likely challenge the well-worn and politically motivated views about Vietnam that have been peddled by diplomatic and military historians who have ignored this important aspect of the war for much too long. Mann's provocative and controversial views will likely offend some and challenge the long-held views of others, many of whom are still captured by the "grand delusions" of Vietnam. In many ways, he is as critical of the war's opponents, as its mindless advocates.This excellent and groundbreaking work is a very welcome addition to the historiography of the Vietnam War and is a must for any Vietnam War collection.

Let me start by saying that this is a long book, a very long book. As it should be. Starting with the "roots" of the war, specifically the fallout over Truman's so-called "loss" of China, Mann takes us through every twist and turn of political thought and action behind the war, covering the period from the late 1940s to April 29, 1975. The great value of the book and its length is that Mann frequently makes wonderful connections between events of different times. This is the best pure political history of the war, and as such should be a must-read for anyone wishing to understand why it unfolded as it did.