1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East

Tom Segev is brilliant, and really knows his stuff. History reading like a novel; but filled -- filled -- with facts backed up by pages and pages of citations. Nonetheless, an unbiased and fair report of what really happened during this time period. Human, humane, and humanizing. If possible, read Segev's "1948" first.

Mr. Segev has given readers another look into Israeli society and history. What I really liked about this book is how the author tackles the topic from all facets of Israeli society. He doesn't simply chronicle the decision making process among the leaders of Israeli society, but instead attempts to chronicle the story as seen by all Israelis. In doing so the author has written a psychological history as much as anything else. By going through letters, diaries, newspaper headlines and combing through government archives Mr. Segev attempts to give the reader an inside look at what was happening with Israeli society before, during and immediately after the Six Day War. He uses soldiers diaries to give the reader a sense of what they were fighting for and what they thought. He uses correspondence between relatives in Israel and abroad to show the mood of the Israeli people. He writes of the elitism of Ashkenazi and the impoverishment of the Mizrahi Jews. The feeling of gloom and failure of the Zionist dream seems almost palpable. The Zionist dream seems to have stalled after hitting the harsh realities. Israel's great leaders had gone into semi-retirement (although never really far from center stage). The recession on top of all the other real problems created a depressing mood on the eve of Israel's most resounding triumph. Mr. Segev does a great job detailing all of this, and he goes deep into the elites feelings and decision making process in the lead up to the war. But I had some serious problems with some of the history presented here. During the lead up to war Segev paints a picture of indecision and fear among the ministers. He writes about all night ministerial cessions discussing the dangers of war. The reader gets a picture of a government besieged by their own generals demanding immediate action and enemies that surround them ready to crush Israel in a single blow. The military leaders pushing for action and insisting that every delay brings Israel that much closer to total annihilation. At the same time Israel's enemies are pushing for war. The problem I have is this is contrary to everything I have ever read on the situation, and in the book Mr. Segev gives readers hints to the false picture. He writes about a CIA man living in Israel who advises his Israeli neighbor on how to properly dig a trench in preparation for the oncoming war, but then tells the man there is no need in digging the trench since Israel will have won the war in a week anyways. He also writes about a U.S. assessment that basically gives the same time line. At one point he writes that Eshkol knew that the generals were exaggerating about the dangers they faced. Not only that but every account from Egyptian point of view I have read speaks of the fact that Nasser felt himself pushed into a war he couldn't win by the Syrians. Nasser knew he couldn't win which is why he made conciliatory offers such as allowing Israeli shipping to pass but with

Rated by the Economist Magazine as one of the best books of 2007, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East provides exactly what it tries to provide, an insight into how the "Six Day War" affected Israel. I recommend this book to anyone who wants to gain a greater understanding of Israel and their view of the Middle East. This book also provides an inside look into Israeli politics now and then.

This good book is a combined political and social history of Israel before, during, and after the Six Day War. Segev presents a detailed portrait of Israeli society and politics as being in the throes of a major transition. In 1966, Israel was in something of a funk. A major recession caused considerable distress, immigration had slowed, Israeli society was having difficulty assimilating Middle Eastern immigrants, and the Ashkenazi political elite was aging. Against this background, Segev describes the crisis with the Arab states primarily in terms of internal Israeli politics and the difficut decision to take preemptive action. Segev does well in describing the complex political dynamics of politics leading up to the war and the decision to go to war. Segev sees internal Israeli politics as the major driver of the decision to go to war. He asserts that the war was avoidable and clearly sees the Israelis as the major decision makers. These views, however, are only assertions. Segev presents no real discussion of this contentious issue. A major problem with his assertion is that there is no discussion of the war from the Arab point of view or any documentation about Arab decision making. The issue of whether or not the war was avoidable, however, is not really the focus of the book. Segev's recurrent theme, which runs throughout the whole book and emerges most strongly in the final sections, is the internal contradictions of the Zionist ideal. The Zionists exhibited a quasi-mystical desire to possess Palestine but also wished to establish a European style democratic state. This second goal, however, conflicted with the reality that fulfillment of the Zionist project meant the involuntary displacement of Palestinian Arabs. The best parts of the book are the later parts dealing with aftermath of the war and the initial occupation. Segev rebuts the myth that the Israeli government offered to restore the conquests in exchange for peace. His description of the beginnings of the occupation is useful for explaining the genesis of the present disastrous situation. As a social history and description of Israeli politics, this book is very good. In terms of the genesis of the war, Segev is unconvincing because he doesn't present any real data. I recommend reading this book in conjunction with Michael Oren's Six Days in June. Oren's book is a more conventional diplomatic and political history of the war. Unlike Segev, Oren did make an effort to examine Arab sources and his conclusion is that the state of Israel faced an 'existential' threat.

Segev, Tom. "1967: Israel, War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East", Metropolitan Books, 2007. Bringing Back Memories Amos Lassen and Literary Pride I moved to Israel in 1967, three days before the famous and legendary "Six Day War" began. Reading Tom Segev's monumental 671 page "1967", I realized how both I and the country changed as a result of that war. Israel and I were young back then; I had my newly granted Master of Arts degree in my hands and Israel (created in 1948) was beginning to find her place among the nations of the world. When the war began, Israel was naïve but militarily strong and I had been the "cockeyed optimist" who had emigrated because of idealistic notions of helping to build the Jewish state. We both got slapped across the face and there was no turning back. Both of our naivetes were tested. Israel now knew that her place in the world was insecure and I knew that I had finally found the place I wanted to call home (and home it was for me for the following 30 years). The war made both of us become adults very quickly. Segev gives us an intimate look at Israel because as a sabra (native born Israeli) he had access to the files and letters about the war and he presents a vivid picture of the country in the years before the war. He examines what led to the war ad spends pages recounting all of the miscalculations that caused the war to break out. The book is not really about the nation of Israel in its entirety. Segev instead writes about the eastern-European settlers who fled war-torn Germany, Austria and Poland and settled on the kibbutzim (communal farms). Being from eastern European family ties myself, you can see and havig settled on a kibbutz in the north of Israel, you can guess where my sympathies lie. The problem here is that those settlers only represent a tenth of the population of Israel--those nationalistic Jews who ate, drank and dreamt idealism and socialism and virtually ignores the other 90% of the population which comprise a group of a dozen or so languages and who came from over 50 various countries. Nevertheless this is an intense and readable look at the country biased as it may be. It is an examination of almost every aspect of life and deals with the culture and lifestyles of the citizens of the new country who face war just as we face peace. The Arab nations who went to war with Israel in 1967 had been begging for a war to break out--their hatred of the Jewish state was that intense. They were sure, without a shadow of a doubt, that they could defeat the tiny country. Segev maintains that the war was not inevitable (the view held by most is that the war had to happen to secure Israel's place in the world). He states, quite empathically, that if the Ashkenazi Jews (those Eastern European settlers) had just ignored the Egyptian military build-up in the Sinai Peninsula, the blockade and the exit of the United Nations, the war could have been prevented. Looking back now, that is an easy as